bpf: Check for BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO when bpf_skb_change_proto
In the forwarding path GRO -> BPF 6 to 4 -> GSO for TCP traffic, the coalesced packet payload can be > MSS, but < MSS + 20. bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4() will upgrade the MSS and it can be > the payload length. After then tcp_gso_segment checks for the payload length if it is <= MSS. The condition is causing the packet to be dropped. tcp_gso_segment(): [...] mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size; if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss)) goto out; [...] Allow to upgrade/downgrade MSS only when BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO is not set. Signed-off-by: Dongseok Yi <dseok.yi@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1620804453-57566-1-git-send-email-dseok.yi@samsung.com
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@ -3235,7 +3235,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_net_hdr_pop(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off, u32 len)
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return ret;
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}
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static int bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(struct sk_buff *skb)
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static int bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(struct sk_buff *skb, u64 flags)
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{
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const u32 len_diff = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(struct iphdr);
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u32 off = skb_mac_header_len(skb);
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@ -3264,7 +3264,9 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(struct sk_buff *skb)
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}
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/* Due to IPv6 header, MSS needs to be downgraded. */
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skb_decrease_gso_size(shinfo, len_diff);
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if (!(flags & BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO))
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skb_decrease_gso_size(shinfo, len_diff);
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/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs recomputed. */
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shinfo->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
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shinfo->gso_segs = 0;
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@ -3276,7 +3278,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(struct sk_buff *skb)
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return 0;
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}
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static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb)
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static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb, u64 flags)
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{
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const u32 len_diff = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(struct iphdr);
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u32 off = skb_mac_header_len(skb);
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@ -3305,7 +3307,9 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb)
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}
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/* Due to IPv4 header, MSS can be upgraded. */
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skb_increase_gso_size(shinfo, len_diff);
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if (!(flags & BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO))
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skb_increase_gso_size(shinfo, len_diff);
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/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs recomputed. */
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shinfo->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
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shinfo->gso_segs = 0;
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@ -3317,17 +3321,17 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb)
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return 0;
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}
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static int bpf_skb_proto_xlat(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 to_proto)
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static int bpf_skb_proto_xlat(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 to_proto, u64 flags)
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{
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__be16 from_proto = skb->protocol;
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if (from_proto == htons(ETH_P_IP) &&
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to_proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
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return bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(skb);
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return bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(skb, flags);
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if (from_proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) &&
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to_proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
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return bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(skb);
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return bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(skb, flags);
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return -ENOTSUPP;
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}
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@ -3337,7 +3341,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_skb_change_proto, struct sk_buff *, skb, __be16, proto,
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{
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int ret;
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if (unlikely(flags))
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if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO)))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* General idea is that this helper does the basic groundwork
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@ -3357,7 +3361,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_skb_change_proto, struct sk_buff *, skb, __be16, proto,
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* that. For offloads, we mark packet as dodgy, so that headers
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* need to be verified first.
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*/
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ret = bpf_skb_proto_xlat(skb, proto);
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ret = bpf_skb_proto_xlat(skb, proto, flags);
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bpf_compute_data_pointers(skb);
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return ret;
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}
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