rtas_parse_epow_errlog() should pass 'modifier' to
handle_system_shutdown, because event modifier only use
bottom 4 bits.
Reviewed-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191023134838.21280-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
On the 8xx, signals are generated after executing the instruction. So
no need to manually single-step on 8xx. Also, 8xx __set_dabr()
currently ignores length and hardcodes the length to 8 bytes. So all
unaligned and 512 byte testcase will fail on 8xx. Ignore those
testcases on 8xx.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-8-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
So far we used to ignore exception if DAR points outside of user
specified range. But now we are ignoring it only if actual load/store
range does not overlap with user specified range. Include selftests
for the same:
# ./tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/perf-hwbreak
...
TESTED: No overlap
TESTED: Partial overlap
TESTED: Partial overlap
TESTED: No overlap
TESTED: Full overlap
success: perf_hwbreak
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-7-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
ptrace-hwbreak.c selftest is logically broken. On powerpc, when
watchpoint is created with ptrace, signals are generated before
executing the instruction and user has to manually singlestep the
instruction with watchpoint disabled, which selftest never does and
thus it keeps on getting the signal at the same instruction. If we fix
it, selftest fails because the logical connection between
tracer(parent) and tracee(child) is also broken. Rewrite the selftest
and add new tests for unaligned access.
With patch:
$ ./tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-hwbreak
test: ptrace-hwbreak
tags: git_version:powerpc-5.3-4-224-g218b868240c7-dirty
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, WO, len: 1: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, WO, len: 2: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, WO, len: 4: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, WO, len: 8: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RO, len: 1: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RO, len: 2: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RO, len: 4: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RO, len: 8: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RW, len: 1: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RW, len: 2: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RW, len: 4: Ok
PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG, RW, len: 8: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_EXACT, WO, len: 1: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_EXACT, RO, len: 1: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_EXACT, RW, len: 1: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW ALIGNED, WO, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW ALIGNED, RO, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW ALIGNED, RW, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW UNALIGNED, WO, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW UNALIGNED, RO, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW UNALIGNED, RW, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, MODE_RANGE, DW UNALIGNED, DAR OUTSIDE, RW, len: 6: Ok
PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG, DAWR_MAX_LEN, RW, len: 512: Ok
success: ptrace-hwbreak
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-6-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
On powerpc, watchpoint match range is double-word granular. On a
watchpoint hit, DAR is set to the first byte of overlap between actual
access and watched range. And thus it's quite possible that DAR does
not point inside user specified range. Ex, say user creates a
watchpoint with address range 0x1004 to 0x1007. So hw would be
configured to watch from 0x1000 to 0x1007. If there is a 4 byte access
from 0x1002 to 0x1005, DAR will point to 0x1002 and thus interrupt
handler considers it as extraneous, but it's actually not, because
part of the access belongs to what user has asked.
Instead of blindly ignoring the exception, get actual address range by
analysing an instruction, and ignore only if actual range does not
overlap with user specified range.
Note: The behavior is unchanged for 8xx.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-5-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
ptrace_set_debugreg() does not consider new length while overwriting
the watchpoint. Fix that. ppc_set_hwdebug() aligns watchpoint address
to doubleword boundary but does not change the length. If address
range is crossing doubleword boundary and length is less then 8, we
will lose samples from second doubleword. So fix that as well.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-4-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
Watchpoint match range is always doubleword(8 bytes) aligned on
powerpc. If the given range is crossing doubleword boundary, we need
to increase the length such that next doubleword also get
covered. Ex,
address len = 6 bytes
|=========.
|------------v--|------v--------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---------------|
<---8 bytes--->
In such case, current code configures hw as:
start_addr = address & ~HW_BREAKPOINT_ALIGN
len = 8 bytes
And thus read/write in last 4 bytes of the given range is ignored.
Fix this by including next doubleword in the length.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-3-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
The issue was showing "Mitigation" message via sysfs whatever the
state of "RFI Flush", but it should show "Vulnerable" when it is
disabled.
If you have "L1D private" feature enabled and not "RFI Flush" you are
vulnerable to meltdown attacks.
