Unfortunately, while commit 4a928436 ("audit: correctly record file
names with different path name types") fixed a problem where we were
not recording filenames, it created a new problem by attempting to use
these file names after they had been freed. This patch resolves the
issue by creating a copy of the filename which the audit subsystem
frees after it is done with the string.
At some point it would be nice to resolve this issue with refcounts,
or something similar, instead of having to allocate/copy strings, but
that is almost surely beyond the scope of a -rcX patch so we'll defer
that for later. On the plus side, only audit users should be impacted
by the string copying.
Reported-by: Toralf Foerster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull audit fixes from Paul Moore:
"Four patches to fix various problems with the audit subsystem, all are
fairly small and straightforward.
One patch fixes a problem where we weren't using the correct gfp
allocation flags (GFP_KERNEL regardless of context, oops), one patch
fixes a problem with old userspace tools (this was broken for a
while), one patch fixes a problem where we weren't recording pathnames
correctly, and one fixes a problem with PID based filters.
In general I don't think there is anything controversial with this
patchset, and it fixes some rather unfortunate bugs; the allocation
flag one can be particularly scary looking for users"
* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI
audit: correctly record file names with different path name types
audit: use supplied gfp_mask from audit_buffer in kauditd_send_multicast_skb
audit: don't attempt to lookup PIDs when changing PID filtering audit rules
There is a problem with the audit system when multiple audit records
are created for the same path, each with a different path name type.
The root cause of the problem is in __audit_inode() when an exact
match (both the path name and path name type) is not found for a
path name record; the existing code creates a new path name record,
but it never sets the path name in this record, leaving it NULL.
This patch corrects this problem by assigning the path name to these
newly created records.
There are many ways to reproduce this problem, but one of the
easiest is the following (assuming auditd is running):
# mkdir /root/tmp/test
# touch /root/tmp/test/567
# auditctl -a always,exit -F dir=/root/tmp/test
# touch /root/tmp/test/567
Afterwards, or while the commands above are running, check the audit
log and pay special attention to the PATH records. A faulty kernel
will display something like the following for the file creation:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1416957442.025:93): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=yes exit=3 ... comm="touch" exe="/usr/bin/touch"
type=CWD msg=audit(1416957442.025:93): cwd="/root/tmp"
type=PATH msg=audit(1416957442.025:93): item=0 name="test/"
inode=401409 ... nametype=PARENT
type=PATH msg=audit(1416957442.025:93): item=1 name=(null)
inode=393804 ... nametype=NORMAL
type=PATH msg=audit(1416957442.025:93): item=2 name=(null)
inode=393804 ... nametype=NORMAL
While a patched kernel will show the following:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1416955786.566:89): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=yes exit=3 ... comm="touch" exe="/usr/bin/touch"
type=CWD msg=audit(1416955786.566:89): cwd="/root/tmp"
type=PATH msg=audit(1416955786.566:89): item=0 name="test/"
inode=401409 ... nametype=PARENT
type=PATH msg=audit(1416955786.566:89): item=1 name="test/567"
inode=393804 ... nametype=NORMAL
This issue was brought up by a number of people, but special credit
should go to hujianyang@huawei.com for reporting the problem along
with an explanation of the problem and a patch. While the original
patch did have some problems (see the archive link below), it did
demonstrate the problem and helped kickstart the fix presented here.
* https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/5/66
Reported-by: hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
... for situations when we don't have any candidate in pathnames - basically,
in descriptor-based syscalls.
[Folded the build fix for !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL configs from Chen Gang]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris:
"So this change across a whole bunch of arches really solves one basic
problem. We want to audit when seccomp is killing a process. seccomp
hooks in before the audit syscall entry code. audit_syscall_entry
took as an argument the arch of the given syscall. Since the arch is
part of what makes a syscall number meaningful it's an important part
of the record, but it isn't available when seccomp shoots the
syscall...
For most arch's we have a better way to get the arch (syscall_get_arch)
So the solution was two fold: Implement syscall_get_arch() everywhere
there is audit which didn't have it. Use syscall_get_arch() in the
seccomp audit code. Having syscall_get_arch() everywhere meant it was
a useless flag on the stack and we could get rid of it for the typical
syscall entry.
