Plenty of acronym soup here:
- Initial support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE)
- Improved handling for SError interrupts (required to handle RAS events)
- Enable GCC support for 128-bit integer types
- Remove kernel text addresses from backtraces and register dumps
- Use of WFE to implement long delay()s
- ACPI IORT updates from Lorenzo Pieralisi
- Perf PMU driver for the Statistical Profiling Extension (SPE)
- Perf PMU driver for Hisilicon's system PMUs
- Misc cleanups and non-critical fixes
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"The big highlight is support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE)
which required extensive ABI work to ensure we don't break existing
applications by blowing away their signal stack with the rather large
new vector context (<= 2 kbit per vector register). There's further
work to be done optimising things like exception return, but the ABI
is solid now.
Much of the line count comes from some new PMU drivers we have, but
they're pretty self-contained and I suspect we'll have more of them in
future.
Plenty of acronym soup here:
- initial support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE)
- improved handling for SError interrupts (required to handle RAS
events)
- enable GCC support for 128-bit integer types
- remove kernel text addresses from backtraces and register dumps
- use of WFE to implement long delay()s
- ACPI IORT updates from Lorenzo Pieralisi
- perf PMU driver for the Statistical Profiling Extension (SPE)
- perf PMU driver for Hisilicon's system PMUs
- misc cleanups and non-critical fixes"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (97 commits)
arm64: Make ARMV8_DEPRECATED depend on SYSCTL
arm64: Implement __lshrti3 library function
arm64: support __int128 on gcc 5+
arm64/sve: Add documentation
arm64/sve: Detect SVE and activate runtime support
arm64/sve: KVM: Hide SVE from CPU features exposed to guests
arm64/sve: KVM: Treat guest SVE use as undefined instruction execution
arm64/sve: KVM: Prevent guests from using SVE
arm64/sve: Add sysctl to set the default vector length for new processes
arm64/sve: Add prctl controls for userspace vector length management
arm64/sve: ptrace and ELF coredump support
arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around EFI runtime service calls
arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around kernel-mode NEON use
arm64/sve: Probe SVE capabilities and usable vector lengths
arm64: cpufeature: Move sys_caps_initialised declarations
arm64/sve: Backend logic for setting the vector length
arm64/sve: Signal handling support
arm64/sve: Support vector length resetting for new processes
arm64/sve: Core task context handling
arm64/sve: Low-level CPU setup
...
This patch adds two arm64-specific prctls, to permit userspace to
control its vector length:
* PR_SVE_SET_VL: set the thread's SVE vector length and vector
length inheritance mode.
* PR_SVE_GET_VL: get the same information.
Although these prctls resemble instruction set features in the SVE
architecture, they provide additional control: the vector length
inheritance mode is Linux-specific and nothing to do with the
architecture, and the architecture does not permit EL0 to set its
own vector length directly. Both can be used in portable tools
without requiring the use of SVE instructions.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[will: Fixed up prctl constants to avoid clash with PDEATHSIG]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During checkpointing and restore of userspace tasks
we bumped into the situation, that it's not possible
to restore the tasks, which user namespace does not
have uid 0 or gid 0 mapped.
People create user namespace mappings like they want,
and there is no a limitation on obligatory uid and gid
"must be mapped". So, if there is no uid 0 or gid 0
in the mapping, it's impossible to restore mm->exe_file
of the processes belonging to this user namespace.
Also, there is no a workaround. It's impossible
to create a temporary uid/gid mapping, because
only one write to /proc/[pid]/uid_map and gid_map
is allowed during a namespace lifetime.
If there is an entry, then no more mapings can't be
written. If there isn't an entry, we can't write
there too, otherwise user task won't be able
to do that in the future.
The patch changes the check, and looks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
instead of zero uid and gid. This allows to restore
a task independently of its user namespace mappings.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CC: Stanislav Kinsburskiy <skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com>
CC: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Fixes: commit d9e968cb9f "getrlimit()/setrlimit(): move compat to native"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
PR_SET_THP_DISABLE has a rather subtle semantic. It doesn't affect any
existing mapping because it only updated mm->def_flags which is a
template for new mappings.
