Using signed 32-bit types for UTC time leads to the y2038 overflow,
which is what happens in the sunrpc code at the moment.
This changes the sunrpc code over to use time64_t where possible.
The one exception is the gss_import_v{1,2}_context() function for
kerberos5, which uses 32-bit timestamps in the protocol. Here,
we can at least treat the numbers as 'unsigned', which extends the
range from 2038 to 2106.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Files under net/sunrpc/auth_gss/ do not yet have SPDX ID tags.
This directory is somewhat complicated because most of these files
have license boilerplate that is not strictly GPL 2.0.
In this patch I add ID tags where there is an obvious match. The
less recognizable licenses are still under research.
For reference, SPDX IDs added in this patch correspond to the
following license text:
GPL-2.0 https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0.html
GPL-2.0+ https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0+.html
BSD-3-Clause https://spdx.org/licenses/BSD-3-Clause.html
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Enable distributions to enforce the rejection of ancient and
insecure Kerberos enctypes in the kernel's RPCSEC_GSS
implementation. These are the single-DES encryption types that
were deprecated in 2012 by RFC 6649.
Enctypes that were deprecated more recently (by RFC 8429) remain
fully supported for now because they are still likely to be widely
used.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
The seq_send & seq_send64 fields in struct krb5_ctx are used as
atomically incrementing counters. This is implemented using cmpxchg() &
cmpxchg64() to implement what amount to custom versions of
atomic_fetch_inc() & atomic64_fetch_inc().
Besides the duplication, using cmpxchg64() has another major drawback in
that some 32 bit architectures don't provide it. As such commit
571ed1fd23 ("SUNRPC: Replace krb5_seq_lock with a lockless scheme")
resulted in build failures for some architectures.
Change seq_send to be an atomic_t and seq_send64 to be an atomic64_t,
then use atomic(64)_* functions to manipulate the values. The atomic64_t
type & associated functions are provided even on architectures which
lack real 64 bit atomic memory access via CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64 which
uses spinlocks to serialize access. This fixes the build failures for
architectures lacking cmpxchg64().
A potential alternative that was raised would be to provide cmpxchg64()
on the 32 bit architectures that currently lack it, using spinlocks.
However this would provide a version of cmpxchg64() with semantics a
little different to the implementations on architectures with real 64
bit atomics - the spinlock-based implementation would only work if all
access to the memory used with cmpxchg64() is *always* performed using
cmpxchg64(). That is not currently a requirement for users of
cmpxchg64(), and making it one seems questionable. As such avoiding
cmpxchg64() outside of architecture-specific code seems best,
particularly in cases where atomic64_t seems like a better fit anyway.
The CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64 implementation of atomic64_* functions will
use spinlocks & so faces the same issue, but with the key difference
that the memory backing an atomic64_t ought to always be accessed via
the atomic64_* functions anyway making the issue moot.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Fixes: 571ed1fd23 ("SUNRPC: Replace krb5_seq_lock with a lockless scheme")
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Writes may depend on the auth_gss crypto code, so we shouldn't be
allocating with GFP_KERNEL there.
This still leaves some crypto_alloc_* calls which end up doing
GFP_KERNEL allocations in the crypto code. Those could probably done at
crypto import time.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Direct data placement is not allowed when using flavors that
guarantee integrity or privacy. When such security flavors are in
effect, don't allow the use of Read and Write chunks for moving
individual data items. All messages larger than the inline threshold
are sent via Long Call or Long Reply.
On my systems (CX-3 Pro on FDR), for small I/O operations, the use
of Long messages adds only around 5 usecs of latency in each
direction.
Note that when integrity or encryption is used, the host CPU touches
every byte in these messages. Even if it could be used, data
movement offload doesn't buy much in this case.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
The skcpiher/shash conversion introduced a number of bugs in the
sunrpc code:
1) Missing calls to skcipher_request_set_tfm lead to crashes.
2) The allocation size of shash_desc is too small which leads to
memory corruption.
