linux_old1/include/net/scm.h

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#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
* to accept passed FDs 8)
*/
#define SCM_MAX_FD 253
struct scm_creds {
u32 pid;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
};
struct scm_fp_list {
short count;
short max;
struct user_struct *user;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
struct scm_cookie {
struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#endif
};
void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
scm->creds.uid = uid;
scm->creds.gid = gid;
}
static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
put_pid(scm->pid);
scm->pid = NULL;
}
static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
scm_destroy_cred(scm);
if (scm->fp)
__scm_destroy(scm);
}
static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
{
af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default Since commit 7361c36c5224 (af_unix: Allow credentials to work across user and pid namespaces) af_unix performance dropped a lot. This is because we now take a reference on pid and cred in each write(), and release them in read(), usually done from another process, eventually from another cpu. This triggers false sharing. # Events: 154K cycles # # Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol # ........ ....... .................. ......................... # 10.40% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] put_pid 8.60% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_recvmsg 7.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_sendmsg 6.11% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] do_raw_spin_lock 4.95% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_scm_to_skb 4.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] pid_nr_ns 4.34% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] cred_to_ucred 2.39% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_destruct_scm 2.24% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sub_preempt_count 1.75% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fget_light 1.51% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __mutex_lock_interruptible_slowpath 1.42% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sock_alloc_send_pskb This patch includes SCM_CREDENTIALS information in a af_unix message/skb only if requested by the sender, [man 7 unix for details how to include ancillary data using sendmsg() system call] Note: This might break buggy applications that expected SCM_CREDENTIAL from an unaware write() system call, and receiver not using SO_PASSCRED socket option. If SOCK_PASSCRED is set on source or destination socket, we still include credentials for mere write() syscalls. Performance boost in hackbench : more than 50% gain on a 16 thread machine (2 quad-core cpus, 2 threads per core) hackbench 20 thread 2000 4.228 sec instead of 9.102 sec Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-09-19 13:52:27 +08:00
memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID;
scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID;
if (forcecreds)
scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid());
unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
return 0;
return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
}
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
}
}
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
}
#else
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
{
if (!msg->msg_control) {
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || scm->fp)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
scm_destroy(scm);
return;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
struct ucred ucreds = {
.pid = scm->creds.pid,
.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
};
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
}
scm_destroy_cred(scm);
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
if (!scm->fp)
return;
scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
}
#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */