File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now*
people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new
file-private locks suck.
...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck.
We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's
important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them.
The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as
"open file description locks".
The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not
visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The
glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to
look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a
programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier
to spot this difference when reading code.
This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before
v3.15 ships:
1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi
headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that
glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to
be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest.
2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK"
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Pull file locking updates from Jeff Layton:
"Highlights:
- maintainership change for fs/locks.c. Willy's not interested in
maintaining it these days, and is OK with Bruce and I taking it.
- fix for open vs setlease race that Al ID'ed
- cleanup and consolidation of file locking code
- eliminate unneeded BUG() call
- merge of file-private lock implementation"
* 'locks-3.15' of git://git.samba.org/jlayton/linux:
locks: make locks_mandatory_area check for file-private locks
locks: fix locks_mandatory_locked to respect file-private locks
locks: require that flock->l_pid be set to 0 for file-private locks
locks: add new fcntl cmd values for handling file private locks
locks: skip deadlock detection on FL_FILE_PVT locks
locks: pass the cmd value to fcntl_getlk/getlk64
locks: report l_pid as -1 for FL_FILE_PVT locks
locks: make /proc/locks show IS_FILE_PVT locks as type "FLPVT"
locks: rename locks_remove_flock to locks_remove_file
locks: consolidate checks for compatible filp->f_mode values in setlk handlers
locks: fix posix lock range overflow handling
locks: eliminate BUG() call when there's an unexpected lock on file close
locks: add __acquires and __releases annotations to locks_start and locks_stop
locks: remove "inline" qualifier from fl_link manipulation functions
locks: clean up comment typo
locks: close potential race between setlease and open
MAINTAINERS: update entry for fs/locks.c
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called
before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded
selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux
evm: enable key retention service automatically
ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
evm: EVM does not use MD5
ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
integrity: fix checkpatch errors
ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes
ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
fs: move i_readcount
ima: use static const char array definitions
security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error
ima: new helper: file_inode(file)
kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c
capability: Use current logging styles
...
Due to some unfortunate history, POSIX locks have very strange and
unhelpful semantics. The thing that usually catches people by surprise
is that they are dropped whenever the process closes any file descriptor
associated with the inode.
This is extremely problematic for people developing file servers that
need to implement byte-range locks. Developers often need a "lock
management" facility to ensure that file descriptors are not closed
until all of the locks associated with the inode are finished.
Additionally, "classic" POSIX locks are owned by the process. Locks
taken between threads within the same process won't conflict with one
another, which renders them useless for synchronization between threads.
This patchset adds a new type of lock that attempts to address these
issues. These locks conflict with classic POSIX read/write locks, but
have semantics that are more like BSD locks with respect to inheritance
and behavior on close.
This is implemented primarily by changing how fl_owner field is set for
these locks. Instead of having them owned by the files_struct of the
process, they are instead owned by the filp on which they were acquired.
Thus, they are inherited across fork() and are only released when the
last reference to a filp is put.
These new semantics prevent them from being merged with classic POSIX
locks, even if they are acquired by the same process. These locks will
also conflict with classic POSIX locks even if they are acquired by
the same process or on the same file descriptor.
The new locks are managed using a new set of cmd values to the fcntl()
syscall. The initial implementation of this converts these values to
"classic" cmd values at a fairly high level, and the details are not
exposed to the underlying filesystem. We may eventually want to push
this handing out to the lower filesystem code but for now I don't
see any need for it.
Also, note that with this implementation the new cmd values are only
available via fcntl64() on 32-bit arches. There's little need to
add support for legacy apps on a new interface like this.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.
Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.
(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Merge tag 'v3.13' into next
Linux 3.13
Minor fixup needed in selinux_inet_conn_request()
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux
(and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static
tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP
tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure
tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific
tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers
tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c
tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs
tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c
char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable
tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file
tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings
tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning)
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount
tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name
tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1
ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()
ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation
ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()
...
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Call Trace:
security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
__inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
inode_permission+0x18/0x50
link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
CR2: 0000000000000020
Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.
in selinux_inode_permission():
isec = inode->i_security;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not
sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.
What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().
The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).
Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
selinux: fix possible memory leak
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965
and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.
Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Explanation from Eric Paris:
SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that
fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
command, they will deadlock.
I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe
that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is
not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the
rule in question. The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.
See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.
Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.
See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.
Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore
taking over as maintainer of that code.
Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as
maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor"
and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling,
here's the explanation from David Howells on that:
"Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits
and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just
fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can
do that too.
(1) Keyring capacity expansion.
KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access
KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID
Add a generic associative array implementation.
KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring
Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a
keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page.
Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives
you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses
a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to
the cause.
Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only
store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings
may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node
struct into the key struct for this purpose.
I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node
and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored
in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code.
I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that
could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the
radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by
their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over
the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side
for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly
allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree.
So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree
with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key
type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by
type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to
the target key.
I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is
concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a
pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it
also. FS-Cache might, for example.
(2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'.
KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace
KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing
These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as
being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the
addition or linkage of trusted keys.
Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel
during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be
loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system
keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that
are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can
thus be added into the master keyring.
Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also.
(3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature.
X.509: Remove certificate date checks
It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was
generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel
hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is
loaded - so just remove those checks.
(4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel.
KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate
The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509"
into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the
kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section.
(5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings.
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches
KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs.
We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain
advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain
amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more
easily.
To make this work, two things were needed:
(a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's
sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them.
The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the
session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is
deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out
happens), so neither of these places is suitable.
I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is
created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their
persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user
doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically
expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos
tokens it held are then also gc'd.
(b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size).
The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots
of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge
tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is
greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump
the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an
inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we
slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer"
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits)
KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner
KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()
KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature
kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set
KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean
apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging
apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
Smack: Ptrace access check mode
ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr
ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms
ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default
ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template
...
