linux/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S

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/*
* Low-level CPU initialisation
* Based on arch/arm/kernel/head.S
*
* Copyright (C) 1994-2002 Russell King
* Copyright (C) 2003-2012 ARM Ltd.
* Authors: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
* Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h>
#include <asm/assembler.h>
#include <asm/boot.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
#include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
#include <asm/memory.h>
#include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/virt.h>
#include "efi-header.S"
#define __PHYS_OFFSET (KERNEL_START - TEXT_OFFSET)
#if (TEXT_OFFSET & 0xfff) != 0
#error TEXT_OFFSET must be at least 4KB aligned
#elif (PAGE_OFFSET & 0x1fffff) != 0
#error PAGE_OFFSET must be at least 2MB aligned
#elif TEXT_OFFSET > 0x1fffff
#error TEXT_OFFSET must be less than 2MB
#endif
/*
* Kernel startup entry point.
* ---------------------------
*
* The requirements are:
* MMU = off, D-cache = off, I-cache = on or off,
* x0 = physical address to the FDT blob.
*
* This code is mostly position independent so you call this at
* __pa(PAGE_OFFSET + TEXT_OFFSET).
*
* Note that the callee-saved registers are used for storing variables
* that are useful before the MMU is enabled. The allocations are described
* in the entry routines.
*/
__HEAD
_head:
/*
* DO NOT MODIFY. Image header expected by Linux boot-loaders.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
* This add instruction has no meaningful effect except that
* its opcode forms the magic "MZ" signature required by UEFI.
*/
add x13, x18, #0x16
b stext
#else
b stext // branch to kernel start, magic
.long 0 // reserved
#endif
le64sym _kernel_offset_le // Image load offset from start of RAM, little-endian
le64sym _kernel_size_le // Effective size of kernel image, little-endian
le64sym _kernel_flags_le // Informative flags, little-endian
.quad 0 // reserved
.quad 0 // reserved
.quad 0 // reserved
.ascii "ARM\x64" // Magic number
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
.long pe_header - _head // Offset to the PE header.
pe_header:
__EFI_PE_HEADER
#else
.long 0 // reserved
#endif
__INIT
/*
* The following callee saved general purpose registers are used on the
* primary lowlevel boot path:
*
* Register Scope Purpose
* x21 stext() .. start_kernel() FDT pointer passed at boot in x0
* x23 stext() .. start_kernel() physical misalignment/KASLR offset
* x28 __create_page_tables() callee preserved temp register
* x19/x20 __primary_switch() callee preserved temp registers
*/
ENTRY(stext)
bl preserve_boot_args
bl el2_setup // Drop to EL1, w0=cpu_boot_mode
adrp x23, __PHYS_OFFSET
and x23, x23, MIN_KIMG_ALIGN - 1 // KASLR offset, defaults to 0
bl set_cpu_boot_mode_flag
bl __create_page_tables
/*
* The following calls CPU setup code, see arch/arm64/mm/proc.S for
* details.
* On return, the CPU will be ready for the MMU to be turned on and
* the TCR will have been set.
*/
bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor
b __primary_switch
ENDPROC(stext)
/*
* Preserve the arguments passed by the bootloader in x0 .. x3
*/
preserve_boot_args:
mov x21, x0 // x21=FDT
adr_l x0, boot_args // record the contents of
stp x21, x1, [x0] // x0 .. x3 at kernel entry
stp x2, x3, [x0, #16]
dmb sy // needed before dc ivac with
// MMU off
mov x1, #0x20 // 4 x 8 bytes
b __inval_dcache_area // tail call
ENDPROC(preserve_boot_args)
/*
* Macro to create a table entry to the next page.
*
* tbl: page table address
* virt: virtual address
* shift: #imm page table shift
* ptrs: #imm pointers per table page
*
* Preserves: virt
* Corrupts: ptrs, tmp1, tmp2
* Returns: tbl -> next level table page address
*/
.macro create_table_entry, tbl, virt, shift, ptrs, tmp1, tmp2
add \tmp1, \tbl, #PAGE_SIZE
phys_to_pte \tmp2, \tmp1
orr \tmp2, \tmp2, #PMD_TYPE_TABLE // address of next table and entry type
lsr \tmp1, \virt, #\shift
sub \ptrs, \ptrs, #1
and \tmp1, \tmp1, \ptrs // table index
str \tmp2, [\tbl, \tmp1, lsl #3]
add \tbl, \tbl, #PAGE_SIZE // next level table page
.endm
/*
* Macro to populate page table entries, these entries can be pointers to the next level
* or last level entries pointing to physical memory.