The other changes inside the audit system aren't grand, fixed some
records that had invalid spaces. Better locking around the task comm
field. Removing some dead functions and structs. Make some things
static. Really minor stuff"
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits)
audit: rename audit_log_remove_rule to disambiguate for trees
audit: cull redundancy in audit_rule_change
audit: WARN if audit_rule_change called illegally
audit: put rule existence check in canonical order
next: openrisc: Fix build
audit: get comm using lock to avoid race in string printing
audit: remove open_arg() function that is never used
audit: correct AUDIT_GET_FEATURE return message type
audit: set nlmsg_len for multicast messages.
audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive
audit: invalid op= values for rules
audit: use atomic_t to simplify audit_serial()
kernel/audit.c: use ARRAY_SIZE instead of sizeof/sizeof[0]
audit: reduce scope of audit_log_fcaps
audit: reduce scope of audit_net_id
audit: arm64: Remove the audit arch argument to audit_syscall_entry
arm64: audit: Add audit hook in syscall_trace_enter/exit()
audit: x86: drop arch from __audit_syscall_entry() interface
sparc: implement is_32bit_task
sparc: properly conditionalize use of TIF_32BIT
...
When task->comm is passed directly to audit_log_untrustedstring() without
getting a copy or using the task_lock, there is a race that could happen that
would output a NULL (\0) in the output string that would effectively truncate
the rest of the report text after the comm= field in the audit, losing fields.
Use get_task_comm() to get a copy while acquiring the task_lock to prevent
this and to prevent the result from being a mixture of old and new values of
comm.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Since the arch is found locally in __audit_syscall_entry(), there is no need to
pass it in as a parameter. Delete it from the parameter list.
x86* was the only arch to call __audit_syscall_entry() directly and did so from
assembly code.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
As this patch relies on changes in the audit tree, I think it
appropriate to send it through my tree rather than the x86 tree.
The AUDIT_SECCOMP record looks something like this:
type=SECCOMP msg=audit(1373478171.953:32775): auid=4325 uid=4325 gid=4325 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0 pid=12381 comm="test" sig=31 syscall=231 compat=0 ip=0x39ea8bca89 code=0x0
In order to determine what syscall 231 maps to, we need to have the arch= field right before it.
To see the event, compile this test.c program:
=====
int main(void)
{
return seccomp_load(seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL));
}
=====
gcc -g test.c -o test -lseccomp
After running the program, find the record by: ausearch --start recent -m SECCOMP -i
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Since every arch should have syscall_get_arch() defined, stop using the
function argument and just collect this ourselves. We do not drop the
argument as fixing some code paths (in assembly) to not pass this first
argument is non-trivial. The argument will be dropped when that is
fixed.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This patch fix spelling typo found in DocBook/kernel-api.xml.
It is because the file is generated from the source comments,
I have to fix the comments in source codes.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
sched: declare pid_alive as inline
audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
audit: include subject in login records
audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
audit: Add generic compat syscall support
audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
...
The login uid change record does not include the selinux context of the
task logging in. Add that information.
(Updated from 2011-01: RHBZ:670328 -- RGB)
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Store and log all PIDs with reference to the initial PID namespace and
use the access functions task_pid_nr() and task_tgid_nr() for task->pid
and task->tgid.
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(informed by ebiederman's c776b5d2)
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
sys_getppid() returns the parent pid of the current process in its own pid
namespace. Since audit filters are based in the init pid namespace, a process
could avoid a filter or trigger an unintended one by being in an alternate pid
namespace or log meaningless information.
Switch to task_ppid_nr() for PPIDs to anchor all audit filters in the
init_pid_ns.
(informed by ebiederman's 6c621b7e)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
"get" usually implies incrementing a refcount into a structure to indicate a
reference being held by another part of code.