Conflicts:
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
include/net/dst.h
Trivial merge conflicts, both were overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pass the hook ops to the hookfn to allow for generic hook
functions. This change is required by nf_tables.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Every single user passes in '0'. I think we had non-zero users back in
some stone age when selinux_inode_permission() was implemented in terms
of inode_has_perm(), but that complicated case got split up into a
totally separate code-path so that we could optimize the much simpler
special cases.
See commit 2e33405785 ("SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in
selinux_inode_permission") for example.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Move sysctl_local_ports from a global variable into struct netns_ipv4.
- Modify inet_get_local_port_range to take a struct net, and update all
of the callers.
- Move the initialization of sysctl_local_ports into
sysctl_net_ipv4.c:ipv4_sysctl_init_net from inet_connection_sock.c
v2:
- Ensure indentation used tabs
- Fixed ip.h so it applies cleanly to todays net-next
v3:
- Compile fixes of strange callers of inet_get_local_port_range.
This patch now successfully passes an allmodconfig build.
Removed manual inlining of inet_get_local_port_range in ipv4_local_port_range
Originally-by: Samya <samya@twitter.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.
This reverts commit 308ab70c46.
It breaks my FC6 test box. /dev/pts is not mounted. dmesg says
SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support
for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace
filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS,
a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing
FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time
deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a
different subtype) have the mount time deadlock.
By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies,
allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way:
fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);
This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and
subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes.
Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.
Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.
Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.
The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Use a helper to determine if a superblock should have the seclabel flag
rather than doing it in the function. I'm going to use this in the
security server as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Instead of having special code around the 'non-mount' seclabel mount option
just handle it like the mount options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently we set the initialize and seclabel flag in one place. Do some
unrelated printk then we unset the seclabel flag. Eww. Instead do the flag
twiddling in one place in the code not seperated by unrelated printk. Also
don't set and unset the seclabel flag. Only set it if we need to.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We had this random hard coded value of '8' in the code (I put it there)
for the number of bits to check for mount options. This is stupid. Instead
use the #define we already have which tells us the number of mount
options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We check if the fsname is proc and if so set the proc superblock security
struct flag. We then check if the flag is set and use the string 'proc'
for the fsname instead of just using the fsname. What's the point? It's
always proc... Get rid of the useless conditional.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
rootfs (ramfs) can support setting of security contexts
by userspace due to the vfs fallback behavior of calling
the security module to set the in-core inode state
for security.* attributes when the filesystem does not
provide an xattr handler. No xattr handler required
as the inodes are pinned in memory and have no backing
store.
This is useful in allowing early userspace to label individual
files within a rootfs while still providing a policy-defined
default via genfs.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() and propogate the
error code up to the caller. Also check the return values in the
only caller function, selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:
* xfrm_state_alloc
* xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Feature highlights include:
- Add basic client support for NFSv4.2
- Add basic client support for Labeled NFS (selinux for NFSv4.2)
- Fix the use of credentials in NFSv4.1 stateful operations, and
add support for NFSv4.1 state protection.
Bugfix highlights:
- Fix another NFSv4 open state recovery race
- Fix an NFSv4.1 back channel session regression
- Various rpc_pipefs races
- Fix another issue with NFSv3 auth negotiation
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.11-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
"Feature highlights include:
- Add basic client support for NFSv4.2
- Add basic client support for Labeled NFS (selinux for NFSv4.2)
- Fix the use of credentials in NFSv4.1 stateful operations, and add
support for NFSv4.1 state protection.
Bugfix highlights:
- Fix another NFSv4 open state recovery race
- Fix an NFSv4.1 back channel session regression
- Various rpc_pipefs races
- Fix another issue with NFSv3 auth negotiation
Please note that Labeled NFS does require some additional support from
the security subsystem. The relevant changesets have all been
reviewed and acked by James Morris."
* tag 'nfs-for-3.11-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (54 commits)
NFS: Set NFS_CS_MIGRATION for NFSv4 mounts
NFSv4.1 Refactor nfs4_init_session and nfs4_init_channel_attrs
nfs: have NFSv3 try server-specified auth flavors in turn
nfs: have nfs_mount fake up a auth_flavs list when the server didn't provide it
nfs: move server_authlist into nfs_try_mount_request
nfs: refactor "need_mount" code out of nfs_try_mount
SUNRPC: PipeFS MOUNT notification optimization for dying clients
SUNRPC: split client creation routine into setup and registration
SUNRPC: fix races on PipeFS UMOUNT notifications
SUNRPC: fix races on PipeFS MOUNT notifications
NFSv4.1 use pnfs_device maxcount for the objectlayout gdia_maxcount
NFSv4.1 use pnfs_device maxcount for the blocklayout gdia_maxcount
NFSv4.1 Fix gdia_maxcount calculation to fit in ca_maxresponsesize
NFS: Improve legacy idmapping fallback
NFSv4.1 end back channel session draining
NFS: Apply v4.1 capabilities to v4.2
NFSv4.1: Clean up layout segment comparison helper names
NFSv4.1: layout segment comparison helpers should take 'const' parameters
NFSv4: Move the DNS resolver into the NFSv4 module
rpc_pipefs: only set rpc_dentry_ops if d_op isn't already set
...
Create a file_path_has_perm() function that is like path_has_perm() but
instead takes a file struct that is the source of both the path and the
inode (rather than getting the inode from the dentry in the path). This
is then used where appropriate.
This will be useful for situations like unionmount where it will be
possible to have an apparently-negative dentry (eg. a fallthrough) that is
open with the file struct pointing to an inode on the lower fs.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch implements the client transport and handling support for labeled
NFS. The patch adds two functions to encode and decode the security label
recommended attribute which makes use of the LSM hooks added earlier. It also
adds code to grab the label from the file attribute structures and encode the
label to be sent back to the server.