*
* tbl: page table address
* rtbl: pointer to page table or physical memory
* index: start index to write
* eindex: end index to write - [index, eindex] written to
* flags: flags for pagetable entry to or in
* inc: increment to rtbl between each entry
* tmp1: temporary variable
*
* Preserves: tbl, eindex, flags, inc
* Corrupts: index, tmp1
* Returns: rtbl
*/
.macro populate_entries, tbl, rtbl, index, eindex, flags, inc, tmp1
.Lpe\@: phys_to_pte \tmp1, \rtbl
orr \tmp1, \tmp1, \flags // tmp1 = table entry
str \tmp1, [\tbl, \index, lsl #3]
add \rtbl, \rtbl, \inc // rtbl = pa next level
add \index, \index, #1
cmp \index, \eindex
b.ls .Lpe\@
.endm
/*
* Compute indices of table entries from virtual address range. If multiple entries
* were needed in the previous page table level then the next page table level is assumed
* to be composed of multiple pages. (This effectively scales the end index).
*
* vstart: virtual address of start of range
* vend: virtual address of end of range
* shift: shift used to transform virtual address into index
* ptrs: number of entries in page table
* istart: index in table corresponding to vstart
* iend: index in table corresponding to vend
* count: On entry: how many extra entries were required in previous level, scales
* our end index.
* On exit: returns how many extra entries required for next page table level
*
* Preserves: vstart, vend, shift, ptrs
* Returns: istart, iend, count
*/
.macro compute_indices, vstart, vend, shift, ptrs, istart, iend, count
lsr \iend, \vend, \shift
mov \istart, \ptrs
sub \istart, \istart, #1
and \iend, \iend, \istart // iend = (vend >> shift) & (ptrs - 1)
mov \istart, \ptrs
mul \istart, \istart, \count
add \iend, \iend, \istart // iend += (count - 1) * ptrs
// our entries span multiple tables
lsr \istart, \vstart, \shift
mov \count, \ptrs
sub \count, \count, #1
and \istart, \istart, \count
sub \count, \iend, \istart
.endm
/*
* Map memory for specified virtual address range. Each level of page table needed supports
* multiple entries. If a level requires n entries the next page table level is assumed to be
* formed from n pages.
*
* tbl: location of page table
* rtbl: address to be used for first level page table entry (typically tbl + PAGE_SIZE)
* vstart: start address to map
* vend: end address to map - we map [vstart, vend]
* flags: flags to use to map last level entries
* phys: physical address corresponding to vstart - physical memory is contiguous
* pgds: the number of pgd entries
*
* Temporaries: istart, iend, tmp, count, sv - these need to be different registers
* Preserves: vstart, vend, flags
* Corrupts: tbl, rtbl, istart, iend, tmp, count, sv
*/
.macro map_memory, tbl, rtbl, vstart, vend, flags, phys, pgds, istart, iend, tmp, count, sv
add \rtbl, \tbl, #PAGE_SIZE
mov \sv, \rtbl
mov \count, #0
compute_indices \vstart, \vend, #PGDIR_SHIFT, \pgds, \istart, \iend, \count
populate_entries \tbl, \rtbl, \istart, \iend, #PMD_TYPE_TABLE, #PAGE_SIZE, \tmp
mov \tbl, \sv
mov \sv, \rtbl
#if SWAPPER_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
compute_indices \vstart, \vend, #PUD_SHIFT, #PTRS_PER_PUD, \istart, \iend, \count
populate_entries \tbl, \rtbl, \istart, \iend, #PMD_TYPE_TABLE, #PAGE_SIZE, \tmp
mov \tbl, \sv
mov \sv, \rtbl
#endif
#if SWAPPER_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
compute_indices \vstart, \vend, #SWAPPER_TABLE_SHIFT, #PTRS_PER_PMD, \istart, \iend, \count
populate_entries \tbl, \rtbl, \istart, \iend, #PMD_TYPE_TABLE, #PAGE_SIZE, \tmp
mov \tbl, \sv
#endif
compute_indices \vstart, \vend, #SWAPPER_BLOCK_SHIFT, #PTRS_PER_PTE, \istart, \iend, \count
bic \count, \phys, #SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE - 1
populate_entries \tbl, \count, \istart, \iend, \flags, #SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE, \tmp
.endm
/*
* Setup the initial page tables. We only setup the barest amount which is
* required to get the kernel running. The following sections are required:
* - identity mapping to enable the MMU (low address, TTBR0)
* - first few MB of the kernel linear mapping to jump to once the MMU has
* been enabled
*/
__create_page_tables:
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
mov x28, lr
/*
* Invalidate the idmap and swapper page tables to avoid potential
* dirty cache lines being evicted.
*/
adrp x0, idmap_pg_dir
adrp x1, swapper_pg_end
sub x1, x1, x0
bl __inval_dcache_area
/*
* Clear the idmap and swapper page tables.
*/
adrp x0, idmap_pg_dir
adrp x1, swapper_pg_end
sub x1, x1, x0
1: stp xzr, xzr, [x0], #16
stp xzr, xzr, [x0], #16
stp xzr, xzr, [x0], #16
stp xzr, xzr, [x0], #16
subs x1, x1, #64
b.ne 1b
mov x7, SWAPPER_MM_MMUFLAGS
/*
* Create the identity mapping.
*/
adrp x0, idmap_pg_dir
adrp x3, __idmap_text_start // __pa(__idmap_text_start)
/*
* VA_BITS may be too small to allow for an ID mapping to be created
* that covers system RAM if that is located sufficiently high in the
* physical address space. So for the ID map, use an extended virtual
* range in that case, and configure an additional translation level
* if needed.
