As we need to indicate to the rest of the kernel which region of
the HYP VA space is safe to use, add a capability that will
indicate that KVM should use the [VA_BITS-2:0] range.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
HYP_PAGE_OFFSET is not massively useful. And the way we use it
in KERN_HYP_VA is inconsistent with the equivalent operation in
EL2, where we use a mask instead.
Let's replace the uses of HYP_PAGE_OFFSET with HYP_PAGE_OFFSET_MASK,
and get rid of the pointless macro.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
hyp_kern_va is now completely unused, so let's remove it entirely.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
__hyp_panic_string is passed via the HYP panic code to the panic
function, and is being "upgraded" to a kernel address, as it is
referenced by the HYP code (in a PC-relative way).
This is a bit silly, and we'd be better off obtaining the kernel
address and not mess with it at all. This patch implements this
with a tiny bit of asm glue, by forcing the string pointer to be
read from the literal pool.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Since dealing with VA ranges tends to hurt my brain badly, let's
start with a bit of documentation that will hopefully help
understanding what comes next...
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
I don't think any single piece of the KVM/ARM code ever generated
as much hatred as the GIC emulation.
It was written by someone who had zero experience in modeling
hardware (me), was riddled with design flaws, should have been
scrapped and rewritten from scratch long before having a remote
chance of reaching mainline, and yet we supported it for a good
three years. No need to mention the names of those who suffered,
the git log is singing their praises.
Thankfully, we now have a much more maintainable implementation,
and we can safely put the grumpy old GIC to rest.
Fellow hackers, please raise your glass in memory of the GIC:
The GIC is dead, long live the GIC!
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Structures that can be generally written to don't have any requirement
to be executable (quite the opposite). This includes the kvm and vcpu
structures, as well as the stacks.
Let's change the default to incorporate the XN flag.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
There should be no reason for mapping the HYP text read/write.
As such, let's have a new set of flags (PAGE_HYP_EXEC) that allows
execution, but makes the page as read-only, and update the two call
sites that deal with mapping code.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
In order to be able to use C code in HYP, we're now mapping the kernel's
rodata in HYP. It works absolutely fine, except that we're mapping it RWX,
which is not what it should be.
Add a new HYP_PAGE_RO protection, and pass it as the protection flags
when mapping the rodata section.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
EL2 page tables can be configured to deny code from being
executed, which is done by setting bit 54 in the page descriptor.
It is the same bit as PTE_UXN, but the "USER" reference felt odd
in the hypervisor code.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Currently, create_hyp_mappings applies a "one size fits all" page
protection (PAGE_HYP). As we're heading towards separate protections
for different sections, let's make this protection a parameter, and
let the callers pass their prefered protection (PAGE_HYP for everyone
for the time being).
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
With an updated QEMU this allows to create nested KVM guests
(KVM under KVM) on s390.
s390 memory management changes from Martin Schwidefsky or
acked by Martin. One common code memory management change (pageref)
acked by Andrew Morton.
The feature has to be enabled with the nested medule parameter.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux)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=ubb/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'kvm-s390-next-4.8-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD
KVM: s390: vSIE (nested virtualization) feature for 4.8 (kvm/next)
With an updated QEMU this allows to create nested KVM guests
(KVM under KVM) on s390.
s390 memory management changes from Martin Schwidefsky or
acked by Martin. One common code memory management change (pageref)
acked by Andrew Morton.
The feature has to be enabled with the nested medule parameter.
Let's be careful first and allow nested virtualization only if enabled
by the system administrator. In addition, user space still has to
explicitly enable it via SCLP features for it to work.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We have certain SIE features that we cannot support for now.
Let's add these features, so user space can directly prepare to enable
them, so we don't have to update yet another component.
In addition, add a comment block, telling why it is for now not possible to
forward/enable these features.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Guest 2 sets up the epoch of guest 3 from his point of view. Therefore,
we have to add the guest 2 epoch to the guest 3 epoch. We also have to take
care of guest 2 epoch changes on STP syncs. This will work just fine by
also updating the guest 3 epoch when a vsie_block has been set for a VCPU.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Whenever a SIGP external call is injected via the SIGP external call
interpretation facility, the VCPU is not kicked. When a VCPU is currently
in the VSIE, the external call might not be processed immediately.