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There currently doesn't exist a labeling type that is adequate for use with
labeled NFS. Since NFS doesn't really support xattrs we can't use the use xattr
labeling behavior. For this we developed a new labeling type. The native
labeling type is used solely by NFS to ensure NFS inodes are labeled at runtime
by the NFS code instead of relying on the SELinux security server on the client
end.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user
space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the
security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent
to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount.
This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows
us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the
inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and
calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights (1721 non-merge commits, this has to be a record of some
sort):
1) Add 'random' mode to team driver, from Jiri Pirko and Eric
Dumazet.
2) Make it so that any driver that supports configuration of multiple
MAC addresses can provide the forwarding database add and del
calls by providing a default implementation and hooking that up if
the driver doesn't have an explicit set of handlers. From Vlad
Yasevich.
3) Support GSO segmentation over tunnels and other encapsulating
devices such as VXLAN, from Pravin B Shelar.
4) Support L2 GRE tunnels in the flow dissector, from Michael Dalton.
5) Implement Tail Loss Probe (TLP) detection in TCP, from Nandita
Dukkipati.
6) In the PHY layer, allow supporting wake-on-lan in situations where
the PHY registers have to be written for it to be configured.
Use it to support wake-on-lan in mv643xx_eth.
From Michael Stapelberg.
7) Significantly improve firewire IPV6 support, from YOSHIFUJI
Hideaki.
8) Allow multiple packets to be sent in a single transmission using
network coding in batman-adv, from Martin Hundebøll.
9) Add support for T5 cxgb4 chips, from Santosh Rastapur.
10) Generalize the VXLAN forwarding tables so that there is more
flexibility in configurating various aspects of the endpoints.
From David Stevens.
11) Support RSS and TSO in hardware over GRE tunnels in bxn2x driver,
from Dmitry Kravkov.
12) Zero copy support in nfnelink_queue, from Eric Dumazet and Pablo
Neira Ayuso.
13) Start adding networking selftests.
14) In situations of overload on the same AF_PACKET fanout socket, or
per-cpu packet receive queue, minimize drop by distributing the
load to other cpus/fanouts. From Willem de Bruijn and Eric
Dumazet.
15) Add support for new payload offset BPF instruction, from Daniel
Borkmann.
16) Convert several drivers over to mdoule_platform_driver(), from
Sachin Kamat.
17) Provide a minimal BPF JIT image disassembler userspace tool, from
Daniel Borkmann.
18) Rewrite F-RTO implementation in TCP to match the final
specification of it in RFC4138 and RFC5682. From Yuchung Cheng.
19) Provide netlink socket diag of netlink sockets ("Yo dawg, I hear
you like netlink, so I implemented netlink dumping of netlink
sockets.") From Andrey Vagin.
20) Remove ugly passing of rtnetlink attributes into rtnl_doit
functions, from Thomas Graf.
21) Allow userspace to be able to see if a configuration change occurs
in the middle of an address or device list dump, from Nicolas
Dichtel.
22) Support RFC3168 ECN protection for ipv6 fragments, from Hannes
Frederic Sowa.
23) Increase accuracy of packet length used by packet scheduler, from
Jason Wang.
24) Beginning set of changes to make ipv4/ipv6 fragment handling more
scalable and less susceptible to overload and locking contention,
from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
25) Get rid of using non-type-safe NLMSG_* macros and use nlmsg_*()
instead. From Hong Zhiguo.
26) Optimize route usage in IPVS by avoiding reference counting where
possible, from Julian Anastasov.
27) Convert IPVS schedulers to RCU, also from Julian Anastasov.
28) Support cpu fanouts in xt_NFQUEUE netfilter target, from Holger
Eitzenberger.
29) Network namespace support for nf_log, ebt_log, xt_LOG, ipt_ULOG,
nfnetlink_log, and nfnetlink_queue. From Gao feng.
30) Implement RFC3168 ECN protection, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
31) Support several new r8169 chips, from Hayes Wang.
32) Support tokenized interface identifiers in ipv6, from Daniel
Borkmann.
33) Use usbnet_link_change() helper in USB net driver, from Ming Lei.
34) Add 802.1ad vlan offload support, from Patrick McHardy.
35) Support mmap() based netlink communication, also from Patrick
McHardy.
36) Support HW timestamping in mlx4 driver, from Amir Vadai.
37) Rationalize AF_PACKET packet timestamping when transmitting, from
Willem de Bruijn and Daniel Borkmann.
38) Bring parity to what's provided by /proc/net/packet socket dumping
and the info provided by netlink socket dumping of AF_PACKET
sockets. From Nicolas Dichtel.
39) Fix peeking beyond zero sized SKBs in AF_UNIX, from Benjamin
Poirier"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1722 commits)
filter: fix va_list build error
af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields
bnx2x: Prevent memory leak when cnic is absent
bnx2x: correct reading of speed capabilities
net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks
netlink: kconfig: move mmap i/o into netlink kconfig
netpoll: convert mutex into a semaphore
netlink: Fix skb ref counting.
net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtables
mlx4_en: fix a build error on 32bit arches
Revert "bnx2x: allow nvram test to run when device is down"
bridge: avoid OOPS if root port not found
drivers: net: cpsw: fix kernel warn on cpsw irq enable
sh_eth: use random MAC address if no valid one supplied
3c509.c: call SET_NETDEV_DEV for all device types (ISA/ISAPnP/EISA)
tg3: fix to append hardware time stamping flags
unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
unix/dgram: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
unix/dgram: peek beyond 0-sized skbs
openvswitch: Remove unneeded ovs_netdev_get_ifindex()
...
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just some minor updates across the subsystem"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmsmac/mac80211_if.c
include/net/scm.h
net/batman-adv/routing.c
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
The e{uid,gid} --> {uid,gid} credentials fix conflicted with the
cleanup in net-next to now pass cred structs around.