*
* Calculate the maximum allowed value for TCR_EL1.T0SZ so that the
* entire ID map region can be mapped. As T0SZ == (64 - #bits used),
* this number conveniently equals the number of leading zeroes in
* the physical address of __idmap_text_end.
*/
adrp x5, __idmap_text_end
clz x5, x5
cmp x5, TCR_T0SZ(VA_BITS) // default T0SZ small enough?
b.ge 1f // .. then skip VA range extension
adr_l x6, idmap_t0sz
str x5, [x6]
dmb sy
dc ivac, x6 // Invalidate potentially stale cache line
#if (VA_BITS < 48)
#define EXTRA_SHIFT (PGDIR_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT - 3)
#define EXTRA_PTRS (1 << (PHYS_MASK_SHIFT - EXTRA_SHIFT))
/*
* If VA_BITS < 48, we have to configure an additional table level.
* First, we have to verify our assumption that the current value of
* VA_BITS was chosen such that all translation levels are fully
* utilised, and that lowering T0SZ will always result in an additional
* translation level to be configured.
*/
#if VA_BITS != EXTRA_SHIFT
#error "Mismatch between VA_BITS and page size/number of translation levels"
#endif
mov x4, EXTRA_PTRS
create_table_entry x0, x3, EXTRA_SHIFT, x4, x5, x6
#else
/*
* If VA_BITS == 48, we don't have to configure an additional
* translation level, but the top-level table has more entries.
*/
mov x4, #1 << (PHYS_MASK_SHIFT - PGDIR_SHIFT)
str_l x4, idmap_ptrs_per_pgd, x5
#endif
1:
ldr_l x4, idmap_ptrs_per_pgd
mov x5, x3 // __pa(__idmap_text_start)
adr_l x6, __idmap_text_end // __pa(__idmap_text_end)
map_memory x0, x1, x3, x6, x7, x3, x4, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14
/*
* Map the kernel image (starting with PHYS_OFFSET).
*/
adrp x0, swapper_pg_dir
mov_q x5, KIMAGE_VADDR + TEXT_OFFSET // compile time __va(_text)
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
add x5, x5, x23 // add KASLR displacement
mov x4, PTRS_PER_PGD
adrp x6, _end // runtime __pa(_end)
adrp x3, _text // runtime __pa(_text)
sub x6, x6, x3 // _end - _text
add x6, x6, x5 // runtime __va(_end)
map_memory x0, x1, x5, x6, x7, x3, x4, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14
/*
* Since the page tables have been populated with non-cacheable
* accesses (MMU disabled), invalidate the idmap and swapper page
* tables again to remove any speculatively loaded cache lines.
*/
adrp x0, idmap_pg_dir
adrp x1, swapper_pg_end
sub x1, x1, x0
dmb sy
bl __inval_dcache_area
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
ret x28
ENDPROC(__create_page_tables)
.ltorg
/*
* The following fragment of code is executed with the MMU enabled.
*
* x0 = __PHYS_OFFSET
*/
__primary_switched:
adrp x4, init_thread_union
add sp, x4, #THREAD_SIZE
arm64: split thread_info from task stack This patch moves arm64's struct thread_info from the task stack into task_struct. This protects thread_info from corruption in the case of stack overflows, and makes its address harder to determine if stack addresses are leaked, making a number of attacks more difficult. Precise detection and handling of overflow is left for subsequent patches. Largely, this involves changing code to store the task_struct in sp_el0, and acquire the thread_info from the task struct. Core code now implements current_thread_info(), and as noted in <linux/sched.h> this relies on offsetof(task_struct, thread_info) == 0, enforced by core code. This change means that the 'tsk' register used in entry.S now points to a task_struct, rather than a thread_info as it used to. To make this clear, the TI_* field offsets are renamed to TSK_TI_*, with asm-offsets appropriately updated to account for the structural change. Userspace clobbers sp_el0, and we can no longer restore this from the stack. Instead, the current task is cached in a per-cpu variable that we can safely access from early assembly as interrupts are disabled (and we are thus not preemptible). Both secondary entry and idle are updated to stash the sp and task pointer separately. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-11-04 04:23:13 +08:00
adr_l x5, init_task
msr sp_el0, x5 // Save thread_info
adr_l x8, vectors // load VBAR_EL1 with virtual
msr vbar_el1, x8 // vector table address
isb
stp xzr, x30, [sp, #-16]!