"RFI Flush" is the key feature to mitigate the meltdown whatever the
"L1D private" state.
SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV is a feature for Power9 only.
So the message should be as the truth table shows:
CPU | L1D private | RFI Flush | sysfs
----|-------------|-----------|-------------------------------------
P9 | False | False | Vulnerable
P9 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush
P9 | True | False | Vulnerable: L1D private per thread
P9 | True | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
P8 | False | False | Vulnerable
P8 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush
Output before this fix:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: L1D private per thread
Output after fix:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Vulnerable: L1D private per thread
Signed-off-by: Gustavo L. F. Walbon <gwalbon@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190502210907.42375-1-gwalbon@linux.ibm.com
The stress test for vpmsum implementations executes a long for loop in
the kernel. This blocks the scheduler, which prevents other tasks from
running, resulting in a warning.
This fix adds a call to cond_reshed() at the end of each loop, which
allows the scheduler to run other tasks as required.
Signed-off-by: Chris Smart <chris.smart@humanservices.gov.au>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191103233356.5472-1-chris.smart@humanservices.gov.au
Let's allow to test the implementation without needing HW support.
When "simulate=1" is specified when loading the module, we bypass all
HW checks and HW calls. The sysfs file "simulate_loan_target_kb" can
be used to simulate HW requests.
The simualtion mode can be activated using:
modprobe cmm debug=1 simulate=1
And the requested loan target can be changed using:
echo X > /sys/devices/system/cmm/cmm0/simulate_loan_target_kb
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-11-david@redhat.com
balloon_page_alloc() will use GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE in case we have
CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION. This is now possible, as balloon pages are
movable with CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION. Without
CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION, GFP_HIGHUSER is used.
Note that apart from that, balloon_page_alloc() uses the following
flags:
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN
And current code used:
GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC
GFP_HIGHUSER/GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE include
__GFP_RECLAIM | __GFP_IO | __GFP_FS | __GFP_HARDWALL | __GFP_HIGHMEM
GFP_NOIO is __GFP_RECLAIM.
With CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION, we essentially add:
__GFP_IO | __GFP_FS | __GFP_HARDWALL | __GFP_HIGHMEM | __GFP_MOVABLE
Without CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION, we essentially add:
__GFP_IO | __GFP_FS | __GFP_HARDWALL | __GFP_HIGHMEM
I assume this is fine, as this is what all other balloon compaction
users use. If it turns out to be a problem, we could add __GFP_MOVABLE
manually if we have CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-10-david@redhat.com
We can now get rid of the cmm_lock and completely rely on the balloon
compaction internals, which now also manage the page list and the
lock.
Inflated/"loaned" pages are now movable. Memory blocks that contain
such pages can get offlined. Also, all such pages will be marked
PageOffline() and can therefore be excluded in memory dumps using
recent versions of makedumpfile.
Don't switch to balloon_page_alloc() yet (due to the GFP_NOIO). Will
do that separately to discuss this change in detail.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[mpe: Add isolated_pages-- in cmm_migratepage() as suggested by David]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-9-david@redhat.com
When switching to balloon compaction, we want to drop the cmm_lock and
completely rely on the balloon compaction list lock internally.
loaned_pages is currently protected under the cmm_lock.
Note: Right now cmm_alloc_pages() and cmm_free_pages() can be called
at the same time, e.g., via the thread and a concurrent OOM notifier.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-8-david@redhat.com
The memory isolate notifier was added to allow to offline memory
blocks that contain inflated/"loaned" pages. We can achieve the same
using the balloon compaction framework.
Get rid of the memory isolate notifier. Also, we can get rid of
cmm_mem_going_offline(), as we will never reach that code path now
when we have allocated memory in the balloon (allocated pages are
unmovable and will no longer be special-cased using the memory
isolation notifier).
Leave the memory notifier in place, so we can still back off in case
memory gets offlined.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-7-david@redhat.com
adjust_managed_page_count() performs a totalram_pages_add(), but also
adjusts the managed pages of the zone. Let's use that instead, similar
to virtio-balloon. Use it before freeing a page.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-6-david@redhat.com
We can simply store the pages in a list (page->lru), no need for a
separate data structure (+ complicated handling). This is how most
other balloon drivers store allocated pages without additional
tracking data.