The be2net driver had a bug fix in 'net' that overlapped with the VLAN
interface changes by Patrick McHardy in net-next.
An IGB conflict existed because in 'net' the build_skb() support was
reverted, and in 'net-next' there was a comment style fix within that
code.
Several batman-adv conflicts were resolved by making sure that all
calls to batadv_is_my_mac() are changed to have a new bat_priv first
argument.
Eric Dumazet's TS ECR fix in TCP in 'net' conflicted with the F-RTO
rewrite in 'net-next', mostly overlapping changes.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell and Antonio Quartulli for help with several
of these merge resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit 90ba9b1986 (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.
Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.
This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.
Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:
# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2
When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.
This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.
Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.
For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:
# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified
...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.
OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:
# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy
The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull vfs pile (part one) from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff - cleaning namei.c up a bit, fixing ->d_name/->d_parent
locking violations, etc.
The most visible changes here are death of FS_REVAL_DOT (replaced with
"has ->d_weak_revalidate()") and a new helper getting from struct file
to inode. Some bits of preparation to xattr method interface changes.
Misc patches by various people sent this cycle *and* ocfs2 fixes from
several cycles ago that should've been upstream right then.
PS: the next vfs pile will be xattr stuff."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (46 commits)
saner proc_get_inode() calling conventions
proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super()
fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM
fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static
ocfs2/dlm: use GFP_ATOMIC inside a spin_lock
ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
ocfs2: Fix oops in ocfs2_fast_symlink_readpage() code path
get_empty_filp()/alloc_file() leave both ->f_pos and ->f_version zero
target: writev() on single-element vector is pointless
export kernel_write(), convert open-coded instances
fs: encode_fh: return FILEID_INVALID if invalid fid_type
kill f_vfsmnt
vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op
nfsd: handle vfs_getattr errors in acl protocol
switch vfs_getattr() to struct path
default SET_PERSONALITY() in linux/elf.h
ceph: prepopulate inodes only when request is aborted
d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instances
9p: switch v9fs_set_create_acl() to inode+fid, do it before d_instantiate()
9p: split dropping the acls from v9fs_set_create_acl()
...
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.
We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.
The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
replace_fd() began with "eats a reference, tries to insert into
descriptor table" semantics; at some point I'd switched it to
much saner current behaviour ("try to insert into descriptor
table, grabbing a new reference if inserted; caller should do
fput() in any case"), but forgot to update the callers.
Mea culpa...
[Spotted by Pavel Roskin, who has really weird system with pipe-fed
coredumps as part of what he considers a normal boot ;-)]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
iterates through the opened files in given descriptor table,
calling a supplied function; we stop once non-zero is returned.
Callback gets struct file *, descriptor number and const void *
argument passed to iterator. It is called with files->file_lock
held, so it is not allowed to block.
tty_io, netprio_cgroup and selinux flush_unauthorized_files()
converted to its use.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Merge Andrew's first set of patches:
"Non-MM patches:
- lots of misc bits
- tree-wide have_clk() cleanups
- quite a lot of printk tweaks. I draw your attention to "printk:
convert the format for KERN_<LEVEL> to a 2 byte pattern" which
looks a bit scary. But afaict it's solid.
- backlight updates
- lib/ feature work (notably the addition and use of memweight())
- checkpatch updates
- rtc updates
- nilfs updates
- fatfs updates (partial, still waiting for acks)
- kdump, proc, fork, IPC, sysctl, taskstats, pps, etc
- new fault-injection feature work"
* Merge emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (128 commits)
drivers/misc/lkdtm.c: fix missing allocation failure check
lib/scatterlist: do not re-write gfp_flags in __sg_alloc_table()
fault-injection: add tool to run command with failslab or fail_page_alloc
fault-injection: add selftests for cpu and memory hotplug
powerpc: pSeries reconfig notifier error injection module
memory: memory notifier error injection module
PM: PM notifier error injection module
cpu: rewrite cpu-notifier-error-inject module
fault-injection: notifier error injection
c/r: fcntl: add F_GETOWNER_UIDS option
resource: make sure requested range is included in the root range
include/linux/aio.h: cpp->C conversions
fs: cachefiles: add support for large files in filesystem caching
pps: return PTR_ERR on error in device_create
taskstats: check nla_reserve() return
sysctl: suppress kmemleak messages
ipc: use Kconfig options for __ARCH_WANT_[COMPAT_]IPC_PARSE_VERSION
ipc: compat: use signed size_t types for msgsnd and msgrcv
ipc: allow compat IPC version field parsing if !ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
ipc: add COMPAT_SHMLBA support
...
When we restore file descriptors we would like them to look exactly as
they were at dumping time.
With help of fcntl it's almost possible, the missing snippet is file
owners UIDs.
To be able to read their values the F_GETOWNER_UIDS is introduced.
This option is valid iif CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is turned on, otherwise
returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
OK, what we have so far is e.g.
setxattr(path, name, whatever, 0, XATTR_REPLACE)
with name being good enough to get through xattr_permission().
Then we reach security_inode_setxattr() with the desired value and size.
Aha. name should begin with "security.selinux", or we won't get that
far in selinux_inode_setxattr(). Suppose we got there and have enough
permissions to relabel that sucker. We call security_context_to_sid()
with value == NULL, size == 0. OK, we want ss_initialized to be non-zero.
I.e. after everything had been set up and running. No problem...
We do 1-byte kmalloc(), zero-length memcpy() (which doesn't oops, even
thought the source is NULL) and put a NUL there. I.e. form an empty
string. string_to_context_struct() is called and looks for the first
':' in there. Not found, -EINVAL we get. OK, security_context_to_sid_core()
has rc == -EINVAL, force == 0, so it silently returns -EINVAL.
All it takes now is not having CAP_MAC_ADMIN and we are fucked.