mov x29, sp
str_l x21, __fdt_pointer, x5 // Save FDT pointer
ldr_l x4, kimage_vaddr // Save the offset between
sub x4, x4, x0 // the kernel virtual and
str_l x4, kimage_voffset, x5 // physical mappings
// Clear BSS
adr_l x0, __bss_start
mov x1, xzr
adr_l x2, __bss_stop
sub x2, x2, x0
bl __pi_memset
arm64: mm: place empty_zero_page in bss Currently the zero page is set up in paging_init, and thus we cannot use the zero page earlier. We use the zero page as a reserved TTBR value from which no TLB entries may be allocated (e.g. when uninstalling the idmap). To enable such usage earlier (as may be required for invasive changes to the kernel page tables), and to minimise the time that the idmap is active, we need to be able to use the zero page before paging_init. This patch follows the example set by x86, by allocating the zero page at compile time, in .bss. This means that the zero page itself is available immediately upon entry to start_kernel (as we zero .bss before this), and also means that the zero page takes up no space in the raw Image binary. The associated struct page is allocated in bootmem_init, and remains unavailable until this time. Outside of arch code, the only users of empty_zero_page assume that the empty_zero_page symbol refers to the zeroed memory itself, and that ZERO_PAGE(x) must be used to acquire the associated struct page, following the example of x86. This patch also brings arm64 inline with these assumptions. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-25 19:44:57 +08:00
dsb ishst // Make zero page visible to PTW
2015-10-12 23:52:58 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
bl kasan_early_init
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
tst x23, ~(MIN_KIMG_ALIGN - 1) // already running randomized?
b.ne 0f
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
mov x0, x21 // pass FDT address in x0
bl kaslr_early_init // parse FDT for KASLR options
cbz x0, 0f // KASLR disabled? just proceed
orr x23, x23, x0 // record KASLR offset
ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 // we must enable KASLR, return
ret // to __primary_switch()
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
0:
2015-10-12 23:52:58 +08:00
#endif
arm64: unwind: reference pt_regs via embedded stack frame As it turns out, the unwind code is slightly broken, and probably has been for a while. The problem is in the dumping of the exception stack, which is intended to dump the contents of the pt_regs struct at each level in the call stack where an exception was taken and routed to a routine marked as __exception (which means its stack frame is right below the pt_regs struct on the stack). 'Right below the pt_regs struct' is ill defined, though: the unwind code assigns 'frame pointer + 0x10' to the .sp member of the stackframe struct at each level, and dump_backtrace() happily dereferences that as the pt_regs pointer when encountering an __exception routine. However, the actual size of the stack frame created by this routine (which could be one of many __exception routines we have in the kernel) is not known, and so frame.sp is pretty useless to figure out where struct pt_regs really is. So it seems the only way to ensure that we can find our struct pt_regs when walking the stack frames is to put it at a known fixed offset of the stack frame pointer that is passed to such __exception routines. The simplest way to do that is to put it inside pt_regs itself, which is the main change implemented by this patch. As a bonus, doing this allows us to get rid of a fair amount of cruft related to walking from one stack to the other, which is especially nice since we intend to introduce yet another stack for overflow handling once we add support for vmapped stacks. It also fixes an inconsistency where we only add a stack frame pointing to ELR_EL1 if we are executing from the IRQ stack but not when we are executing from the task stack. To consistly identify exceptions regs even in the presence of exceptions taken from entry code, we must check whether the next frame was created by entry text, rather than whether the current frame was crated by exception text. To avoid backtracing using PCs that fall in the idmap, or are controlled by userspace, we must explcitly zero the FP and LR in startup paths, and must ensure that the frame embedded in pt_regs is zeroed upon entry from EL0. To avoid these NULL entries showin in the backtrace, unwind_frame() is updated to avoid them. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [Mark: compare current frame against .entry.text, avoid bogus PCs] Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-07-23 01:45:33 +08:00
add sp, sp, #16
mov x29, #0
mov x30, #0
b start_kernel
ENDPROC(__primary_switched)
/*
* end early head section, begin head code that is also used for
* hotplug and needs to have the same protections as the text region
*/
.section ".idmap.text","awx"
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
ENTRY(kimage_vaddr)
.quad _text - TEXT_OFFSET
/*
* If we're fortunate enough to boot at EL2, ensure that the world is
* sane before dropping to EL1.
*
* Returns either BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1 or BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 in w0 if
* booted in EL1 or EL2 respectively.
*/
ENTRY(el2_setup)
msr SPsel, #1 // We want to use SP_EL{1,2}
mrs x0, CurrentEL
cmp x0, #CurrentEL_EL2
b.eq 1f
mov_q x0, (SCTLR_EL1_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL1)
msr sctlr_el1, x0
mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1 // This cpu booted in EL1
isb
ret
1: mov_q x0, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL2)
msr sctlr_el2, x0
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
/*
* Check for VHE being present. For the rest of the EL2 setup,
* x2 being non-zero indicates that we do have VHE, and that the
* kernel is intended to run at EL2.
*/
mrs x2, id_aa64mmfr1_el1
ubfx x2, x2, #8, #4
#else
mov x2, xzr
#endif
/* Hyp configuration. */
mov x0, #HCR_RW // 64-bit EL1
cbz x2, set_hcr
orr x0, x0, #HCR_TGE // Enable Host Extensions
orr x0, x0, #HCR_E2H
set_hcr:
msr hcr_el2, x0
isb
/*
* Allow Non-secure EL1 and EL0 to access physical timer and counter.