The mappings created after prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE) have VM_NOHUGEPAGE
flag set. This can be quite surprising for all those applications which
do not do prctl(); fork() & exec() and want to control their own THP
behavior.
Another usecase when the immediate semantic of the prctl might be useful
is a combination of pre- and post-copy migration of containers with
CRIU. In this case CRIU populates a part of a memory region with data
that was saved during the pre-copy stage. Afterwards, the region is
registered with userfaultfd and CRIU expects to get page faults for the
parts of the region that were not yet populated. However, khugepaged
collapses the pages and the expected page faults do not occur.
In more general case, the prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE) could be used as a
temporary mechanism for enabling/disabling THP process wide.
Implementation wise, a new MMF_DISABLE_THP flag is added. This flag is
tested when decision whether to use huge pages is taken either during
page fault of at the time of THP collapse.
It should be noted, that the new implementation makes PR_SET_THP_DISABLE
master override to any per-VMA setting, which was not the case
previously.
Fixes: a0715cc226 ("mm, thp: add VM_INIT_DEF_MASK and PRCTL_THP_DISABLE")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496415802-30944-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull misc compat stuff updates from Al Viro:
"This part is basically untangling various compat stuff. Compat
syscalls moved to their native counterparts, getting rid of quite a
bit of double-copying and/or set_fs() uses. A lot of field-by-field
copyin/copyout killed off.
- kernel/compat.c is much closer to containing just the
copyin/copyout of compat structs. Not all compat syscalls are gone
from it yet, but it's getting there.
- ipc/compat_mq.c killed off completely.
- block/compat_ioctl.c cleaned up; floppy compat ioctls moved to
drivers/block/floppy.c where they belong. Yes, there are several
drivers that implement some of the same ioctls. Some are m68k and
one is 32bit-only pmac. drivers/block/floppy.c is the only one in
that bunch that can be built on biarch"
* 'misc.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
mqueue: move compat syscalls to native ones
usbdevfs: get rid of field-by-field copyin
compat_hdio_ioctl: get rid of set_fs()
take floppy compat ioctls to sodding floppy.c
ipmi: get rid of field-by-field __get_user()
ipmi: get COMPAT_IPMICTL_RECEIVE_MSG in sync with the native one
rt_sigtimedwait(): move compat to native
select: switch compat_{get,put}_fd_set() to compat_{get,put}_bitmap()
put_compat_rusage(): switch to copy_to_user()
sigpending(): move compat to native
getrlimit()/setrlimit(): move compat to native
times(2): move compat to native
compat_{get,put}_bitmap(): use unsafe_{get,put}_user()
fb_get_fscreeninfo(): don't bother with do_fb_ioctl()
do_sigaltstack(): lift copying to/from userland into callers
take compat_sys_old_getrlimit() to native syscall
trim __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
New helpers: kernel_waitid() and kernel_wait4(). sys_waitid(),
sys_wait4() and their compat variants switched to those. Copying
struct rusage to userland is left to syscall itself. For
compat_sys_wait4() that eliminates the use of set_fs() completely.
For compat_sys_waitid() it's still needed (for siginfo handling);
that will change shortly.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This is a set of small fixes that were mostly stumbled over during
more significant development. This proc fix and the fix to
posix-timers are the most significant of the lot.
There is a lot of good development going on but unfortunately it
didn't quite make the merge window"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: Fix unbalanced hard link numbers
signal: Make kill_proc_info static
rlimit: Properly call security_task_setrlimit
signal: Remove unused definition of sig_user_definied
ia64: Remove unused IA64_TASK_SIGHAND_OFFSET and IA64_SIGHAND_SIGLOCK_OFFSET
ipc: Remove unused declaration of recompute_msgmni
posix-timers: Correct sanity check in posix_cpu_nsleep
sysctl: Remove dead register_sysctl_root
Modify do_prlimit to call security_task_setrlimit passing the task
whose rlimit we are changing not the tsk->group_leader.
In general this should not matter as the lsms implementing
security_task_setrlimit apparmor and selinux both examine the
task->cred to see what should be allowed on the destination task.
That task->cred is shared between tasks created with CLONE_THREAD
unless thread keyrings are in play, in which case both apparmor and
selinux create duplicate security contexts.