All right, it might be a different bug (modulo strange code quoted in the
report), but it's real. Easily fixed, AFAICS:
Deal with size == 0, value == NULL case in selinux_inode_setxattr()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Recently, glibc made a change to suppress sign-conversion warnings in
FD_SET (glibc commit ceb9e56b3d1). This uncovered an issue with the
kernel's definition of __NFDBITS if applications #include
<linux/types.h> after including <sys/select.h>. A build failure would
be seen when passing the -Werror=sign-compare and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
flags to gcc.
It was suggested that the kernel should either match the glibc
definition of __NFDBITS or remove that entirely. The current in-kernel
uses of __NFDBITS can be replaced with BITS_PER_LONG, and there are no
uses of the related __FDELT and __FDMASK defines. Given that, we'll
continue the cleanup that was started with commit 8b3d1cda4f
("posix_types: Remove fd_set macros") and drop the remaining unused
macros.
Additionally, linux/time.h has similar macros defined that expand to
nothing so we'll remove those at the same time.
Reported-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
[ .. and fix up whitespace as per akpm ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull networking changes from David S Miller:
1) Remove the ipv4 routing cache. Now lookups go directly into the FIB
trie and use prebuilt routes cached there.
No more garbage collection, no more rDOS attacks on the routing
cache. Instead we now get predictable and consistent performance,
no matter what the pattern of traffic we service.
This has been almost 2 years in the making. Special thanks to
Julian Anastasov, Eric Dumazet, Steffen Klassert, and others who
have helped along the way.
I'm sure that with a change of this magnitude there will be some
kind of fallout, but such things ought the be simple to fix at this
point. Luckily I'm not European so I'll be around all of August to
fix things :-)
The major stages of this work here are each fronted by a forced
merge commit whose commit message contains a top-level description
of the motivations and implementation issues.
2) Pre-demux of established ipv4 TCP sockets, saves a route demux on
input.
3) TCP SYN/ACK performance tweaks from Eric Dumazet.
4) Add namespace support for netfilter L4 conntrack helpers, from Gao
Feng.
5) Add config mechanism for Energy Efficient Ethernet to ethtool, from
Yuval Mintz.
6) Remove quadratic behavior from /proc/net/unix, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Support for connection tracker helpers in userspace, from Pablo
Neira Ayuso.
8) Allow userspace driven TX load balancing functions in TEAM driver,
from Jiri Pirko.
9) Kill off NLMSG_PUT and RTA_PUT macros, more gross stuff with
embedded gotos.
10) TCP Small Queues, essentially minimize the amount of TCP data queued
up in the packet scheduler layer. Whereas the existing BQL (Byte
Queue Limits) limits the pkt_sched --> netdevice queuing levels,
this controls the TCP --> pkt_sched queueing levels.
From Eric Dumazet.
11) Reduce the number of get_page/put_page ops done on SKB fragments,
from Alexander Duyck.
12) Implement protection against blind resets in TCP (RFC 5961), from
Eric Dumazet.
13) Support the client side of TCP Fast Open, basically the ability to
send data in the SYN exchange, from Yuchung Cheng.
Basically, the sender queues up data with a sendmsg() call using
MSG_FASTOPEN, then they do the connect() which emits the queued up
fastopen data.
14) Avoid all the problems we get into in TCP when timers or PMTU events
hit a locked socket. The TCP Small Queues changes added a
tcp_release_cb() that allows us to queue work up to the
release_sock() caller, and that's what we use here too. From Eric
Dumazet.
15) Zero copy on TX support for TUN driver, from Michael S. Tsirkin.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1870 commits)
genetlink: define lockdep_genl_is_held() when CONFIG_LOCKDEP
r8169: revert "add byte queue limit support".
ipv4: Change rt->rt_iif encoding.
net: Make skb->skb_iif always track skb->dev
ipv4: Prepare for change of rt->rt_iif encoding.
ipv4: Remove all RTCF_DIRECTSRC handliing.
ipv4: Really ignore ICMP address requests/replies.
decnet: Don't set RTCF_DIRECTSRC.
net/ipv4/ip_vti.c: Fix __rcu warnings detected by sparse.
ipv4: Remove redundant assignment
rds: set correct msg_namelen
openvswitch: potential NULL deref in sample()
tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications
bnx2x: Add new 57840 device IDs
tcp: avoid oops in tcp_metrics and reset tcpm_stamp
niu: Change niu_rbr_fill() to use unlikely() to check niu_rbr_add_page() return value
niu: Fix to check for dma mapping errors.
net: Fix references to out-of-scope variables in put_cmsg_compat()
net: ethernet: davinci_emac: add pm_runtime support
net: ethernet: davinci_emac: Remove unnecessary #include
...
Pull the big VFS changes from Al Viro:
"This one is *big* and changes quite a few things around VFS. What's in there:
- the first of two really major architecture changes - death to open
intents.
The former is finally there; it was very long in making, but with
Miklos getting through really hard and messy final push in
fs/namei.c, we finally have it. Unlike his variant, this one
doesn't introduce struct opendata; what we have instead is
->atomic_open() taking preallocated struct file * and passing
everything via its fields.
Instead of returning struct file *, it returns -E... on error, 0
on success and 1 in "deal with it yourself" case (e.g. symlink
found on server, etc.).
See comments before fs/namei.c:atomic_open(). That made a lot of
goodies finally possible and quite a few are in that pile:
->lookup(), ->d_revalidate() and ->create() do not get struct
nameidata * anymore; ->lookup() and ->d_revalidate() get lookup
flags instead, ->create() gets "do we want it exclusive" flag.
With the introduction of new helper (kern_path_locked()) we are rid
of all struct nameidata instances outside of fs/namei.c; it's still
visible in namei.h, but not for long. Come the next cycle,
declaration will move either to fs/internal.h or to fs/namei.c
itself. [me, miklos, hch]
- The second major change: behaviour of final fput(). Now we have
__fput() done without any locks held by caller *and* not from deep
in call stack.