* This is not necessary for VHE, since the host kernel runs in EL2,
* and EL0 accesses are configured in the later stage of boot process.
* Note that when HCR_EL2.E2H == 1, CNTHCTL_EL2 has the same bit layout
* as CNTKCTL_EL1, and CNTKCTL_EL1 accessing instructions are redefined
* to access CNTHCTL_EL2. This allows the kernel designed to run at EL1
* to transparently mess with the EL0 bits via CNTKCTL_EL1 access in
* EL2.
*/
cbnz x2, 1f
mrs x0, cnthctl_el2
orr x0, x0, #3 // Enable EL1 physical timers
msr cnthctl_el2, x0
1:
msr cntvoff_el2, xzr // Clear virtual offset
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_GIC_V3
/* GICv3 system register access */
mrs x0, id_aa64pfr0_el1
ubfx x0, x0, #24, #4
cmp x0, #1
b.ne 3f
mrs_s x0, SYS_ICC_SRE_EL2
orr x0, x0, #ICC_SRE_EL2_SRE // Set ICC_SRE_EL2.SRE==1
orr x0, x0, #ICC_SRE_EL2_ENABLE // Set ICC_SRE_EL2.Enable==1
msr_s SYS_ICC_SRE_EL2, x0
isb // Make sure SRE is now set
mrs_s x0, SYS_ICC_SRE_EL2 // Read SRE back,
tbz x0, #0, 3f // and check that it sticks
msr_s SYS_ICH_HCR_EL2, xzr // Reset ICC_HCR_EL2 to defaults
3:
#endif
/* Populate ID registers. */
mrs x0, midr_el1
mrs x1, mpidr_el1
msr vpidr_el2, x0
msr vmpidr_el2, x1
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
msr hstr_el2, xzr // Disable CP15 traps to EL2
#endif
/* EL2 debug */
mrs x1, id_aa64dfr0_el1 // Check ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 PMUVer
sbfx x0, x1, #8, #4
cmp x0, #1
b.lt 4f // Skip if no PMU present
mrs x0, pmcr_el0 // Disable debug access traps
ubfx x0, x0, #11, #5 // to EL2 and allow access to
4:
csel x3, xzr, x0, lt // all PMU counters from EL1
/* Statistical profiling */
ubfx x0, x1, #32, #4 // Check ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 PMSVer
cbz x0, 7f // Skip if SPE not present
cbnz x2, 6f // VHE?
mrs_s x4, SYS_PMBIDR_EL1 // If SPE available at EL2,
and x4, x4, #(1 << SYS_PMBIDR_EL1_P_SHIFT)
cbnz x4, 5f // then permit sampling of physical
mov x4, #(1 << SYS_PMSCR_EL2_PCT_SHIFT | \
1 << SYS_PMSCR_EL2_PA_SHIFT)
msr_s SYS_PMSCR_EL2, x4 // addresses and physical counter
5:
mov x1, #(MDCR_EL2_E2PB_MASK << MDCR_EL2_E2PB_SHIFT)
orr x3, x3, x1 // If we don't have VHE, then
b 7f // use EL1&0 translation.
6: // For VHE, use EL2 translation
orr x3, x3, #MDCR_EL2_TPMS // and disable access from EL1
7:
msr mdcr_el2, x3 // Configure debug traps
/* LORegions */
mrs x1, id_aa64mmfr1_el1
ubfx x0, x1, #ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT, 4
cbz x0, 1f
msr_s SYS_LORC_EL1, xzr
1:
/* Stage-2 translation */
msr vttbr_el2, xzr
cbz x2, install_el2_stub
mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 // This CPU booted in EL2
isb
ret
install_el2_stub:
/*
* When VHE is not in use, early init of EL2 and EL1 needs to be
* done here.
* When VHE _is_ in use, EL1 will not be used in the host and
* requires no configuration, and all non-hyp-specific EL2 setup
* will be done via the _EL1 system register aliases in __cpu_setup.
*/
mov_q x0, (SCTLR_EL1_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL1)
msr sctlr_el1, x0
/* Coprocessor traps. */
mov x0, #0x33ff
msr cptr_el2, x0 // Disable copro. traps to EL2
/* SVE register access */
mrs x1, id_aa64pfr0_el1
ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT, #4
cbz x1, 7f
bic x0, x0, #CPTR_EL2_TZ // Also disable SVE traps
msr cptr_el2, x0 // Disable copro. traps to EL2
isb
mov x1, #ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK // SVE: Enable full vector
msr_s SYS_ZCR_EL2, x1 // length for EL1.
/* Hypervisor stub */
7: adr_l x0, __hyp_stub_vectors
msr vbar_el2, x0
/* spsr */
mov x0, #(PSR_F_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_D_BIT |\
PSR_MODE_EL1h)
msr spsr_el2, x0
msr elr_el2, lr
mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 // This CPU booted in EL2
eret
ENDPROC(el2_setup)
/*
* Sets the __boot_cpu_mode flag depending on the CPU boot mode passed
* in w0. See arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h for more info.