So the only time when it will matter which thread is passed to
security_task_setrlimit is if one of the threads of a process performs
an operation that changes only it's credentials. At which point if a
thread has done that we don't want to hide that information from the
lsms.
So fix the call of security_task_setrlimit. With the removal
of tsk->group_leader this makes the code slightly faster,
more comprehensible and maintainable.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce a trivial, mostly empty <linux/sched/cputime.h> header
to prepare for the moving of cputime functionality out of sched.h.
Update all code that relies on these facilities.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/stat.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/stat.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
The APIs that are going to be moved first are:
mm_alloc()
__mmdrop()
mmdrop()
mmdrop_async_fn()
mmdrop_async()
mmget_not_zero()
mmput()
mmput_async()
get_task_mm()
mm_access()
mm_release()
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/autogroup.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/autogroup.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/loadavg.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/topology.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
If process forks some children when it has is_child_subreaper
flag enabled they will inherit has_child_subreaper flag - first
group, when is_child_subreaper is disabled forked children will
not inherit it - second group. So child-subreaper does not reparent
all his descendants when their parents die. Having these two
differently behaving groups can lead to confusion. Also it is
a problem for CRIU, as when we restore process tree we need to
somehow determine which descendants belong to which group and
much harder - to put them exactly to these group.
To simplify these we can add a propagation of has_child_subreaper
flag on PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, walking all descendants of child-
subreaper to setup has_child_subreaper flag.
In common cases when process like systemd first sets itself to
be a child-subreaper and only after that forks its services, we will
have zero-length list of descendants to walk. Testing with binary
subtree of 2^15 processes prctl took < 0.007 sec and has shown close
to linear dependency(~0.2 * n * usec) on lower numbers of processes.
Moreover, I doubt someone intentionaly pre-forks the children whitch
should reparent to init before becoming subreaper, because some our
ancestor migh have had is_child_subreaper flag while forking our
sub-tree and our childs will all inherit has_child_subreaper flag,
and we have no way to influence it. And only way to check if we have
no has_child_subreaper flag is to create some childs, kill them and
see where they will reparent to.
Using walk_process_tree helper to walk subtree, thanks to Oleg! Timing
seems to be the same.
Optimize:
a) When descendant already has has_child_subreaper flag all his subtree
has it too already.
* for a) to be true need to move has_child_subreaper inheritance under
the same tasklist_lock with adding task to its ->real_parent->children
as without it process can inherit zero has_child_subreaper, then we
set 1 to it's parent flag, check that parent has no more children, and
only after child with wrong flag is added to the tree.
* Also make these inheritance more clear by using real_parent instead of
current, as on clone(CLONE_PARENT) if current has is_child_subreaper
and real_parent has no is_child_subreaper or has_child_subreaper, child
will have has_child_subreaper flag set without actually having a
subreaper in it's ancestors.
b) When some descendant is child_reaper, it's subtree is in different
pidns from us(original child-subreaper) and processes from other pidns
will never reparent to us.
So we can skip their(a,b) subtree from walk.
v2: switch to walk_process_tree() general helper, move
has_child_subreaper inheritance
v3: remove csr_descendant leftover, change current to real_parent
in has_child_subreaper inheritance
v4: small commit message fix
Fixes: ebec18a6d3 ("prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that most cputime readers use the transition API which return the
task cputime in old style cputime_t, we can safely store the cputime in
nsecs. This will eventually make cputime statistics less opaque and more
granular. Back and forth convertions between cputime_t and nsecs in order
to deal with cputime_t random granularity won't be needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485832191-26889-8-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
- various misc bits
- most of MM (quite a lot of MM material is awaiting the merge of
linux-next dependencies)
- kasan
- printk updates
- procfs updates
- MAINTAINERS
- /lib updates
- checkpatch updates
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (123 commits)
init: reduce rootwait polling interval time to 5ms
binfmt_elf: use vmalloc() for allocation of vma_filesz
checkpatch: don't emit unified-diff error for rename-only patches
checkpatch: don't check c99 types like uint8_t under tools
checkpatch: avoid multiple line dereferences
checkpatch: don't check .pl files, improve absolute path commit log test
scripts/checkpatch.pl: fix spelling
checkpatch: don't try to get maintained status when --no-tree is given
lib/ida: document locking requirements a bit better
lib/rbtree.c: fix typo in comment of ____rb_erase_color
lib/Kconfig.debug: make CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM depend on CONFIG_DEVMEM
MAINTAINERS: add drm and drm/i915 irc channels
MAINTAINERS: add "C:" for URI for chat where developers hang out
MAINTAINERS: add drm and drm/i915 bug filing info
MAINTAINERS: add "B:" for URI where to file bugs
get_maintainer: look for arbitrary letter prefixes in sections
printk: add Kconfig option to set default console loglevel
printk/sound: handle more message headers
printk/btrfs: handle more message headers
printk/kdb: handle more message headers
...