That obviously lifts a lot of constraints on the locking in there.
Moreover, it's legal now to call fput() from atomic contexts (which
has immediately simplified life for aio.c). We also don't need
anti-recursion logics in __scm_destroy() anymore.
There is a price, though - the damn thing has become partially
asynchronous. For fput() from normal process we are guaranteed
that pending __fput() will be done before the caller returns to
userland, exits or gets stopped for ptrace.
For kernel threads and atomic contexts it's done via
schedule_work(), so theoretically we might need a way to make sure
it's finished; so far only one such place had been found, but there
might be more.
There's flush_delayed_fput() (do all pending __fput()) and there's
__fput_sync() (fput() analog doing __fput() immediately). I hope
we won't need them often; see warnings in fs/file_table.c for
details. [me, based on task_work series from Oleg merged last
cycle]
- sync series from Jan
- large part of "death to sync_supers()" work from Artem; the only
bits missing here are exofs and ext4 ones. As far as I understand,
those are going via the exofs and ext4 trees resp.; once they are
in, we can put ->write_super() to the rest, along with the thread
calling it.
- preparatory bits from unionmount series (from dhowells).
- assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place, as usual.
This is not the last pile for this cycle; there's at least jlayton's
ESTALE work and fsfreeze series (the latter - in dire need of fixes,
so I'm not sure it'll make the cut this cycle). I'll probably throw
symlink/hardlink restrictions stuff from Kees into the next pile, too.
Plus there's a lot of misc patches I hadn't thrown into that one -
it's large enough as it is..."
* 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (127 commits)
ext4: switch EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS to mnt_want_write_file()
btrfs: switch btrfs_ioctl_balance() to mnt_want_write_file()
switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself
spufs: shift dget/mntget towards dentry_open()
zoran: don't bother with struct file * in zoran_map
ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion
don't expose I_NEW inodes via dentry->d_inode
tidy up namei.c a bit
unobfuscate follow_up() a bit
ext3: pass custom EOF to generic_file_llseek_size()
ext4: use core vfs llseek code for dir seeks
vfs: allow custom EOF in generic_file_llseek code
vfs: Avoid unnecessary WB_SYNC_NONE writeback during sys_sync and reorder sync passes
vfs: Remove unnecessary flushing of block devices
vfs: Make sys_sync writeout also block device inodes
vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices
vfs: Reorder operations during sys_sync
quota: Move quota syncing to ->sync_fs method
quota: Split dquot_quota_sync() to writeback and cache flushing part
vfs: Move noop_backing_dev_info check from sync into writeback
...
When I introduced open perms policy didn't understand them and I
implemented them as a policycap. When I added the checking of open perm
to truncate I forgot to conditionalize it on the userspace defined
policy capability. Running an old policy with a new kernel will not
check open on open(2) but will check it on truncate. Conditionalize the
truncate check the same as the open check.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4.x
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch is a cleanup. Use NFPROTO_* for consistency with other
netfilter code.
Signed-off-by: Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Sanders <vincent.sanders@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an
audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we
currently have as "data".
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path. Instead of declaring the
common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in
the rare case we need to send an audit message.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data.
Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit
message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch
splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(),
avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting
up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving
measurable time in a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We know that some yum operation is causing CAP_MAC_ADMIN failures. This
implies that an RPM is laying down (or attempting to lay down) a file with
an invalid label. The problem is that we don't have any information to
track down the cause. This patch will cause such a failure to report the
failed label in an SELINUX_ERR audit message. This is similar to the
SELINUX_ERR reports on invalid transitions and things like that. It should
help run down problems on what is trying to set invalid labels in the
future.
Resulting records look something like:
type=AVC msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): avc: denied { mac_admin } for pid=2594 comm="chcon" capability=33 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): op=setxattr invalid_context=unconfined_u:object_r:hello:s0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): arch=c000003e syscall=188 success=no exit=-22 a0=a2c0e0 a1=390341b79b a2=a2d620 a3=1f items=1 ppid=2519 pid=2594 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="chcon" exe="/usr/bin/chcon" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=CWD msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): item=0 name="test" inode=785879 dev=fc:03 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to
truncate files outside of the sandbox. The reason is because sandbox
confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission. The idea
was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do
harm to those files. This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like
truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call. I looked
at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that
truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a
separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by
sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless).
This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate. I think a better solution
for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have
today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs and then
use the standard non-atomic bit operations rather than the FD_* macros.
This:
(1) Removes the abuses of struct fd_set:
(a) Since we don't want to allocate a full fd_set the vast majority of the
time, we actually, in effect, just allocate a just-big-enough array of
unsigned longs and cast it to an fd_set type - so why bother with the
fd_set at all?
(b) Some places outside of the core fdtable handling code (such as
SELinux) want to look inside the array of unsigned longs hidden inside
the fd_set struct for more efficient iteration over the entire set.
(2) Eliminates the use of FD_*() macros in the kernel completely.
(3) Permits the __FD_*() macros to be deleted entirely where not exposed to
userspace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174954.23314.48147.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd77846152 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b9 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (165 commits)
reiserfs: Properly display mount options in /proc/mounts
vfs: prevent remount read-only if pending removes
vfs: count unlinked inodes
vfs: protect remounting superblock read-only
vfs: keep list of mounts for each superblock
vfs: switch ->show_options() to struct dentry *
vfs: switch ->show_path() to struct dentry *
vfs: switch ->show_devname() to struct dentry *
vfs: switch ->show_stats to struct dentry *
switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *
vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sb
vfs: trim includes a bit
switch mnt_namespace ->root to struct mount
vfs: take /proc/*/mounts and friends to fs/proc_namespace.c
vfs: opencode mntget() mnt_set_mountpoint()
vfs: spread struct mount - remaining argument of next_mnt()
vfs: move fsnotify junk to struct mount
vfs: move mnt_devname
vfs: move mnt_list to struct mount
vfs: switch pnode.h macros to struct mount *
...