Change this function name to indicate it is in fact being taken from it,
returning the value while clearing it in the supplying structure.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
During an audit event, cache and print the value of the process's
proctitle value (proc/<pid>/cmdline). This is useful in situations
where processes are started via fork'd virtual machines where the
comm field is incorrect. Often times, setting the comm field still
is insufficient as the comm width is not very wide and most
virtual machine "package names" do not fit. Also, during execution,
many threads have their comm field set as well. By tying it back to
the global cmdline value for the process, audit records will be more
complete in systems with these properties. An example of where this
is useful and applicable is in the realm of Android. With Android,
their is no fork/exec for VM instances. The bare, preloaded Dalvik
VM listens for a fork and specialize request. When this request comes
in, the VM forks, and the loads the specific application (specializing).
This was done to take advantage of COW and to not require a load of
basic packages by the VM on very app spawn. When this spawn occurs,
the package name is set via setproctitle() and shows up in procfs.
Many of these package names are longer then 16 bytes, the historical
width of task->comm. Having the cmdline in the audit records will
couple the application back to the record directly. Also, on my
Debian development box, some audit records were more useful then
what was printed under comm.
The cached proctitle is tied to the life-cycle of the audit_context
structure and is built on demand.
Proctitle is controllable by userspace, and thus should not be trusted.
It is meant as an aid to assist in debugging. The proctitle event is
emitted during syscall audits, and can be filtered with auditctl.
Example:
type=AVC msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1971 comm="mkdir" name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): arch=c000003e syscall=137 success=yes exit=0 a0=7f019dfc8bd7 a1=7fffa6aed2c0 a2=fffffffffff4bd25 a3=7fffa6aed050 items=0 ppid=1967 pid=1971 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1327] msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): proctitle=6D6B646972002D70002F7661722F72756E2F636F6E736F6C65
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> (wrt record formating)
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This changes 'do_execve()' to get the executable name as a 'struct
filename', and to free it when it is done. This is what the normal
users want, and it simplifies and streamlines their error handling.
The controlled lifetime of the executable name also fixes a
use-after-free problem with the trace_sched_process_exec tracepoint: the
lifetime of the passed-in string for kernel users was not at all
obvious, and the user-mode helper code used UMH_WAIT_EXEC to serialize
the pathname allocation lifetime with the execve() having finished,
which in turn meant that the trace point that happened after
mm_release() of the old process VM ended up using already free'd memory.
To solve the kernel string lifetime issue, this simply introduces
"getname_kernel()" that works like the normal user-space getname()
function, except with the source coming from kernel memory.
As Oleg points out, this also means that we could drop the tcomm[] array
from 'struct linux_binprm', since the pathname lifetime now covers
setup_new_exec(). That would be a separate cleanup.
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove spaces between "new", "old" label modifiers and "auid", "ses" labels in
log output since userspace tools can't parse orphaned keywords.
Make variable names more consistent and intuitive.
Make audit_log_format() argument code easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Right now the sessionid value in the kernel is a combination of u32,
int, and unsigned int. Just use unsigned int throughout.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently when the coredump signals are logged by the audit system, the
actual path to the executable is not logged. Without details of exe, the
system admin may not have an exact idea on what program failed.
This patch changes the audit_log_task() so that the path to the exe is also
logged.
This was copied from audit_log_task_info() and the latter enhanced to avoid
disappearing text fields.
Signed-off-by: Paul Davies C <pauldaviesc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit_log_abend() is used only by the audit_core_dumps(). Thus there is no
need of maintaining the audit_log_abend() as a separate function.
This patch drops the audit_log_abend() and pushes its functionalities back to
the audit_core_dumps(). Apart from that the "reason" field is also dropped
from being logged since the reason can be deduced from the signal number.
Signed-off-by: Paul Davies C <pauldaviesc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If audit is disabled, we shouldn't generate loginuid audit
log.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
- Always report the current process as capset now always only works on
the current process. This prevents reporting 0 or a random pid in
a random pid namespace.
- Don't bother to pass the pid as is available.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(cherry picked from commit bcc85f0af31af123e32858069eb2ad8f39f90e67)
(cherry picked from commit f911cac4556a7a23e0b3ea850233d13b32328692)
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[eparis: fix build error when audit disabled]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
sfr pointed out that with CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS set the audit
tree would not build. This is because the oldsessionid in
audit_set_loginuid() was accidentally being declared as a kuid_t. This
patch fixes that declaration mistake.