For the notifiers, use page_to_pfn() to check if a page is in the
applicable range. Use page_to_phys() in plpar_page_set_loaned() and
plpar_page_set_active() (I assume due to the __pa() that's the right
thing to do).
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-5-david@redhat.com
When unloading the module, one gets
------------[ cut here ]------------
Device 'cmm0' does not have a release() function, it is broken and must be fixed. See Documentation/kobject.txt.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 19308 at drivers/base/core.c:1244 .device_release+0xcc/0xf0
...
We only have one static fake device. There is nothing to do when
releasing the device (via cmm_exit()).
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-2-david@redhat.com
Advertise client support for the PAPR architected ibm,drc-info device
tree property during CAS handshake.
Fixes: c7a3275e0f ("powerpc/pseries: Revert support for ibm,drc-info devtree property")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-11-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
The newer ibm,drc-info property is a condensed description of the old
ibm,drc-* properties (ie. names, types, indexes, and power-domains).
When matching a drc-index to a drc-name we need to verify that the
index is within the start and last drc-index range and map it to a
drc-name using the drc-name-prefix and logical index.
Fix the mapping by checking that the index is within the range of the
current drc-info entry, and build the name from the drc-name-prefix
concatenated with the starting drc-name-suffix value and the sequential
index obtained by subtracting ibm,my-drc-index from this entries
drc-start-index.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-10-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
The device tree is in big endian format and any properties directly
retrieved using OF helpers that don't explicitly byte swap should
be annotated. In particular there are several places where we grab
the opaque property value for the old ibm,drc-* properties and the
ibm,my-drc-index property.
Fix this for better static checking by annotating values we know to
explicitly big endian, and byte swap where appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-9-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Split physical PCI slot registration scanning into separate routines
that support the old ibm,drc-* properties and one that supports the
new compressed ibm,drc-info property.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-7-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
In the event that the partition is migrated to a platform with older
firmware that doesn't support the ibm,drc-info property the device
tree is modified to remove the ibm,drc-info property and replace it
with the older style ibm,drc-* properties for types, names, indexes,
and power-domains. One of the requirements of the drc-info firmware
feature is that the client is able to handle both the new property,
and old style properties at runtime. Therefore we can't rely on the
firmware feature alone to dictate which property is currently
present in the device tree.
Fix this short coming by checking explicitly for the ibm,drc-info
property, and falling back to the older ibm,drc-* properties if it
doesn't exist.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-6-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
The first entry of the ibm,drc-info property is an int encoded count
of the number of drc-info entries that follow. The "value" pointer
returned by of_prop_next_u32() is still pointing at the this value
when we call of_read_drc_info_cell(), but the helper function
expects that value to be pointing at the first element of an entry.
Fix up by incrementing the "value" pointer to point at the first
element of the first drc-info entry prior.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-5-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Older firmwares provided information about Dynamic Reconfig
Connectors (DRC) through several device tree properties, namely
ibm,drc-types, ibm,drc-indexes, ibm,drc-names, and
ibm,drc-power-domains. New firmwares have the ability to present this
same information in a much condensed format through a device tree
property called ibm,drc-info.
The existing cpu DLPAR hotplug code only understands the older DRC
property format when validating the drc-index of a cpu during a
hotplug add. This updates those code paths to use the ibm,drc-info
property, when present, instead for validation.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-4-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
There are a couple subtle errors in the mapping between cpu-ids and a
cpus associated drc-index when using the new ibm,drc-info property.
The first is that while drc-info may have been a supported firmware
feature at boot it is possible we have migrated to a CEC with older
firmware that doesn't support the ibm,drc-info property. In that case
the device tree would have been updated after migration to remove the
ibm,drc-info property and replace it with the older style ibm,drc-*
properties for types, indexes, names, and power-domains. PAPR even
goes as far as dictating that if we advertise support for drc-info
that we are capable of supporting either property type at runtime.