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective
capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get
the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire
purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the
capable() call.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions
on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the
process which might have security and attack implications. If the current
task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields
are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial
is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials.
This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without
flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the
current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the
security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security
decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead
forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is
appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor.
I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely
unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it
just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it.
The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be
wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may
have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its
mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent
and it's the only caller of the method
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not
fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The ultimate goal is to get the sock_diag module, that works in
family+protocol terms. Currently this is suitable to do on the
inet_diag basis, so rename parts of the code. It will be moved
to sock_diag.c later.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While parsing through IPv6 extension headers, fragment headers are
skipped making them invisible to the caller. This reports the
fragment offset of the last header in order to make it possible to
determine whether the packet is fragmented and, if so whether it is
a first or last fragment.
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The pervasive, but implicit presence of <linux/module.h> meant
that things like this file would happily compile as-is. But
with the desire to phase out the module.h being included everywhere,
point this file at export.h which will give it THIS_MODULE and
the EXPORT_SYMBOL variants.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>
Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits)
vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp
isofs: Remove global fs lock
jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory
fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al.
mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled
fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure
Remove dead code in dget_parent()
AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment
switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well
simplify gfs2_lookup()
jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or ..
get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link()
get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers
drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations
fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek
Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically
Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek
fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags
reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new
shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to
start the periodic workers later.
* 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc: (39 commits)
ptrace: do_wait(traced_leader_killed_by_mt_exec) can block forever
ptrace: fix ptrace_signal() && STOP_DEQUEUED interaction
connector: add an event for monitoring process tracers
ptrace: dont send SIGSTOP on auto-attach if PT_SEIZED
ptrace: mv send-SIGSTOP from do_fork() to ptrace_init_task()
ptrace_init_task: initialize child->jobctl explicitly
has_stopped_jobs: s/task_is_stopped/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/
ptrace: make former thread ID available via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG after PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop
ptrace: wait_consider_task: s/same_thread_group/ptrace_reparented/
ptrace: kill real_parent_is_ptracer() in in favor of ptrace_reparented()
ptrace: ptrace_reparented() should check same_thread_group()
redefine thread_group_leader() as exit_signal >= 0
do not change dead_task->exit_signal
kill task_detached()
reparent_leader: check EXIT_DEAD instead of task_detached()
make do_notify_parent() __must_check, update the callers
__ptrace_detach: avoid task_detached(), check do_notify_parent()
kill tracehook_notify_death()
make do_notify_parent() return bool
ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/
...
tracehook.h is on the way out. Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to
ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL
"struct common_audit_data" pointer argument. And in that case it has to
provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure.
However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data
structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time
test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame
for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case!
So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few)
functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper
function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has
no adp argument).
This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead,
and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need
the dummy structure. And a denser stack not only means less stack space
usage, it means better cache behavior. So we have a win-win-win from
this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and
better cache behavior.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm. dentry_has_perm just
calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data. But dentry_has_perm can
take either a dentry or a path. Split those to make the code obvious and
to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a
valid dentry and mnt.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.
This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.
Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.
This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.
Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If one builds a kernel without CONFIG_BUG there are a number of 'may be
used uninitialized' warnings. Silence these by returning after the BUG().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
And give it a kernel-doc comment.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: btrfs changed in linux-next]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits)
bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status
xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup
net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that
bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag
bonding: wrap slave state work
net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags
bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler
be2net: Bump up the version number
be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines
e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency
netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables
xen network backend driver
bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time
bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice
bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset
net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio
xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward()
be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl
Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve
netxen: support for GbE port settings
...
Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c
with the staging updates.
I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi
structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes
first, much like struct sock_common.
This is the first step to move in that direction.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For SELinux we do not allow security information to change during a remount
operation. Thus this hook simply strips the security module options from
the data and verifies that those are the same options as exist on the
current superblock.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The security context for the newly created socket shares the same
user, role and MLS attribute as its creator but may have a different
type, which could be specified by a type_transition rule in the relevant
policy package.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
[fix call to security_transition_sid to include qstr, Eric Paris]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Netlink message processing in the kernel is synchronous these days, the
session information can be collected when needed.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This reverts commit 242631c49d.
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
SELinux used to recognize certain individual ioctls and check
permissions based on the knowledge of the individual ioctl. In commit
242631c49d the SELinux code stopped trying to understand
individual ioctls and to instead looked at the ioctl access bits to
determine in we should check read or write for that operation. This
same suggestion was made to SMACK (and I believe copied into TOMOYO).
But this suggestion is total rubbish. The ioctl access bits are
actually the access requirements for the structure being passed into the
ioctl, and are completely unrelated to the operation of the ioctl or the
object the ioctl is being performed upon.
Take FS_IOC_FIEMAP as an example. FS_IOC_FIEMAP is defined as:
FS_IOC_FIEMAP _IOWR('f', 11, struct fiemap)
So it has access bits R and W. What this really means is that the
kernel is going to both read and write to the struct fiemap. It has
nothing at all to do with the operations that this ioctl might perform
on the file itself!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The IPSKB_FORWARDED and IP6SKB_FORWARDED flags are used only in the
multicast forwarding case to indicate that a packet looped back after
forward. So these flags are not a good indicator for packet forwarding.
A better indicator is the incoming interface. If we have no socket context,
but an incoming interface and we see the packet in the ip postroute hook,
the packet is going to be forwarded.
With this patch we use the incoming interface as an indicator on packet
forwarding.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat and selinux_ip_postroute_compat are just
called if selinux_policycap_netpeer is not set. However in these
functions we check if selinux_policycap_netpeer is set. This leads
to some dead code and to the fact that selinux_xfrm_postroute_last
is never executed. This patch removes the dead code and the checks
for selinux_policycap_netpeer in the compatibility functions.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().