This limitation came with the reason to remove "another way for
malicious code to obscure a compromised program and masquerade as a
benign process" by allowing "security-concious program can use this
prctl once during its early initialization to ensure the prctl cannot
later be abused for this purpose":
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=133160684517468&w=2
This explanation doesn't look sufficient. The only thing "exe" link is
indicating is the file, used to execve, which is basically nothing and
not reliable immediately after process has returned from execve system
call.
Moreover, to use this feture, all the mappings to previous exe file have
to be unmapped and all the new exe file permissions must be satisfied.
Which means, that changing exe link is very similar to calling execve on
the binary.
The need to remove this limitations comes from migration of NFS mount
point, which is not accessible during restore and replaced by other file
system. Because of this exe link has to be changed twice.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160927153755.9337.69650.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskiy <skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about
25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out.
Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to
use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were
disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create,
timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete,
clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm.
The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep
syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME,
CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast
majority of use cases with very little code.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
PR_SET_THP_DISABLE requires mmap_sem for write. If the waiting task
gets killed by the oom killer it would block oom_reaper from
asynchronous address space reclaim and reduce the chances of timely OOM
resolving. Wait for the lock in the killable mode and return with EINTR
if the task got killed while waiting.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patchset introduces a /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface which
would allow controlling processes to be able to set the timerslack value
on other processes in order to save power by avoiding wakeups (Something
Android currently does via out-of-tree patches).
The first patch tries to fix the internal timer_slack_ns usage which was
defined as a long, which limits the slack range to ~4 seconds on 32bit
systems. It converts it to a u64, which provides the same basically
unlimited slack (500 years) on both 32bit and 64bit machines.
The second patch introduces the /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface
which allows the full 64bit slack range for a task to be read or set on
both 32bit and 64bit machines.
With these two patches, on a 32bit machine, after setting the slack on
bash to 10 seconds:
$ time sleep 1
real 0m10.747s
user 0m0.001s
sys 0m0.005s
The first patch is a little ugly, since I had to chase the slack delta
arguments through a number of functions converting them to u64s. Let me
know if it makes sense to break that up more or not.
Other than that things are fairly straightforward.
This patch (of 2):
The timer_slack_ns value in the task struct is currently a unsigned
long. This means that on 32bit applications, the maximum slack is just
over 4 seconds. However, on 64bit machines, its much much larger (~500
years).
This disparity could make application development a little (as well as
the default_slack) to a u64. This means both 32bit and 64bit systems
have the same effective internal slack range.
Now the existing ABI via PR_GET_TIMERSLACK and PR_SET_TIMERSLACK specify
the interface as a unsigned long, so we preserve that limitation on
32bit systems, where SET_TIMERSLACK can only set the slack to a unsigned
long value, and GET_TIMERSLACK will return ULONG_MAX if the slack is
actually larger then what can be stored by an unsigned long.
