Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and
additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes. Also,
bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies
by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information. However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff. This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.
Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume
future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.
An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.
An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes. The three choices for the
policy flags are
0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access
The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs. /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.
(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.
This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.
The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The structure is as follows (relative to selinuxfs root):
/class/file/index
/class/file/perms/read
/class/file/perms/write
...
Each class is allocated 33 inodes, 1 for the class index and 32 for
permissions. Relative to SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET, the inode of the index file
DIV 33 is the class number. The inode of the permission file % 33 is the
index of the permission for that class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes,
and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make the initial SID contexts accessible to userspace via selinuxfs.
An initial use of this support will be to make the unlabeled context
available to libselinux for use for invalidated userspace SIDs.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel
as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission
definitions and userland definitions may change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In the beginning I named the file selinux_netlabel.h to avoid potential
namespace colisions. However, over time I have realized that there are several
other similar cases of multiple header files with the same name so I'm changing
the name to something which better fits with existing naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to
SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for
various reasons is not really ideal. This patch makes an effort to extract as
much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch is an incremental fix to the flow_cache_genid
patch for selinux that breaks the build of 2.6.20-rc6 when
xfrm is not configured.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the
sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled
IPsec and NetLabel. In addition, create a new function,
security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the
security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further
simplify the code in a few places.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code. A
summary of the changes include:
* Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct
instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex.
* Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create().
* Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel
sk_security functions.
* Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of
the common case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP
(http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in
operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers.
The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of
TCP.
A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol
differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the
socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind,
name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled
networking is not, at this stage.
Patches for SELinux userspace are at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/
I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as
expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real
difference being that it's a different protocol.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.
With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of
the peer (as represented by the SA from the peer) as opposed to the
SA used by the local/source socket.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since the upstreaming of the mlsxfrm modification a few months back,
testing has resulted in the identification of the following issues/bugs that
are resolved in this patch set.
1. Fix the security context used in the IKE negotiation to be the context
of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule.
2. Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of
the peer as opposed to the source.
3. Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow.
The following would be the result of applying this patchset:
- SO_PEERSEC will now correctly return the peer's context.
- IKE deamons will receive the context of the source socket/flow
as opposed to the SPD rule's context so that the negotiated SA
will be at the same context as the source socket/flow.
- The SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
This Patch: Pass correct security context to IKE for use in negotiation
Fix the security context passed to IKE for use in negotiation to be the
context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule so that
the SA carries the label of the originating socket/flow.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Moves the definition of the 3 structs containing object class and
permission definitions from avc.c to avc_ss.h so that the security
server can access them for validation on policy load. This also adds
a new struct type, defined_classes_perms_t, suitable for allowing the
security server to access these data structures from the avc.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or
tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket. The first is the requirement
that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option
on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own
CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send. The second change is to
SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there
is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents
applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they
send.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a
mutex. No locking changes or other code changes are done.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex. Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore. An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduces support for policy version 21. This version of the binary
kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes
other than the process security class. As always, backwards compatibility
for older formats is retained. The security class is read in as specified
when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed
when using an older policy format.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support
legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support
newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3
and FC4.
[bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of
Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct
structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:
* selinux_file_permission()
* selinux_socket_sendmsg()
* selinux_socket_post_create()
* selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
* selinux_sock_graft()
* selinux_inet_conn_request()
The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.
In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew
Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled.
As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in
-mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in
selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller
selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the
same as the socket they are set on.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.
The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.
ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).
This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of
one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new
sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association
that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for
open requests and connection-oriented child sockets.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux
purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and
security associations.
This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System,
traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy
rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might
need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for
classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to
these security levels).
This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping
of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with
each association used in the security context it is defined for. It
also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in
the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be
negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are
also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match
policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle
used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This
patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups
seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open
requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled
automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of
appropriately labeled IPSec associations.
Description of changes:
A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the
sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups
automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket
on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on
the inbound.
Outbound case:
1. Find policy for the socket.
2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy.
NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket.
This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy
can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS,
and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to
use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket.
3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the
flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found,
create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE,
include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE
daemon.
Inbound case:
1. OLD: Find policy for the socket.
NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the
SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were
used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two
policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the
packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be
using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).)
2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with
the policy sec_ctx-wise.
(It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that
this was being accomplished by
(x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok,
but it turns out tmpl->id.spi
would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one
at the template level, which they usually don't).
NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the
sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb().
Forward case:
This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3
from the Outbound case.
Outstanding items/issues:
- Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the
current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the
any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed
by this patch set.
This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux
Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm
policy rule.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options. If
context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if
both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get
the label specified by context=. The superblock will be labeled with the
label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock
security context, such as associate permissions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.
I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.
Has passed David's testsuite.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old
packet controls.
Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets,
then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls.
To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is
still present, but not active by default. To restore previous
behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a
'1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter
selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models
requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will
probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged.
With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by
default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is
not affected at all.
It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by
default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is
also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated
userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll
probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol
helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel
configuration.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to
packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these
markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this
scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/
Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches
for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/
The code has been tested with various compilation options and in
several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP
and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection
tracking.
This patch:
Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated
permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce
security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for
adding labeling rules.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be
distinguished in SELinux policy. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.
Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the
module.
LSM changes:
The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.
Use:
The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).
SELinux changes:
The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace,
and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is
not enabled in configuration.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: Jon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet. An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.
Patch design approach:
- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association. The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.
- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.
The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).
Patch implementation details:
- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error
checking):
getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);
The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.
getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.
- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for UDP should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.
When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space. The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along
with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers. These fields and
tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a
loadable module during LSM development.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches
previously applied.
(1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user
interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak.
(2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context
in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto
to setcontext.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations. It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.
The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.
When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.
When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.
Testing:
The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as
they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic
inode security labeling.
If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now. Also,
is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created
inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the
existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it
is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache
prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the
post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be
left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works
around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is
initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes
(in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but
potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test
program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the
problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real
applications.
This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation
to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch improves memory use by SELinux by both reducing the avtab node
size and reducing the number of avtab nodes. The memory savings are
substantial, e.g. on a 64-bit system after boot, James Morris reported the
following data for the targeted and strict policies:
#objs objsize kernmem
Targeted:
Before: 237888 40 9.1MB
After: 19968 24 468KB
Strict:
Before: 571680 40 21.81MB
After: 221052 24 5.06MB
The improvement in memory use comes at a cost in the speed of security
server computations of access vectors, but these computations are only
required on AVC cache misses, and performance measurements by James Morris
using a number of benchmarks have shown that the change does not cause any
significant degradation.
Note that a rebuilt policy via an updated policy toolchain
(libsepol/checkpolicy) is required in order to gain the full benefits of
this patch, although some memory savings benefits are immediately applied
even to older policies (in particular, the reduction in avtab node size).
Sources for the updated toolchain are presently available from the
sourceforge CVS tree (http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=21266), and
tarballs are available from http://www.flux.utah.edu/~sds.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field. This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.
With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file). This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.
This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap
permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so
that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently
an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that
even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous
memory mapped in order to make it executable.
The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.
making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it
could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.
The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code
generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.
The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)
The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patchhttp://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch
policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.
kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.
1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET
operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation
however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux
permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.
2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel,
collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An
example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out
nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
written to the kernel.
Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.
Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Paul Moore