Fix these bugs by
(1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().
(2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for
/proc/sys returned
-r--r--r-- unknown /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
instead of
-r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling:
1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/
commit 77b14db502
[PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support
2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table:
commit 3fbfa98112
[PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables
3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply
labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did
not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/
inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by
selinux.
commit bbaca6c2e7
[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
commit 86a71dbd3e
[PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux
Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook
that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry.
We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the
proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this
patch). With this patch:
* we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private
* we don't need the sysclt security hook
* we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode.
We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a
proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like
'/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does
know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label).
PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code
because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example
from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.
There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.
However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().
Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
selinux_inode_init_security computes transitions sids even for filesystems
that use mount point labeling. It shouldn't do that. It should just use
the mount point label always and no matter what.
This causes 2 problems. 1) it makes file creation slower than it needs to be
since we calculate the transition sid and 2) it allows files to be created
with a different label than the mount point!
# id -Z
staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
# sesearch --type --class file --source sysadm_t --target tmp_t
Found 1 semantic te rules:
type_transition sysadm_t tmp_t : file user_tmp_t;
# mount -o loop,context="system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0" /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# ls -lZ /mnt/tmp
drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found
# touch /mnt/tmp/file1
# ls -lZ /mnt/tmp
-rw-r--r--. root root staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 file1
drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found
Whoops, we have a mount point labeled filesystem tmp_t with a user_tmp_t
labeled file!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The SELinux ip postroute code indicates when policy rejected a packet and
passes the error back up the stack. The compat code does not. This patch
sends the same kind of error back up the stack in the compat code.
Based-on-patch-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some of the SELinux netlink code returns a fatal error when the error might
actually be transient. This patch just silently drops packets on
potentially transient errors but continues to return a permanant error
indicator when the denial was because of policy.
Based-on-comments-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The SELinux netfilter hooks just return NF_DROP if they drop a packet. We
want to signal that a drop in this hook is a permanant fatal error and is not
transient. If we do this the error will be passed back up the stack in some
places and applications will get a faster interaction that something went
wrong.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and
remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge
we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at
least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also
have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.
This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
tty: fix fu_list abuse
tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling.
If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode
removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is
because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb
list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose).
This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean".
Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct
at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking
file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes
and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug.
The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take
the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors.
This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule
anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers.
[ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the
driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether
that will ever be worth implementing. ]
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
fs: cleanup files_lock locking
Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to
manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock.
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux:
unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall
rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit
rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit
rlimits: add rlimit64 structure
rlimits: do security check under task_lock
rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks
rlimits: split sys_setrlimit
rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock
rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit
rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu
rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit
Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify
system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4
along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open
in the common file perms.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which
calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It
is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable
or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real
permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots
of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently
SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in
order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules
like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file
permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless
and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this
permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:
dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access
With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and
thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial.
If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions
(rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial.
This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a
method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting
correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In
order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags
they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't
need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or
any LSM.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
There were a number of places using the following code pattern:
struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
... which were simplified to the following:
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At present, the socket related access controls use a mix of inode and
socket labels; while there should be no practical difference (they
_should_ always be the same), it makes the code more confusing. This
patch attempts to convert all of the socket related access control
points (with the exception of some of the inode/fd based controls) to
use the socket's own label. In the process, I also converted the
socket_has_perm() function to take a 'sock' argument instead of a
'socket' since that was adding a bit more overhead in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The sk_alloc_security() and sk_free_security() functions were only being
called by the selinux_sk_alloc_security() and selinux_sk_free_security()
functions so we just move the guts of the alloc/free routines to the
callers and eliminate a layer of indirection.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Consolidate the basic sockcreate_sid logic into a single helper function
which allows us to do some cleanups in the related code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on
the client end of a pair of connected UNIX sockets.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When doing an exec, selinux updates rlimits in its code of current
process depending on current max. Make sure max or cur doesn't change
in the meantime by grabbing task_lock which do_prlimit needs for
changing limits too.
While at it, use rlimit helper for accessing CPU rlimit a line below.
To have a volatile access too.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Add task_struct as a parameter to update_rlimit_cpu to be able to set
rlimit_cpu of different task than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set
rlimit of task other than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On Tue, 2010-04-27 at 11:47 -0700, David Miller wrote:
> From: "Tom \"spot\" Callaway" <tcallawa@redhat.com>
> Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:20:21 -0400
>
> > [root@apollo ~]$ cat /proc/2174/maps
> > 00010000-00014000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 15466577
> > /sbin/mingetty
> > 00022000-00024000 rwxp 00002000 fd:00 15466577
> > /sbin/mingetty
> > 00024000-00046000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
> > [heap]
>
> SELINUX probably barfs on the executable heap, the PLT is in the HEAP
> just like powerpc32 and that's why VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS has to set
> both executable and writable.
>
> You also can't remove the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdefs in selinux, since
> because of the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS setting used still in that arch,
> the heap will always have executable permission, just like sparc does.
> You have to support those binaries forever, whether you like it or not.
>
> Let's just replace the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdef in SELINUX with CONFIG_PPC32
> || CONFIG_SPARC as in Tom's original patch and let's be done with
> this.
>
> In fact I would go through all the arch/ header files and check the
> VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS settings and add the necessary new ifdefs to the
> SELINUX code so that other platforms don't have the pain of having to
> go through this process too.
To avoid maintaining per-arch ifdefs, it seems that we could just
directly use (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC) as the basis for deciding
whether to enable or disable these checks. VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS isn't
constant on some architectures but instead depends on
current->personality, but we want this applied uniformly. So we'll just
use the initial task state to determine whether or not to enable these
checks.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
trying to grep everything that messes with a sk_security_struct isn't easy
since we don't always call it sksec. Just rename everything sksec.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Jeff Layton