Example of problem:
kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_set_loginuid':
kernel/auditsc.c:2003:15: error: incompatible types when assigning to
type 'kuid_t' from type 'int'
oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Move the audit_bprm() call from search_binary_handler() to exec_binprm(). This
allows us to get rid of the mm member of struct audit_aux_data_execve since
bprm->mm will equal current->mm.
This also mitigates the issue that ->argc could be modified by the
load_binary() call in search_binary_handler().
audit_bprm() was being called to add an AUDIT_EXECVE record to the audit
context every time search_binary_handler() was recursively called. Only one
reference is necessary.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <onestero@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
This patch is against 3.11, but was developed on Oleg's post-3.11 patches that
introduce exec_binprm().
audit_bprm() was being called to add an AUDIT_EXECVE record to the audit
context every time search_binary_handler() was recursively called. Only one
reference is necessary, so just update it. Move the the contents of
audit_aux_data_execve into the union in audit_context, removing dependence on a
kmalloc along the way.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <onestero@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Get rid of write-only audit_aux_data_exeve structure member envc.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(cherry picked from ebiederman commit 6904431d6b41190e42d6b94430b67cb4e7e6a4b7)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It appears this one comparison function got missed in f368c07d (and 9c937dcc).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This adds a new 'audit_feature' bit which allows userspace to set it
such that the loginuid is absolutely immutable, even if you have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This is a new audit feature which only grants processes with
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL the ability to unset their loginuid. They cannot
directly set it from a valid uid to another valid uid. The ability to
unset the loginuid is nice because a priviledged task, like that of
container creation, can unset the loginuid and then priv is not needed
inside the container when a login daemon needs to set the loginuid.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
After trying to use this feature in Fedora we found the hard coding
policy like this into the kernel was a bad idea. Surprise surprise.
We ran into these problems because it was impossible to launch a
container as a logged in user and run a login daemon inside that container.
This reverts back to the old behavior before this option was added. The
option will be re-added in a userspace selectable manor such that
userspace can choose when it is and when it is not appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This is just a code rework. It makes things more readable. It does not
make any functional changes.
It does change the log messages to include both the old session id as
well the new and it includes a new res field, which means we get
messages even when the user did not have permission to change the
loginuid.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If audit_filter_task() nacks the new thread it makes sense
to clear TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT which can be copied from parent
by dup_task_struct().
A wrong TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is not really bad but it triggers
the "slow" audit paths in entry.S to ensure the task can not
miss audit_syscall_*() calls, this is pointless if the task
has no ->audit_context.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The old audit PATH records for mq_open looked like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=1 name=(null) inode=6777
dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=26732
dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
...with the audit related changes that went into 3.7, they now look like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=2 name=(null) inode=66655
dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=1 name=(null) inode=6926
dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=0 name="test_mq"
Both of these look wrong to me. As Steve Grubb pointed out:
"What we need is 1 PATH record that identifies the MQ. The other PATH
records probably should not be there."
Fix it to record the mq root as a parent, and flag it such that it
should be hidden from view when the names are logged, since the root of
the mq filesystem isn't terribly interesting. With this change, we get
a single PATH record that looks more like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1368021604.836:484): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=16914
dev=00:0c mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0
In order to do this, a new audit_inode_parent_hidden() function is
added. If we do it this way, then we avoid having the existing callers
of audit_inode needing to do any sort of flag conversion if auditing is
inactive.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing
with EINVAL because of a regression caused by e1760bd.
Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid
has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine
that.
In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set,
because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break
every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes.
So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and
silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible
new idiom.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7
Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The userspace audit tools didn't like the existing formatting of the
AUDIT_ANOM_LINK event. It needed to be expanded to emit an AUDIT_PATH
event as well, so this implements the change. The bulk of the patch is
moving code out of auditsc.c into audit.c and audit.h for general use.