Therefore we have to provoke partial execution exceptions, which leads to a
kick of the VCPU and therefore also kick out of VSIE. This is done by
simulating the WAIT state. This bit has no other side effects.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As we want to make use of CPUSTAT_WAIT also when a VCPU is not idle but
to force interception of external calls, let's check in the bitmap instead.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Whenever we want to wake up a VCPU (e.g. when injecting an IRQ), we
have to kick it out of vsie, so the request will be handled faster.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can avoid one unneeded SIE entry after we reported a fault to g2.
Theoretically, g2 resolves the fault and we can create the shadow mapping
directly, instead of failing again when entering the SIE.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily enable ibs for guest 2, so he can use it for guest 3.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily enable cei for guest 2, so he can use it for guest 3.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily enable intervention bypass for guest 2, so it can use it
for guest 3.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily forward guest-storage-limit-suppression if available.
One thing to care about is keeping the prefix properly mapped when
gsls in toggled on/off or the mso changes in between. Therefore we better
remap the prefix on any mso changes just like we already do with the
prefix.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily forward the guest-PER-enhancement facility to guest 2 if
available.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As we forward the whole SCA provided by guest 2, we can directly forward
SIIF if available.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Let's provide the 64-bit-SCAO facility to guest 2, so he can set up a SCA
for guest 3 that has a 64 bit address. Please note that we already require
the 64 bit SCAO for our vsie implementation, in order to forward the SCA
directly (by pinning the page).
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As soon as guest 2 is allowed to use run-time-instrumentation (indicated
via via STFLE), it can also enable it for guest 3.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As soon as guest 2 is allowed to use the vector facility (indicated via
STFLE), it can also enable it for guest 3. We have to take care of the
sattellite block that might be used when not relying on lazy vector
copying (not the case for KVM).
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As soon as guest 2 is allowed to use transactional execution (indicated via
STFLE), he can also enable it for guest 3.
Active transactional execution requires also the second prefix page to be
mapped. If that page cannot be mapped, a validity icpt has to be presented
to the guest.
We have to take care of tx being toggled on/off, otherwise we might get
wrong prefix validity icpt.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As soon as message-security-assist extension 3 is enabled for guest 2,
we have to allow key wrapping for guest 3.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Issuing STFLE is extremely rare. Instead of copying 2k on every
VSIE call, let's do this lazily, when a guest 3 tries to execute
STFLE. We can setup the block and retry.
Unfortunately, we can't directly forward that facility list, as
we only have a 31 bit address for the facility list designation.
So let's use a DMA allocation for our vsie_page instead for now.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Introduced with ESOP, therefore available for the guest if it
is allowed to use ESOP.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If guest 2 is allowed to use edat 1 / edat 2, it can also set it up for
guest 3, so let's properly check and forward the edat cpuflags.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As soon as we forward an ibc to guest 2 (indicated via
kvm->arch.model.ibc), he can also use it for guest 3. Let's properly round
the ibc up/down, so we avoid any potential validity icpts from the
underlying SIE, if it doesn't simply round the values.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
In order to not always map the prefix, we have to take care of certain
aspects that implicitly unmap the prefix:
- Changes to the prefix address
- Changes to MSO, because the HVA of the prefix is changed
- Changes of the gmap shadow (e.g. unshadowed, asce or edat changes)
By properly handling these cases, we can stop remapping the prefix when
there is no reason to do so.
This also allows us now to not acquire any gmap shadow locks when
rerunning the vsie and still having a valid gmap shadow.
Please note, to detect changing gmap shadows, we have to keep the reference
of the gmap shadow. The address of a gmap shadow does otherwise not
reliably indicate if the gmap shadow has changed (the memory chunk
could get reused).
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
This patch adds basic support for nested virtualization on s390x, called
VSIE (virtual SIE) and allows it to be used by the guest if the necessary
facilities are supported by the hardware and enabled for the guest.
In order to make this work, we have to shadow the sie control block
provided by guest 2. In order to gain some performance, we have to
reuse the same shadow blocks as good as possible. For now, we allow
as many shadow blocks as we have VCPUs (that way, every VCPU can run the
VSIE concurrently).
We have to watch out for the prefix getting unmapped out of our shadow
gmap and properly get the VCPU out of VSIE in that case, to fault the
prefix pages back in. We use the PROG_REQUEST bit for that purpose.