*/
set_cpu_boot_mode_flag:
adr_l x1, __boot_cpu_mode
cmp w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2
b.ne 1f
add x1, x1, #4
1: str w0, [x1] // This CPU has booted in EL1
dmb sy
dc ivac, x1 // Invalidate potentially stale cache line
ret
ENDPROC(set_cpu_boot_mode_flag)
/*
* These values are written with the MMU off, but read with the MMU on.
* Writers will invalidate the corresponding address, discarding up to a
* 'Cache Writeback Granule' (CWG) worth of data. The linker script ensures
* sufficient alignment that the CWG doesn't overlap another section.
*/
.pushsection ".mmuoff.data.write", "aw"
/*
* We need to find out the CPU boot mode long after boot, so we need to
* store it in a writable variable.
*
* This is not in .bss, because we set it sufficiently early that the boot-time
* zeroing of .bss would clobber it.
*/
ENTRY(__boot_cpu_mode)
.long BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2
.long BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1
/*
* The booting CPU updates the failed status @__early_cpu_boot_status,
* with MMU turned off.
*/
ENTRY(__early_cpu_boot_status)
.long 0
.popsection
/*
* This provides a "holding pen" for platforms to hold all secondary
* cores are held until we're ready for them to initialise.
*/
ENTRY(secondary_holding_pen)
bl el2_setup // Drop to EL1, w0=cpu_boot_mode
bl set_cpu_boot_mode_flag
mrs x0, mpidr_el1
mov_q x1, MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK
and x0, x0, x1
adr_l x3, secondary_holding_pen_release
pen: ldr x4, [x3]
cmp x4, x0
b.eq secondary_startup
wfe
b pen
ENDPROC(secondary_holding_pen)
/*
* Secondary entry point that jumps straight into the kernel. Only to
* be used where CPUs are brought online dynamically by the kernel.
*/
ENTRY(secondary_entry)
bl el2_setup // Drop to EL1
bl set_cpu_boot_mode_flag
b secondary_startup
ENDPROC(secondary_entry)
secondary_startup:
/*
* Common entry point for secondary CPUs.
*/
bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor
bl __enable_mmu
ldr x8, =__secondary_switched
br x8
ENDPROC(secondary_startup)
__secondary_switched:
adr_l x5, vectors
msr vbar_el1, x5
isb
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
adr_l x0, secondary_data
arm64: split thread_info from task stack This patch moves arm64's struct thread_info from the task stack into task_struct. This protects thread_info from corruption in the case of stack overflows, and makes its address harder to determine if stack addresses are leaked, making a number of attacks more difficult. Precise detection and handling of overflow is left for subsequent patches. Largely, this involves changing code to store the task_struct in sp_el0, and acquire the thread_info from the task struct. Core code now implements current_thread_info(), and as noted in <linux/sched.h> this relies on offsetof(task_struct, thread_info) == 0, enforced by core code. This change means that the 'tsk' register used in entry.S now points to a task_struct, rather than a thread_info as it used to. To make this clear, the TI_* field offsets are renamed to TSK_TI_*, with asm-offsets appropriately updated to account for the structural change. Userspace clobbers sp_el0, and we can no longer restore this from the stack. Instead, the current task is cached in a per-cpu variable that we can safely access from early assembly as interrupts are disabled (and we are thus not preemptible). Both secondary entry and idle are updated to stash the sp and task pointer separately. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-11-04 04:23:13 +08:00
ldr x1, [x0, #CPU_BOOT_STACK] // get secondary_data.stack
mov sp, x1
ldr x2, [x0, #CPU_BOOT_TASK]
msr sp_el0, x2
mov x29, #0
arm64: unwind: reference pt_regs via embedded stack frame As it turns out, the unwind code is slightly broken, and probably has been for a while. The problem is in the dumping of the exception stack, which is intended to dump the contents of the pt_regs struct at each level in the call stack where an exception was taken and routed to a routine marked as __exception (which means its stack frame is right below the pt_regs struct on the stack). 'Right below the pt_regs struct' is ill defined, though: the unwind code assigns 'frame pointer + 0x10' to the .sp member of the stackframe struct at each level, and dump_backtrace() happily dereferences that as the pt_regs pointer when encountering an __exception routine. However, the actual size of the stack frame created by this routine (which could be one of many __exception routines we have in the kernel) is not known, and so frame.sp is pretty useless to figure out where struct pt_regs really is. So it seems the only way to ensure that we can find our struct pt_regs when walking the stack frames is to put it at a known fixed offset of the stack frame pointer that is passed to such __exception routines. The simplest way to do that is to put it inside pt_regs itself, which is the main change implemented by this patch. As a bonus, doing this allows us to get rid of a fair amount of cruft related to walking from one stack to the other, which is especially nice since we intend to introduce yet another stack for overflow handling once we add support for vmapped stacks. It also fixes an inconsistency where we only add a stack frame pointing to ELR_EL1 if we are executing from the IRQ stack but not when we are executing from the task stack. To consistly identify exceptions regs even in the presence of exceptions taken from entry code, we must check whether the next frame was created by entry text, rather than whether the current frame was crated by exception text. To avoid backtracing using PCs that fall in the idmap, or are controlled by userspace, we must explcitly zero the FP and LR in startup paths, and must ensure that the frame embedded in pt_regs is zeroed upon entry from EL0. To avoid these NULL entries showin in the backtrace, unwind_frame() is updated to avoid them. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [Mark: compare current frame against .entry.text, avoid bogus PCs] Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-07-23 01:45:33 +08:00
mov x30, #0
b secondary_start_kernel
ENDPROC(__secondary_switched)
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
/*
* The booting CPU updates the failed status @__early_cpu_boot_status,
* with MMU turned off.