This patch also modifies hrtimer functions which specified the slack
delta as a unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
An unprivileged user can trigger an oops on a kernel with
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
proc_pid_cmdline_read takes mmap_sem for reading and obtains args + env
start/end values. These get sanity checked as follows:
BUG_ON(arg_start > arg_end);
BUG_ON(env_start > env_end);
These can be changed by prctl_set_mm. Turns out also takes the semaphore for
reading, effectively rendering it useless. This results in:
kernel BUG at fs/proc/base.c:240!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: virtio_net
CPU: 0 PID: 925 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc8-next-20160105dupa+ #71
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff880077a68000 ti: ffff8800784d0000 task.ti: ffff8800784d0000
RIP: proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530
RSP: 0018:ffff8800784d3db8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff880077c5b6b0 RBX: ffff8800784d3f18 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f78e8857000 RDI: 0000000000000246
RBP: ffff8800784d3e40 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 00007f78e8857800 R14: ffff88006fcef000 R15: ffff880077c5b600
FS: 00007f78e884a740(0000) GS:ffff88007b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00007f78e8361770 CR3: 00000000790a5000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
__vfs_read+0x37/0x100
vfs_read+0x82/0x130
SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Code: 4c 8b 7d a8 eb e9 48 8b 9d 78 ff ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 48 8b 03 48 39 45 a8 0f 87 f0 fe ff ff e9 d1 fe ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 eb c6 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 0b 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
RIP proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530
---[ end trace 97882617ae9c6818 ]---
Turns out there are instances where the code just reads aformentioned
values without locking whatsoever - namely environ_read and get_cmdline.
Interestingly these functions look quite resilient against bogus values,
but I don't believe this should be relied upon.
The first patch gets rid of the oops bug by grabbing mmap_sem for
writing.
The second patch is optional and puts locking around aformentioned
consumers for safety. Consumers of other fields don't seem to benefit
from similar treatment and are left untouched.
This patch (of 2):
The code was taking the semaphore for reading, which does not protect
against readers nor concurrent modifications.
The problem could cause a sanity checks to fail in procfs's cmdline
reader, resulting in an OOPS.
Note that some functions perform an unlocked read of various mm fields,
but they seem to be fine despite possible modificaton.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
setpriority(PRIO_USER, 0, x) will change the priority of tasks outside of
the current pid namespace. This is in contrast to both the other modes of
setpriority and the example of kill(-1). Fix this. getpriority and
ioprio have the same failure mode, fix them too.
Eric said:
: After some more thinking about it this patch sounds justifiable.
:
: My goal with namespaces is not to build perfect isolation mechanisms
: as that can get into ill defined territory, but to build well defined
: mechanisms. And to handle the corner cases so you can use only
: a single namespace with well defined results.
:
: In this case you have found the two interfaces I am aware of that
: identify processes by uid instead of by pid. Which quite frankly is
: weird. Unfortunately the weird unexpected cases are hard to handle
: in the usual way.
:
: I was hoping for a little more information. Changes like this one we
: have to be careful of because someone might be depending on the current
: behavior. I don't think they are and I do think this make sense as part
: of the pid namespace.
Signed-off-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ambrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The MPX code can only work on the current task. You can not,
for instance, enable MPX management in another process or
thread. You can also not handle a fault for another process or
thread.
Despite this, we pass a task_struct around prolifically. This
patch removes all of the task struct passing for code paths
where the code can not deal with another task (which turns out
to be all of them).
This has no functional changes. It's just a cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150607183702.6A81DA2C@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Oleg cleverly suggested using xchg() to set the new mm->exe_file instead
of calling set_mm_exe_file() which requires some form of serialization --
mmap_sem in this case. For archs that do not have atomic rmw instructions
we still fallback to a spinlock alternative, so this should always be
safe. As such, we only need the mmap_sem for looking up the backing
vm_file, which can be done sharing the lock. Naturally, this means we
need to manually deal with both the new and old file reference counting,
and we need not worry about the MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED bits, which can
probably be deleted in the future anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There's a uname workaround for broken userspace which can't handle kernel
versions of 3.x. Update it for 4.x.
Signed-off-by: Jon DeVree <nuxi@vault24.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull MIPS updates from Ralf Baechle:
"This is the main pull request for MIPS:
- a number of fixes that didn't make the 3.19 release.
- a number of cleanups.
- preliminary support for Cavium's Octeon 3 SOCs which feature up to
48 MIPS64 R3 cores with FPU and hardware virtualization.
- support for MIPS R6 processors.