The second is that the first value of the ibm,drc-info property is
the int encoded count of drc-info entries. As such "value" returned
by of_prop_next_u32() is pointing at that count, and not the first
element of the first drc-info entry as is expected by the
of_read_drc_info_cell() helper.
Fix the first by ignoring DRC-INFO firmware feature and instead
testing directly for ibm,drc-info, and then falling back to the
old style ibm,drc-indexes in the case it doesn't exit.
Fix the second by incrementing value to the next element prior to
parsing drc-info entries.
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-3-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
The ibm,drc-info property is an array property that contains drc-info
entries such that each entry is made up of 2 string encoded elements
followed by 5 int encoded elements. The of_read_drc_info_cell()
helper contains comments that correctly name the expected elements
and their encoding. However, the usage of of_prop_next_string() and
of_prop_next_u32() introduced a subtle skippage of the first u32.
This is a result of of_prop_next_string() returning a pointer to the
next property value which is not a string, but actually a (__be32 *).
As, a result the following call to of_prop_next_u32() passes over the
current int encoded value and actually stores the next one wrongly.
Simply endian swap the current value in place after reading the first
two string values. The remaining int encoded values can then be read
correctly using of_prop_next_u32().
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-2-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Merge the secureboot support, as well as the IMA changes needed to
support it.
From Nayna's cover letter:
In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV systems, secure boot
requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform. These are
stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, called OPAL secure
variables. In order to enable users to manage the keys, the secure
variables need to be exposed to userspace.
OPAL provides the runtime services for the kernel to be able to
access the secure variables. This patchset defines the kernel
interface for the OPAL APIs. These APIs are used by the hooks, which
load these variables to the keyring and expose them to the userspace
for reading/writing.
Overall, this patchset adds the following support:
* expose secure variables to the kernel via OPAL Runtime API interface
* expose secure variables to the userspace via kernel sysfs interface
* load kernel verification and revocation keys to .platform and
.blacklist keyring respectively.
The secure variables can be read/written using simple linux
utilities cat/hexdump.
For example:
Path to the secure variables is: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars
Each secure variable is listed as directory.
$ ls -l
total 0
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 db
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 KEK
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 PK
The attributes of each of the secure variables are (for example: PK):
$ ls -l
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:10 data
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Oct 1 15:10 size
--w-------. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:12 update
The "data" is used to read the existing variable value using
hexdump. The data is stored in ESL format. The "update" is used to
write a new value using cat. The update is to be submitted as AUTH
file.
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel
verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to
be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.
This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV
secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating
the keys stored in the secure variables.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure
boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are
controlled by OPAL.
This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL
secure variables based on the unique key.
This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Make secvar_ops __ro_after_init, only build opal-secvar.c if PPC_SECURE_BOOT=y]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-2-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
From Nayna's cover letter:
The IMA subsystem supports custom, built-in, arch-specific policies
to define the files to be measured and appraised. These policies are
honored based on priority, where arch-specific policy is the highest
and custom is the lowest.
PowerNV systems use a Linux-based bootloader to kexec the OS. The
bootloader kernel relies on IMA for signature verification of the OS
kernel before doing the kexec. This patchset adds support for
powerpc arch-specific IMA policies that are conditionally defined
based on a system's secure boot and trusted boot states. The OS
secure boot and trusted boot states are determined via device-tree
properties.
The verification needs to be performed only for binaries that are
not blacklisted. The kernel currently only checks against the
blacklist of keys. However, doing so results in blacklisting all the
binaries that are signed by the same key. In order to prevent just
one particular binary from being loaded, it must be checked against
a blacklist of binary hashes. This patchset also adds support to IMA
for checking against a hash blacklist for files. signed by appended
signature.
The arch specific kernel module policy rule requires kernel modules to
be signed, either as an IMA signature, stored as an xattr, or as an
appended signature. As a result, kernel modules appended signatures
could be enforced without "sig_enforce" being set or reflected in
/sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce. This patch sets
"sig_enforce".
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to
make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel
currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the
public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will
automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key
is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a
particular file.