This patch is based on an initial prototype by Tobias Elpelt.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Let's introduce that helper.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Nested virtualization will have to enable own gmaps. Current code
would enable the wrong gmap whenever scheduled out and back in,
therefore resulting in the wrong gmap being enabled.
This patch reenables the last enabled gmap, therefore avoiding having to
touch vcpu->arch.gmap when enabling a different gmap.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The default kvm gmap notifier doesn't have to handle shadow gmaps.
So let's just directly exit in case we get notified about one.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Let's not fault in everything in read-write but limit it to read-only
where possible.
When restricting access rights, we already have the required protection
level in our hands. When reading from guest 2 storage (gmap_read_table),
it is obviously PROT_READ. When shadowing a pte, the required protection
level is given via the guest 2 provided pte.
Based on an initial patch by Martin Schwidefsky.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
It will be very helpful to have a mechanism to check without any locks
if a given gmap shadow is still valid and matches the given properties.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
For nested virtualization, we want to know if we are handling a protection
exception, because these can directly be forwarded to the guest without
additional checks.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We have no known user of real-space designation and only support it to
be architecture compliant.
Gmap shadows with real-space designation are never unshadowed
automatically, as there is nothing to protect for the top level table.
So let's simply limit the number of such shadows to one by removing
existing ones on creation of another one.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily support real-space designation just like EDAT1 and EDAT2.
So guest2 can provide for guest3 an asce with the real-space control being
set.
We simply have to allocate the biggest page table possible and fake all
levels.
There is no protection to consider. If we exceed guest memory, vsie code
will inject an addressing exception (via program intercept). In the future,
we could limit the fake table level to the gmap page table.
As the top level page table can never go away, such gmap shadows will never
get unshadowed, we'll have to come up with another way to limit the number
of kept gmap shadows.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Just like we already do with ste protection, let's take rte protection
into account. This way, the host pte doesn't have to be mapped writable.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If the guest is enabled for EDAT2, we can easily create shadows for
guest2 -> guest3 provided tables that make use of EDAT2.
If guest2 references a 2GB page, this memory looks consecutive for guest2,
but it does not have to be so for us. Therefore we have to create fake
segment and page tables.
This works just like EDAT1 support, so page tables are removed when the
parent table (r3t table entry) is changed.
We don't hve to care about:
- ACCF-Validity Control in RTTE
- Access-Control Bits in RTTE
- Fetch-Protection Bit in RTTE
- Common-Region Bit in RTTE
Just like for EDAT1, all bits might be dropped and there is no guaranteed
that they are active.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If the guest is enabled for EDAT1, we can easily create shadows for
guest2 -> guest3 provided tables that make use of EDAT1.
If guest2 references a 1MB page, this memory looks consecutive for guest2,
but it might not be so for us. Therefore we have to create fake page tables.
We can easily add that to our existing infrastructure. The invalidation
mechanism will make sure that fake page tables are removed when the parent
table (sgt table entry) is changed.
As EDAT1 also introduced protection on all page table levels, we have to
also shadow these correctly.
We don't have to care about:
- ACCF-Validity Control in STE
- Access-Control Bits in STE
- Fetch-Protection Bit in STE
- Common-Segment Bit in STE
As all bits might be dropped and there is no guaranteed that they are
active ("unpredictable whether the CPU uses these bits", "may be used").
Without using EDAT1 in the shadow ourselfes (STE-format control == 0),
simply shadowing these bits would not be enough. They would be ignored.
Please note that we are using the "fake" flag to make this look consistent
with further changes (EDAT2, real-space designation support) and don't let
the shadow functions handle fc=1 stes.
In the future, with huge pages in the host, gmap_shadow_pgt() could simply
try to map a huge host page if "fake" is set to one and indicate via return
value that no lower fake tables / shadow ptes are required.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
In preparation for EDAT1/EDAT2 support for gmap shadows, we have to store
the requested edat level in the gmap shadow.
The edat level used during shadow translation is a property of the gmap
shadow. Depending on that level, the gmap shadow will look differently for
the same guest tables. We have to store it internally in order to support
it later.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If a guest ste is read-only, it doesn't make sense to force the ptes in as
writable in the host. If the source page is read-only in the host, it won't
have to be made writable. Please note that if the source page is not
available, it will still be faulted in writable. This can be changed
internally later on.
If ste protection is removed, underlying shadow tables are also removed,
therefore this change does not affect the guest.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Marc Zyngier