Revision 6 of the MIPS architecture is a major revision of the MIPS
architecture which does away with many of original sins of the
architecture such as branch delay slots. This and other changes in
R6 require major changes throughout the entire MIPS core
architecture code and make up for the lion share of this pull
request.
- finally some preparatory work for eXtendend Physical Address
support, which allows support of up to 40 bit of physical address
space on 32 bit processors"
[ Ahh, MIPS can't leave the PAE brain damage alone. It's like
every CPU architect has to make that mistake, but pee in the snow
by changing the TLA. But whether it's called PAE, LPAE or XPA,
it's horrid crud - Linus ]
* 'upstream' of git://git.linux-mips.org/pub/scm/ralf/upstream-linus: (114 commits)
MIPS: sead3: Corrected get_c0_perfcount_int
MIPS: mm: Remove dead macro definitions
MIPS: OCTEON: irq: add CIB and other fixes
MIPS: OCTEON: Don't do acknowledge operations for level triggered irqs.
MIPS: OCTEON: More OCTEONIII support
MIPS: OCTEON: Remove setting of processor specific CVMCTL icache bits.
MIPS: OCTEON: Core-15169 Workaround and general CVMSEG cleanup.
MIPS: OCTEON: Update octeon-model.h code for new SoCs.
MIPS: OCTEON: Implement DCache errata workaround for all CN6XXX
MIPS: OCTEON: Add little-endian support to asm/octeon/octeon.h
MIPS: OCTEON: Implement the core-16057 workaround
MIPS: OCTEON: Delete unused COP2 saving code
MIPS: OCTEON: Use correct instruction to read 64-bit COP0 register
MIPS: OCTEON: Save and restore CP2 SHA3 state
MIPS: OCTEON: Fix FP context save.
MIPS: OCTEON: Save/Restore wider multiply registers in OCTEON III CPUs
MIPS: boot: Provide more uImage options
MIPS: Remove unneeded #ifdef __KERNEL__ from asm/processor.h
MIPS: ip22-gio: Remove legacy suspend/resume support
mips: pci: Add ifdef around pci_proc_domain
...
Userland code may be built using an ABI which permits linking to objects
that have more restrictive floating point requirements. For example,
userland code may be built to target the O32 FPXX ABI. Such code may be
linked with other FPXX code, or code built for either one of the more
restrictive FP32 or FP64. When linking with more restrictive code, the
overall requirement of the process becomes that of the more restrictive
code. The kernel has no way to know in advance which mode the process
will need to be executed in, and indeed it may need to change during
execution. The dynamic loader is the only code which will know the
overall required mode, and so it needs to have a means to instruct the
kernel to switch the FP mode of the process.
This patch introduces 2 new options to the prctl syscall which provide
such a capability. The FP mode of the process is represented as a
simple bitmask combining a number of mode bits mirroring those present
in the hardware. Userland can either retrieve the current FP mode of
the process:
mode = prctl(PR_GET_FP_MODE);
or modify the current FP mode of the process:
err = prctl(PR_SET_FP_MODE, new_mode);
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Matthew Fortune <matthew.fortune@imgtec.com>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8899/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Description from Michael Kerrisk. He suggested an identical patch
to one I had already coded up and tested.
commit fe3d197f84 "x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds
tables" added two new prctl() operations, PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT and
PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT. However, no checks were included to ensure
that unused arguments are zero, as is done in many existing prctl()s
and as should be done for all new prctl()s. This patch adds the
required checks.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Suggested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150108223022.7F56FD13@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to
review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here
and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a
relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below).
Long Description:
This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the
management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel
allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables")
and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications
do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect
some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel
support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application
needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an
explicit signal from userspace.
PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to
require kernel's help in managing bounds tables.
PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't
want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel
won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX.
PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds
directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into
a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can
use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in
kernel is enabled.
Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves,
which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce
the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time.
Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time
because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS.
==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ====
MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information.
If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to
spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this
which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers
and some new "bounds tables".
They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by
the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables
are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for
not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes
address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced
earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory
over to it.
The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to
memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall)
to access the tables would obviously destroy performance.
==== Why not do this in userspace? ====
This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel.
However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel.