*
* update_early_cpu_boot_status tmp, status
* - Corrupts tmp1, tmp2
* - Writes 'status' to __early_cpu_boot_status and makes sure
* it is committed to memory.
*/
.macro update_early_cpu_boot_status status, tmp1, tmp2
mov \tmp2, #\status
adr_l \tmp1, __early_cpu_boot_status
str \tmp2, [\tmp1]
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
dmb sy
dc ivac, \tmp1 // Invalidate potentially stale cache line
.endm
/*
* Enable the MMU.
*
* x0 = SCTLR_EL1 value for turning on the MMU.
*
* Returns to the caller via x30/lr. This requires the caller to be covered
* by the .idmap.text section.
*
* Checks if the selected granule size is supported by the CPU.
* If it isn't, park the CPU
*/
ENTRY(__enable_mmu)
mrs x1, ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1
ubfx x2, x1, #ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN_SHIFT, 4
cmp x2, #ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN_SUPPORTED
b.ne __no_granule_support
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
update_early_cpu_boot_status 0, x1, x2
adrp x1, idmap_pg_dir
adrp x2, swapper_pg_dir
phys_to_ttbr x3, x1
phys_to_ttbr x4, x2
msr ttbr0_el1, x3 // load TTBR0
msr ttbr1_el1, x4 // load TTBR1
isb
msr sctlr_el1, x0
isb
/*
* Invalidate the local I-cache so that any instructions fetched
* speculatively from the PoC are discarded, since they may have
* been dynamically patched at the PoU.
*/
ic iallu
dsb nsh
isb
ret
ENDPROC(__enable_mmu)
__no_granule_support:
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
/* Indicate that this CPU can't boot and is stuck in the kernel */
update_early_cpu_boot_status CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL, x1, x2
1:
wfe
arm64: Handle early CPU boot failures A secondary CPU could fail to come online due to insufficient capabilities and could simply die or loop in the kernel. e.g, a CPU with no support for the selected kernel PAGE_SIZE loops in kernel with MMU turned off. or a hotplugged CPU which doesn't have one of the advertised system capability will die during the activation. There is no way to synchronise the status of the failing CPU back to the master. This patch solves the issue by adding a field to the secondary_data which can be updated by the failing CPU. If the secondary CPU fails even before turning the MMU on, it updates the status in a special variable reserved in the head.txt section to make sure that the update can be cache invalidated safely without possible sharing of cache write back granule. Here are the possible states : -1. CPU_MMU_OFF - Initial value set by the master CPU, this value indicates that the CPU could not turn the MMU on, hence the status could not be reliably updated in the secondary_data. Instead, the CPU has updated the status @ __early_cpu_boot_status. 0. CPU_BOOT_SUCCESS - CPU has booted successfully. 1. CPU_KILL_ME - CPU has invoked cpu_ops->die, indicating the master CPU to synchronise by issuing a cpu_ops->cpu_kill. 2. CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL - CPU couldn't invoke die(), instead is looping in the kernel. This information could be used by say, kexec to check if it is really safe to do a kexec reboot. 3. CPU_PANIC_KERNEL - CPU detected some serious issues which requires kernel to crash immediately. The secondary CPU cannot call panic() until it has initialised the GIC. This flag can be used to instruct the master to do so. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: conflict resolution] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: converted "status" from int to long] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated update_early_cpu_boot_status to use str_l] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-23 18:31:42 +08:00
wfi
b 1b
ENDPROC(__no_granule_support)
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
__relocate_kernel:
/*
* Iterate over each entry in the relocation table, and apply the
* relocations in place.