This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of
the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It
defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist".
In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware
"dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted
binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following
example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash.
$ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
kernel/kheaders.ko
$ grep BLACKLIST .config
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list"
$ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list
"bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3"
Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy
rules (/etc/ima-policy):
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel:
545660333 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist:
bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied
10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko
10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko sha256:77fa889b3
5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648
016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264....
10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf
sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132
b blacklisted-hash
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
The -EKEYREJECTED error returned by existing is_hash_blacklisted() is
misleading when called for checking against blacklisted hash of a
binary.
This patch adds a wrapper function is_binary_blacklisted() to return
-EPERM error if binary is blacklisted.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
process_buffer_measurement() is limited to measuring the kexec boot
command line. This patch makes process_buffer_measurement() more
generic, allowing it to measure other types of buffer data (e.g.
blacklisted binary hashes or key hashes).
process_buffer_measurement() may be called directly from an IMA hook
or as an auxiliary measurement record. In both cases the buffer
measurement is based on policy. This patch modifies the function to
conditionally retrieve the policy defined PCR and template for the IMA
hook case.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: added comment in process_buffer_measurement()]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a
combined secure and trusted boot policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be
booted, trusted boot calculates the file hash of the kernel image and
stores the measurement prior to boot, that can be subsequently
compared against good known values via attestation services.
This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state
is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the
IMA arch-specific policies.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e9eeee6b-b9bf-1e41-2954-61dbd6fbfbcf@linux.ibm.com
PowerNV systems use a Linux-based bootloader, which rely on the IMA
subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the
verification policy may differ based on the secure boot mode of the
system, the policies must be defined at runtime.
This patch implements arch-specific support to define IMA policy rules
based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system.
This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
config is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
This patch defines a function to detect the secure boot state of a
PowerNV system.
The PPC_SECURE_BOOT config represents the base enablement of secure
boot for powerpc.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Fold in change from Nayna to add "ibm,secureboot" to ids]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/46b003b9-3225-6bf7-9101-ed6580bb748c@linux.ibm.com
This operation takes a significant amount of time when hotplugging
large amounts of memory (~50 seconds with 890GB of persistent memory).
This was orignally in commit fb5924fddf
("powerpc/mm: Flush cache on memory hot(un)plug") to support memtrace,
but the flush on add is not needed as it is flushed on remove.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-7-alastair@au1.ibm.com
When presented with large amounts of memory being hotplugged
(in my test case, ~890GB), the call to flush_dcache_range takes
a while (~50 seconds), triggering RCU stalls.
This patch breaks up the call into 1GB chunks, calling
cond_resched() inbetween to allow the scheduler to run.
Fixes: fb5924fddf ("powerpc/mm: Flush cache on memory hot(un)plug")
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-6-alastair@au1.ibm.com
Similar to commit 22e9c88d48
("powerpc/64: reuse PPC32 static inline flush_dcache_range()")
this patch converts the following ASM symbols to C:
flush_icache_range()
__flush_dcache_icache()
__flush_dcache_icache_phys()
This was done as we discovered a long-standing bug where the length of the
range was truncated due to using a 32 bit shift instead of a 64 bit one.
By converting these functions to C, it becomes easier to maintain.
flush_dcache_icache_phys() retains a critical assembler section as we must
ensure there are no memory accesses while the data MMU is disabled
(authored by Christophe Leroy). Since this has no external callers, it has
also been made static, allowing the compiler to inline it within
flush_dcache_icache_page().
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
[mpe: Minor fixups, don't export __flush_dcache_icache()]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-5-alastair@au1.ibm.com
This patch adds helpers to retrieve icache sizes, and renames the existing
helpers to make it clear that they are for dcache.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-4-alastair@au1.ibm.com
When calling __kernel_sync_dicache with a size >4GB, we were masking
off the upper 32 bits, so we would incorrectly flush a range smaller
than intended.
This patch replaces the 32 bit shifts with 64 bit ones, so that
the full size is accounted for.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-3-alastair@au1.ibm.com
YueHaibing