It expands audit_log_name to include an optional "struct path" argument
for the simple case of just needing to report a pathname. This also
makes
audit_log_task_info available when syscall auditing is not enabled,
since
it is needed in either case for process details.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
We have a number of places we were reimplementing the same code to write
out lsm labels. Just do it one darn place.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Looks like this one has been around since 5195d8e21:
kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_free_names’:
kernel/auditsc.c:998: error: ‘i’ undeclared (first use in this function)
...and this warning:
kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_putname’:
kernel/auditsc.c:2045: warning: ‘i’ may be used uninitialized in this function
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
RHBZ: 785936
If the audit system collects a record about one process sending a signal
to another process it includes in that collection the 'secid' or 'an int
used to represet an LSM label.' If there is no LSM enabled it will
collect a 0. The problem is that when we attempt to print that record
we ask the LSM to convert the secid back to a string. Since there is no
LSM it returns EOPNOTSUPP.
Most code in the audit system checks if the secid is 0 and does not
print LSM info in that case. The signal information code however forgot
that check. Thus users will see a message in syslog indicating that
converting the sid to string failed. Add the right check.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to
> audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly.
Fair enough. I'd go futher...
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to
audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly.
Signed-off-by: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
__audit_socketcall is an extern function.
better to check its parameters by itself.
also can return error code, when fail (find invalid parameters).
also use macro instead of real hard code number
also give related comments for it.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
[eparis: fix the return value when !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
filename should be destroyed via final_putname() instead of __putname()
Otherwise this result in following BUGON() in case of long names:
kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:3006!
Call Trace:
kmem_cache_free+0x1c1/0x850
audit_putname+0x88/0x90
putname+0x73/0x80
sys_symlinkat+0x120/0x150
sys_symlink+0x16/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Introduced-in: 7950e3852
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It is useful to extend GID/EGID comparation logic to be able to
match not only the exact EID/EGID values but the group/egroup also.
Signed-off-by: Matvejchikov Ilya <matvejchikov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It's possible for audit_log_start() to return NULL. Handle it in the
various callers.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@google.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit
record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors.
In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a
record if the process is under inspection. This change also fixes
userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered
malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull big execve/kernel_thread/fork unification series from Al Viro:
"All architectures are converted to new model. Quite a bit of that
stuff is actually shared with architecture trees; in such cases it's
literally shared branch pulled by both, not a cherry-pick.
A lot of ugliness and black magic is gone (-3KLoC total in this one):
- kernel_thread()/kernel_execve()/sys_execve() redesign.
We don't do syscalls from kernel anymore for either kernel_thread()
or kernel_execve():
kernel_thread() is essentially clone(2) with callback run before we
return to userland, the callbacks either never return or do
successful do_execve() before returning.
kernel_execve() is a wrapper for do_execve() - it doesn't need to
do transition to user mode anymore.
As a result kernel_thread() and kernel_execve() are
arch-independent now - they live in kernel/fork.c and fs/exec.c
resp. sys_execve() is also in fs/exec.c and it's completely
architecture-independent.
- daemonize() is gone, along with its parts in fs/*.c
- struct pt_regs * is no longer passed to do_fork/copy_process/
copy_thread/do_execve/search_binary_handler/->load_binary/do_coredump.
- sys_fork()/sys_vfork()/sys_clone() unified; some architectures
still need wrappers (ones with callee-saved registers not saved in
pt_regs on syscall entry), but the main part of those suckers is in
kernel/fork.c now."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal: (113 commits)
do_coredump(): get rid of pt_regs argument
print_fatal_signal(): get rid of pt_regs argument
ptrace_signal(): get rid of unused arguments
get rid of ptrace_signal_deliver() arguments
new helper: signal_pt_regs()
unify default ptrace_signal_deliver
flagday: kill pt_regs argument of do_fork()
death to idle_regs()
don't pass regs to copy_process()
flagday: don't pass regs to copy_thread()
bfin: switch to generic vfork, get rid of pointless wrappers
xtensa: switch to generic clone()
openrisc: switch to use of generic fork and clone
unicore32: switch to generic clone(2)
score: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
c6x: sanitize copy_thread(), get rid of clone(2) wrapper, switch to generic clone()
take sys_fork/sys_vfork/sys_clone prototypes to linux/syscalls.h
mn10300: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
h8300: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
tile: switch to generic clone()
...
Conflicts:
arch/microblaze/include/asm/Kbuild
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.
Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.
Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.
For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.
This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.
Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.
If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In the cases where we already know the length of the parent, pass it as
a parm so we don't need to recompute it. In the cases where we don't
know the length, pass in AUDIT_NAME_FULL (-1) to indicate that it should
be determined.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.
Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.
While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For now, we just have two possibilities:
UNKNOWN: for a new audit_names record that we don't know anything about yet
NORMAL: for everything else
In later patches, we'll add other types so we can distinguish and update
records created under different circumstances.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.
Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If name is NULL then the condition in the loop will never be true. Also,
with this change, we can eliminate the check for n->name == NULL since
the equivalence check will never be true if it is.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In some cases, we were passing in NULL even when we have a dentry.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Some security modules and oprofile still uses VM_EXECUTABLE for retrieving
a task's executable file. After this patch they will use mm->exe_file
directly. mm->exe_file is protected with mm->mmap_sem, so locking stays
the same.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> [arch/tile]
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [tomoyo]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
- Explicitly format uids gids in audit messges in the initial user
namespace. This is safe because auditd is restrected to be in
the initial user namespace.
- Convert audit_sig_uid into a kuid_t.
- Enable building the audit code and user namespaces at the same time.
The net result is that the audit subsystem now uses kuid_t and kgid_t whenever
possible making it almost impossible to confuse a raw uid_t with a kuid_t
preventing bugs.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t.
Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user
namespace, and then printing the resulting uid.
Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t.
Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the
user namespace of the opener of the file.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid
rom the user namespace of the opener of the file.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ?
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The audit filter code guarantees that uid are always compared with
uids and gids are always compared with gids, as the comparason
operations are type specific. Take advantage of this proper to define
audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator which use the type safe
comparasons from uidgid.h.
Build on audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator and replace
audit_compare_id with audit_compare_uid and audit_compare_gid. This
is one of those odd cases where being type safe and duplicating code
leads to simpler shorter and more concise code.
Don't allow bitmask operations in uid and gid comparisons in
audit_data_to_entry. Bitmask operations are already denined in
audit_rule_to_entry.
Convert constants in audit_rule_to_entry and audit_data_to_entry into
kuids and kgids when appropriate.
Convert the uid and gid field in struct audit_names to be of type
kuid_t and kgid_t respectively, so that the new uid and gid comparators
can be applied in a type safe manner.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
At the suggestion of eparis@redhat.com, move this chunk of task
logging from audit_log_exit to audit_log_task_info and export this
function so it's usuable elsewhere in the kernel.
This patch is against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next-ima-appraisal
Changelog v2:
- add empty audit_log_task_info if CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL isn't set.
Changelog v1:
- Initial post.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
details to the audit log.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: make compat= permanent in the record
v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org
(suggested by eparis@redhat.com)
v*: original by keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Fix new kernel-doc warnings in auditsc.c:
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'success'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'return_code'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): Excess function parameter 'pt_regs' description in '__audit_syscall_exit'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
audit_log_d_path() injects an additional space before the prefix,
which serves no purpose and doesn't mix well with other audit_log*()
functions that do not sneak extra characters into the log.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In the loop, a size_t "len" is used to hold the return value of
audit_log_single_execve_arg(), which returns -1 on error. In that
case the error handling (len <= 0) will be bypassed since "len" is
unsigned, and the loop continues with (p += len) being wrapped.
Change the type of "len" to signed int to fix the error handling.
size_t len;
...
for (...) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(...);
if (len <= 0)
break;
p += len;
}
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This allows audit to specify rules in which we compare two fields of a
process. Such as is the running process uid != to the running process
euid?
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This completes the matrix of interfield comparisons between uid/gid
information for the current task and the uid/gid information for inodes.
aka I can audit based on differences between the euid of the process and
the uid of fs objects.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than code the same loop over and over implement a helper function which
uses some pointer magic to make it generic enough to be used numerous places
as we implement more audit interfield comparisons
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We wish to be able to audit when a uid=500 task accesses a file which is
uid=0. Or vice versa. This patch introduces a new audit filter type
AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE which takes as an 'enum' which indicates which fields
should be compared. At this point we only define the task->uid vs
inode->uid, but other comparisons can be added.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Just a code cleanup really. We don't need to make a function call just for
it to return on error. This also makes the VFS function even easier to follow
and removes a conditional on a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.
Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for
them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.
If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The function always deals with current. Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something. You can't.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Much like the ability to filter audit on the uid of an inode collected, we
should be able to filter on the gid of the inode.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Allow syscall exit filter matching based on the uid of the owner of an
inode used in a syscall. aka:
auditctl -a always,exit -S open -F obj_uid=0 -F perm=wa
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Audit entry,always rules are not allowed and are automatically changed in
exit,always rules in userspace. The kernel refuses to load such rules.
Thus a task in the middle of a syscall (and thus in audit_finish_fork())
can only be in one of two states: AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT or AUDIT_DISABLED.
Since the current task cannot be in AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT we aren't every
going to actually use the code in audit_finish_fork() since it will
return without doing anything. Thus drop the code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
A number of audit hooks make function calls before they determine that
auxilary records do not need to be collected. Do those checks as static
inlines since the most common case is going to be that records are not
needed and we can skip the function call overhead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit code makes heavy use of likely() and unlikely() macros, but they
don't always make sense. Drop any that seem questionable and let the
computer do it's thing.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Every arch calls:
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
audit_syscall_entry()
which requires knowledge about audit (the existance of audit_context) in
the arch code. Just do it all in static inline in audit.h so that arch's
can remain blissfully ignorant.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to
supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was.
Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things
by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating
success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid
pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the
layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it
in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to
determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic
is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the
value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a
separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure.
We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines
instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void*
for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct
pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit
function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the
arch correct structure to dereference it.
The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we
change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure.
THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it
makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs.
In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old
audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro
regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this
patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3].
For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the
regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is
always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative
before calling the audit code when appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion]
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64]
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml]
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc]
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips]
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
The audit system likes to collect information about processes that end
abnormally (SIGSEGV) as this may me useful intrusion detection information.
This patch adds audit support to collect information when seccomp forces a
task to exit because of misbehavior in a similar way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit system has the ability to filter on the major and minor number of
the device containing the inode being operated upon. Lets say that
/dev/sda1 has major,minor 8,1 and that we mount /dev/sda1 on /boot. Now lets
say we add a watch with a filter on 8,1. If we proceed to open an inode
inside /boot, such as /vboot/vmlinuz, we will match the major,minor filter.
Lets instead assume that one were to use a tool like debugfs and were to
open /dev/sda1 directly and to modify it's contents. We might hope that
this would also be logged, but it isn't. The rules will check the
major,minor of the device containing /dev/sda1. In other words the rule
would match on the major/minor of the tmpfs mounted at /dev.
I believe these rules should trigger on either device. The man page is
devoid of useful information about the intended semantics. It only seems
logical that if you want to know everything that happened on a major,minor
that would include things that happened to the device itself...
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This patch does 2 things. First it reduces the number of audit_names
allocated in every audit context from 20 to 5. 5 should be enough for all
'normal' syscalls (rename being the worst). Some syscalls can still touch
more the 5 inodes such as mount. When rpc filesystem is mounted it will
create inodes and those can exceed 5. To handle that problem this patch will
dynamically allocate audit_names if it needs more than 5. This should
decrease the typicall memory usage while still supporting all the possible
kernel operations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Every other filter that matches part of the inodes list collected by audit
will match against any of the inodes on that list. The filetype matching
however had a strange way of doing things. It allowed userspace to
indicated if it should match on the first of the second name collected by
the kernel. Name collection ordering seems like a kernel internal and
making userspace rules get that right just seems like a bad idea. As it
turns out the userspace audit writers had no idea it was doing this and
thus never overloaded the value field. The kernel always checked the first
name collected which for the tested rules was always correct.
This patch just makes the filetype matching like the major, minor, inode,
and LSM rules in that it will match against any of the names collected. It
also changes the rule validation to reject the old unused rule types.
Noone knew it was there. Noone used it. Why keep around the extra code?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Paul Moore