*/
ldr w9, =__rela_offset // offset to reloc table
ldr w10, =__rela_size // size of reloc table
mov_q x11, KIMAGE_VADDR // default virtual offset
add x11, x11, x23 // actual virtual offset
add x9, x9, x11 // __va(.rela)
add x10, x9, x10 // __va(.rela) + sizeof(.rela)
0: cmp x9, x10
arm64: relocatable: suppress R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations in vmlinux The linker routines that we rely on to produce a relocatable PIE binary treat it as a shared ELF object in some ways, i.e., it emits symbol based R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations into the final binary since doing so would be appropriate when linking a shared library that is subject to symbol preemption. (This means that an executable can override certain symbols that are exported by a shared library it is linked with, and that the shared library *must* update all its internal references as well, and point them to the version provided by the executable.) Symbol preemption does not occur for OS hosted PIE executables, let alone for vmlinux, and so we would prefer to get rid of these symbol based relocations. This would allow us to simplify the relocation routines, and to strip the .dynsym, .dynstr and .hash sections from the binary. (Note that these are tiny, and are placed in the .init segment, but they clutter up the vmlinux binary.) Note that these R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations are only emitted for absolute references to symbols defined in the linker script, all other relocatable quantities are covered by anonymous R_AARCH64_RELATIVE relocations that simply list the offsets to all 64-bit values in the binary that need to be fixed up based on the offset between the link time and run time addresses. Fortunately, GNU ld has a -Bsymbolic option, which is intended for shared libraries to allow them to ignore symbol preemption, and unconditionally bind all internal symbol references to its own definitions. So set it for our PIE binary as well, and get rid of the asoociated sections and the relocation code that processes them. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [will: fixed conflict with __dynsym_offset linker script entry] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-07-24 20:00:13 +08:00
b.hs 1f
ldp x11, x12, [x9], #24
ldr x13, [x9, #-8]
cmp w12, #R_AARCH64_RELATIVE
arm64: relocatable: suppress R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations in vmlinux The linker routines that we rely on to produce a relocatable PIE binary treat it as a shared ELF object in some ways, i.e., it emits symbol based R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations into the final binary since doing so would be appropriate when linking a shared library that is subject to symbol preemption. (This means that an executable can override certain symbols that are exported by a shared library it is linked with, and that the shared library *must* update all its internal references as well, and point them to the version provided by the executable.) Symbol preemption does not occur for OS hosted PIE executables, let alone for vmlinux, and so we would prefer to get rid of these symbol based relocations. This would allow us to simplify the relocation routines, and to strip the .dynsym, .dynstr and .hash sections from the binary. (Note that these are tiny, and are placed in the .init segment, but they clutter up the vmlinux binary.) Note that these R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations are only emitted for absolute references to symbols defined in the linker script, all other relocatable quantities are covered by anonymous R_AARCH64_RELATIVE relocations that simply list the offsets to all 64-bit values in the binary that need to be fixed up based on the offset between the link time and run time addresses. Fortunately, GNU ld has a -Bsymbolic option, which is intended for shared libraries to allow them to ignore symbol preemption, and unconditionally bind all internal symbol references to its own definitions. So set it for our PIE binary as well, and get rid of the asoociated sections and the relocation code that processes them. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [will: fixed conflict with __dynsym_offset linker script entry] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-07-24 20:00:13 +08:00
b.ne 0b
add x13, x13, x23 // relocate
str x13, [x11, x23]
b 0b
1: ret
ENDPROC(__relocate_kernel)
#endif
__primary_switch:
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
mov x19, x0 // preserve new SCTLR_EL1 value
mrs x20, sctlr_el1 // preserve old SCTLR_EL1 value
#endif
bl __enable_mmu
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
bl __relocate_kernel
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
ldr x8, =__primary_switched
adrp x0, __PHYS_OFFSET
blr x8
/*
* If we return here, we have a KASLR displacement in x23 which we need
* to take into account by discarding the current kernel mapping and
* creating a new one.
*/
arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041 The ARM architecture defines the memory locations that are permitted to be accessed as the result of a speculative instruction fetch from an exception level for which all stages of translation are disabled. Specifically, the core is permitted to speculatively fetch from the 4KB region containing the current program counter 4K and next 4K. When translation is changed from enabled to disabled for the running exception level (SCTLR_ELn[M] changed from a value of 1 to 0), the Falkor core may errantly speculatively access memory locations outside of the 4KB region permitted by the architecture. The errant memory access may lead to one of the following unexpected behaviors. 1) A System Error Interrupt (SEI) being raised by the Falkor core due to the errant memory access attempting to access a region of memory that is protected by a slave-side memory protection unit. 2) Unpredictable device behavior due to a speculative read from device memory. This behavior may only occur if the instruction cache is disabled prior to or coincident with translation being changed from enabled to disabled. The conditions leading to this erratum will not occur when either of the following occur: 1) A higher exception level disables translation of a lower exception level (e.g. EL2 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0). 2) An exception level disabling its stage-1 translation if its stage-2 translation is enabled (e.g. EL1 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0 when HCR_EL2[VM] has a value of 1). To avoid the errant behavior, software must execute an ISB immediately prior to executing the MSR that will change SCTLR_ELn[M] from 1 to 0. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-29 19:59:52 +08:00
pre_disable_mmu_workaround
msr sctlr_el1, x20 // disable the MMU
isb
bl __create_page_tables // recreate kernel mapping
tlbi vmalle1 // Remove any stale TLB entries
dsb nsh
msr sctlr_el1, x19 // re-enable the MMU
isb
ic iallu // flush instructions fetched
dsb nsh // via old mapping
isb
bl __relocate_kernel
#endif
#endif
ldr x8, =__primary_switched
adrp x0, __PHYS_OFFSET
br x8
ENDPROC(__primary_switch)