We have a bunch of magic that mounts the correct view of storage
access based on the runtime permissions of an app, but we forgot to
protect the real underlying data sources; oops.
This series of changes just bumps the directory heirarchy one level
to give us /mnt/runtime which we can mask off as 0700 to prevent
people from jumping to the exposed internals.
Also add CTS tests to verify that we're protecting access to
internal mount points like this.
Bug: 22964288
Change-Id: I32068e63a3362b37e8ebca1418f900bb8537b498
Long ago, we mounted secondary physical cards as readable by all
users on the device, which enabled the use-case of loading media on
a card and viewing it from all users.
More recently, we started giving write access to these secondary
physical cards, but this created a one-directional channel for
communication across user boundaries; something that CDD disallows.
This change is designed to give us the best of both worlds: the
package-specific directories are writable for the user that mounted
the card, but access to those "Android" directories are blocked for
all other users. Other users remain able to read content elsewhere
on the card.
Bug: 22787184
Change-Id: I4a04a1a857a65becf5fd37d775d927af022b40ca
Required by logd on devices with USE_CPUSETS defined.
Make /dev/cpuset/background, /dev/cpuset/foreground and
/dev/cpuset/task writeable by system gid. Add logd to system
group for writing to cpuset files and to root group to avoid
regressions. When dropping privs, also drop supplementary groups.
Bug: 22699101
Change-Id: Icc01769b18b5e1f1649623da8325a8bfabc3a3f0
The cfs tunables auto-scale with the number of active cpus by default. Given
that the tunable settings are in device-independent code and it's not
known how many cores are currently active when the init.rc file runs,
the cfs tunables can vary pretty significantly across devices depending
on the state at boot. Disable scaling of the the tunables so that we
can get more consistent behavior of cfs across devices. If we want to
do per-device tuning of these values, we can override what's written
here in device specific files.
Bug: 22634118
Change-Id: Id19b24ef819fef762521e75af55e6d4378cfc949
Instead of having each view build and maintain its own tree
representing the underlying storage, switch to building a single tree
that each view augments with GID/mode specific behavior.
This has the nice property of a single file always having the same
node ID when presented across multiple views, giving us a firm handle
that we can use to invalidate kernel caches.
Specifically, when a file is deleted through one view, we now tell
the kernel to invalidate that file in the other two views.
Bug: 22477678, 22375891
Change-Id: I3ff041d549d41040839cde9773504719a508219f
We need to have partition.*.verified properties even when bootloader
is managing dm-verity mode, because we may have failed to set up the
verified partition and need a property to indicate this.
This means we still need to run fs_mgr_update_verity_state and walk
through all the partitions to verify the device mapper status, just
without updating verity mode.
Bug: 22489805
Bug: 22507568
Change-Id: Iaf28185adb8b80e5452447e54e1f4e4417a34168
(cherry picked from commit 2f42554f18)
Require gralloc accept flexible YUV when SW READ/WRITE usage is
set. Also decouple flexible YUV from camera usage flag.
Bug: 22379456
Change-Id: I5a82a8360b08036c31dc03cd639d449ba1e3ed01
Using a getenv('OUT') in such a deep down function is a wrong design
choice. Replacing with explicit parameter that may be NULL in case
device specific files can be accessed from /.
Since TARGET_COPY_OUT_SYSTEM may be defined to something different than
system we also ensure that we use a path relative to TARGET_OUT to
compute path to fs_config_* files.
Bug: 21989305
Bug: 22048934
Change-Id: Id91bc183b29beac7379d1117ad83bd3346e6897b
Signed-off-by: Thierry Strudel <tstrudel@google.com>
If verity state is managed by bootloader, it will pass the verity
mode to the kernel in the androidboot.veritymode command line
parameter. Init copies the value to the ro.boot.veritymode property.
Check for ro.boot.veritymode in fs_mgr and use the value to set
dm-verity mode. If this property is not set, store verity state in
metadata as before, if a storage location is specified in fstab.
Bug: 21605676
Change-Id: Ife3c978c133248432c302583d3b70e179605fe42
(cherry picked from commit ac5c1224cf)
File level encryption must get the key between mounting userdata and
calling post_fs_data when the directories are created. This requires
access to keymaster, which in turn is found from a system property.
Split property loaded into system and data, and load in right order.
Bug: 22233063
Mark Salyzyn