It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are
a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are
practical in the real-world, but here they are.
Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so
that we never have to allocate them?
A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual
area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds
directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of
user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB,
which is larger than the entire virtual address space today.
This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a
single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB
of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.
Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory
is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually
need bounds tables?
A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every
memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small,
constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger
scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the
parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The
kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls.
Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables
allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async
handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still
requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the
allocation state there.
Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
the kernel.
Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Optimized support for Intel "Cluster-on-Die" (CoD) topologies (Dave
Hansen)
- Various sched/idle refinements for better idle handling (Nicolas
Pitre, Daniel Lezcano, Chuansheng Liu, Vincent Guittot)
- sched/numa updates and optimizations (Rik van Riel)
- sysbench speedup (Vincent Guittot)
- capacity calculation cleanups/refactoring (Vincent Guittot)
- Various cleanups to thread group iteration (Oleg Nesterov)
- Double-rq-lock removal optimization and various refactorings
(Kirill Tkhai)
- various sched/deadline fixes
... and lots of other changes"
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (72 commits)
sched/dl: Use dl_bw_of() under rcu_read_lock_sched()
sched/fair: Delete resched_cpu() from idle_balance()
sched, time: Fix build error with 64 bit cputime_t on 32 bit systems
sched: Improve sysbench performance by fixing spurious active migration
sched/x86: Fix up typo in topology detection
x86, sched: Add new topology for multi-NUMA-node CPUs
sched/rt: Use resched_curr() in task_tick_rt()
sched: Use rq->rd in sched_setaffinity() under RCU read lock
sched: cleanup: Rename 'out_unlock' to 'out_free_new_mask'
sched: Use dl_bw_of() under RCU read lock
sched/fair: Remove duplicate code from can_migrate_task()
sched, mips, ia64: Remove __ARCH_WANT_UNLOCKED_CTXSW
sched: print_rq(): Don't use tasklist_lock
sched: normalize_rt_tasks(): Don't use _irqsave for tasklist_lock, use task_rq_lock()
sched: Fix the task-group check in tg_has_rt_tasks()
sched/fair: Leverage the idle state info when choosing the "idlest" cpu
sched: Let the scheduler see CPU idle states
sched/deadline: Fix inter- exclusive cpusets migrations
sched/deadline: Clear dl_entity params when setscheduling to different class
sched/numa: Kill the wrong/dead TASK_DEAD check in task_numa_fault()
...
Fix undefined behavior and compiler warning by replacing right shift 32
with upper_32_bits macro
Signed-off-by: Scotty Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu>
Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix minor errors and warning messages in kernel/sys.c. These errors were
reported by checkpatch while working with some modifications in sys.c
file. Fixing this first will help me to improve my further patches.
ERROR: trailing whitespace - 9
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition - 4
ERROR: spaces required around that '?' (ctx:VxO) - 10
ERROR: switch and case should be at the same indent - 3
total 26 errors & 3 warnings fixed.
Signed-off-by: vishnu.ps <vishnu.ps@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Dump the contents of the relevant struct_mm when we hit the bug condition.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of taking mm->mmap_sem inside prctl_set_mm_exe_file() move it out
and rename the helper to prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked(). This will allow
to reuse this function in a next patch.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Both times() and clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) have scalability
issues on large systems, due to both functions being serialized with a
lock.
The lock protects against reporting a wrong value, due to a thread in the
task group exiting, its statistics reporting up to the signal struct, and
that exited task's statistics being counted twice (or not at all).
Protecting that with a lock results in times() and clock_gettime() being
completely serialized on large systems.
This can be fixed by using a seqlock around the events that gather and
propagate statistics. As an additional benefit, the protection code can
be moved into thread_group_cputime(), slightly simplifying the calling
functions.
In the case of posix_cpu_clock_get_task() things can be simplified a
lot, because the calling function already ensures that the task sticks
around, and the rest is now taken care of in thread_group_cputime().
This way the statistics reporting code can run lockless.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org>
Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com
Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com
Cc: srao@redhat.com
Cc: lwoodman@redhat.com
Cc: atheurer@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140816134010.26a9b572@annuminas.surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Linus Torvalds