Fixes: 3b5cf20cf4 ("sunrpc: Use skcipher and ahash/shash")
Reported-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch replaces uses of blkcipher with skcipher and the long
obsolete hash interface with either shash (for non-SG users) and
ahash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It's always set to whatever CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG is, so just use that.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Note conflict: Chuck's patches modified (and made static)
gss_mech_get_by_OID, which is still needed by gss-proxy patches.
The conflict resolution is a bit minimal; we may want some more cleanup.
We expose this parameter for a future caller.
It will be used to extract the endtime from the gss-proxy upcall mechanism,
in order to set the rsc cache expiration time.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
The NFSv4 SECINFO operation returns a list of security flavors that
the server supports for a particular share. An NFSv4 client is
supposed to pick a pseudoflavor it supports that corresponds to one
of the flavors returned by the server.
GSS flavors in this list have a GSS tuple that identify a specific
GSS pseudoflavor.
Currently our client ignores the GSS tuple's "qop" value. A
matching pseudoflavor is chosen based only on the OID and service
value.
So far this omission has not had much effect on Linux. The NFSv4
protocol currently supports only one qop value: GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
also known as zero.
However, if an NFSv4 server happens to return something other than
zero in the qop field, our client won't notice. This could cause
the client to behave in incorrect ways that could have security
implications.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The current GSS mech switch can find and load GSS pseudoflavor
modules by name ("krb5") or pseudoflavor number ("390003"), but
cannot find GSS modules by GSS tuple:
[ "1.2.840.113554.1.2.2", GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE ]
This is important when dealing with a SECINFO request. A SECINFO
reply contains a list of flavors the server supports for the
requested export, but GSS flavors also have a GSS tuple that maps
to a pseudoflavor (like 390003 for krb5).
If the GSS module that supports the OID in the tuple is not loaded,
our client is not able to load that module dynamically to support
that pseudoflavor.
Add a way for the GSS mech switch to load GSS pseudoflavor support
by OID before searching for the pseudoflavor that matches the OID
and service.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The NFSv4 SECINFO procedure returns a list of security flavors. Any
GSS flavor also has a GSS tuple containing an OID, a quality-of-
protection value, and a service value, which specifies a particular
GSS pseudoflavor.
For simplicity and efficiency, I'd like to return each GSS tuple
from the NFSv4 SECINFO XDR decoder and pass it straight into the RPC
client.
Define a data structure that is visible to both the NFS client and
the RPC client. Take structure and field names from the relevant
standards to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:412:22: warning: incorrect type in assignment
(different address spaces)
- svc_partial_recvfrom now takes a struct kvec, so the variable
save_iovbase needs to be an ordinary (void *)
Make a bunch of variables in net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c static
Fix a couple of "warning: symbol 'foo' was not declared. Should it be
static?" reports.
Fix a couple of conflicting function declarations.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Commit b0b0c0a26e "nfsd: add proc file listing kernel's gss_krb5
enctypes" added an nunnecessary dependency of nfsd on the auth_rpcgss
module.
It's a little ad hoc, but since the only piece of information nfsd needs
from rpcsec_gss_krb5 is a single static string, one solution is just to
share it with an include file.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Michael Guntsche <mike@it-loops.com>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
This reverts commit 411b5e0561.
Olga Kornievskaia reports:
Problem: linux client mounting linux server using rc4-hmac-md5
enctype. gssd fails with create a context after receiving a reply from
the server.
Diagnose: putting printout statements in the server kernel and
kerberos libraries revealed that client and server derived different
integrity keys.
Server kernel code was at fault due the the commit
[aglo@skydive linux-pnfs]$ git show 411b5e0561
Trond: The problem is that since it relies on virt_to_page(), you cannot
call sg_set_buf() for data in the const section.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.36+]
Make the value in gm_upcall_enctypes just the enctype values.
This allows the values to be used more easily elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* 'nfs-for-2.6.37' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/nfs-2.6:
net/sunrpc: Use static const char arrays
nfs4: fix channel attribute sanity-checks
NFSv4.1: Use more sensible names for 'initialize_mountpoint'
NFSv4.1: pnfs: filelayout: add driver's LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO infrastructure
NFSv4.1: pnfs: add LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO infrastructure
NFS: client needs to maintain list of inodes with active layouts
NFS: create and destroy inode's layout cache
NFSv4.1: pnfs: filelayout: introduce minimal file layout driver
NFSv4.1: pnfs: full mount/umount infrastructure
NFS: set layout driver
NFS: ask for layouttypes during v4 fsinfo call
NFS: change stateid to be a union
NFSv4.1: pnfsd, pnfs: protocol level pnfs constants
SUNRPC: define xdr_decode_opaque_fixed
NFSD: remove duplicate NFS4_STATEID_SIZE
krb5 miss returning error to up layer when import security context,
it may be return ok though it has failed to import security context.
Signed-off-by: Bian Naimeng <biannm@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Again, we can deadlock if the memory reclaim triggers a writeback that
requires a rpcsec_gss credential lookup.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add necessary changes to add kernel support for the rc4-hmac Kerberos
encryption type used by Microsoft and described in rfc4757.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
All encryption types use a confounder at the beginning of the
wrap token. In all encryption types except arcfour-hmac, the
confounder is the same as the blocksize. arcfour-hmac has a
blocksize of one, but uses an eight byte confounder.
Add an entry to the crypto framework definitions for the
confounder length and change the wrap/unwrap code to use
the confounder length rather than assuming it is always
the blocksize.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This is needed for deriving arcfour-hmac keys "on the fly"
using the sequence number or checksu
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add the remaining pieces to enable support for Kerberos AES
encryption types.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add the final pieces to support the triple-des encryption type.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The text based upcall now indicates which Kerberos encryption types are
supported by the kernel rpcsecgss code. This is used by gssd to
determine which encryption types it should attempt to negotiate
when creating a context with a server.
The server principal's database and keytab encryption types are
what limits what it should negotiate. Therefore, its keytab
should be created with only the enctypes listed by this file.
Currently we support des-cbc-crc, des-cbc-md4 and des-cbc-md5
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
For encryption types other than DES, gssd sends down context information
in a new format. This new format includes the information needed to
support the new Kerberos GSS-API tokens defined in rfc4121.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Import the code to derive Kerberos keys from a base key into the
kernel. This will allow us to change the format of the context
information sent down from gssd to include only a single key.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Encryption types besides DES may use a keyed checksum (hmac).
Modify the make_checksum() function to allow for a key
and take care of enctype-specific processing such as truncating
the resulting hash.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add enctype framework and change functions to use the generic
values from it rather than the values hard-coded for des.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Prepare for new context format by splitting out the old "v1"
context processing function
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add encryption type to the krb5 context structure and use it to switch
to the correct functions depending on the encryption type.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the context allocation fails, the function currently returns a random
error code, since the variable 'p' still points to a valid memory location.
Ensure that it returns ENOMEM...
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Since the credentials may be allocated during the call to rpc_new_task(),
which again may be called by a memory allocator...
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Return an error from gss_import_sec_context_kerberos if the
negotiated context contains encryption or checksum types not
supported by the kernel code.
This fixes an Oops because success was assumed and later code found
no internal_ctx_id.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Adds oid values to the gss_api mechanism structures. On the NFSV4 server
side, these are required as part of the security triple (oid,qop,service)
information being sent in the response of the SECINFO operation.
Signed-off-by: Usha Ketineni <uketinen@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The tk_pid field is an unsigned short. The proper print format specifier for
that type is %5u, not %4d.
Also clean up some miscellaneous print formatting nits.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We're currently not actually using seed or seed_init.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The sealalg is checked in several places, giving the impression it could be
either SEAL_ALG_NONE or SEAL_ALG_DES. But in fact SEAL_ALG_NONE seems to
be sufficient only for making mic's, and all the contexts we get must be
capable of wrapping as well. So the sealalg must be SEAL_ALG_DES. As
with signalg, just check for the right value on the downcall and ignore it
otherwise. Similarly, tighten expectations for the sealalg on incoming
tokens, in case we do support other values eventually.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Arnd Bergmann