WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2840 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10966 nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
CPU: 3 PID: 2840 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE 4.12.0-rc3+ #23
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
? kvm_check_async_pf_completion+0xef/0x120 [kvm]
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
? vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1171/0x1ce0 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x47/0x240 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x62/0x240 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xf3/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? __fget+0x114/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x220
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
This is triggered occasionally by running both win7 and win2016 in L2, in
addition, EPT is disabled on both L1 and L2. It can't be reproduced easily.
Commit 0b6ac343fc (KVM: nVMX: Correct handling of exception injection) mentioned
that "KVM wants to inject page-faults which it got to the guest. This function
assumes it is called with the exit reason in vmcs02 being a #PF exception".
Commit e011c663 (KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to
L2) allows to check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2. However,
there is no guarantee the exit reason is exception currently, when there is an
external interrupt occurred on host, maybe a time interrupt for host which should
not be injected to guest, and somewhere queues an exception, then the function
nested_vmx_check_exception() will be called and the vmexit emulation codes will
try to emulate the "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior, the warning is
triggered.
Reusing the exit reason from the L2->L0 vmexit is wrong in this case,
the reason must always be EXCEPTION_NMI when injecting an exception into
L1 as a nested vmexit.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Fixes: e011c663b9 ("KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() will return 0 if userspace is
single-stepping the guest.
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() uses return status convention of exit
handler: 0 means "exit to userspace" and 1 means "continue vm entries".
The problem is that nested_vmx_check_vmptr() return status means
something else: 0 is ok, 1 is error.
This means we would continue executing after a failure. Static checker
noticed it because vmptr was not initialized.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 6affcbedca ("KVM: x86: Add kvm_skip_emulated_instruction and use it.")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The decision whether or not to exit from L2 to L1 on an lmsw instruction is
based on bogus values: instead of using the information encoded within the
exit qualification, it uses the data also used for the mov-to-cr
instruction, which boils down to using whatever is in %eax at that point.
Use the correct values instead.
Without this fix, an L1 may not get notified when a 32-bit Linux L2
switches its secondary CPUs to protected mode; the L1 is only notified on
the next modification of CR0. This short time window poses a problem, when
there is some other reason to exit to L1 in between. Then, L2 will be
resumed in real mode and chaos ensues.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We can observe eptad kvm_intel module parameter is still Y
even if ept is disabled which is weird. This patch will
not enable EPT A/D feature if EPT feature is disabled.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
There are PML_ENTITY_NUM elements in the pml_address[] array so the >
should be >= or we write beyond the end of the array when we do:
pml_address[vmcs12->guest_pml_index--] = gpa;
Fixes: c5f983f6e8 ("nVMX: Implement emulated Page Modification Logging")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Advertise the PML bit in vmcs12 but don't try to enable
it in hardware when running L2 since L0 is emulating it. Also,
preserve L0's settings for PML since it may still
want to log writes.
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
With EPT A/D enabled, processor access to L2 guest
paging structures will result in a write violation.
When this happens, write the GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS
to the pml buffer provided by L1 if the access is
write and the dirty bit is being set.
This patch also adds necessary checks during VMEntry if L1
has enabled PML. If the PML index overflows, we change the
exit reason and run L1 to simulate a PML full event.
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
According to the SDM, the CR3-target count must not be greater than
4. Future processors may support a different number of CR3-target
values. Software should read the VMX capability MSR IA32_VMX_MISC to
determine the number of values supported.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
support; virtual interrupt controller performance improvements; support
for userspace virtual interrupt controller (slower, but necessary for
KVM on the weird Broadcom SoCs used by the Raspberry Pi 3)
* MIPS: basic support for hardware virtualization (ImgTec
P5600/P6600/I6400 and Cavium Octeon III)
* PPC: in-kernel acceleration for VFIO
* s390: support for guests without storage keys; adapter interruption
suppression
* x86: usual range of nVMX improvements, notably nested EPT support for
accessed and dirty bits; emulation of CPL3 CPUID faulting
* generic: first part of VCPU thread request API; kvm_stat improvements
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- HYP mode stub supports kexec/kdump on 32-bit
- improved PMU support
- virtual interrupt controller performance improvements
- support for userspace virtual interrupt controller (slower, but
necessary for KVM on the weird Broadcom SoCs used by the Raspberry
Pi 3)
MIPS:
- basic support for hardware virtualization (ImgTec P5600/P6600/I6400
and Cavium Octeon III)
PPC:
- in-kernel acceleration for VFIO
s390:
- support for guests without storage keys
- adapter interruption suppression
x86:
- usual range of nVMX improvements, notably nested EPT support for
accessed and dirty bits
- emulation of CPL3 CPUID faulting
generic:
- first part of VCPU thread request API
- kvm_stat improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
kvm: nVMX: Don't validate disabled secondary controls
KVM: put back #ifndef CONFIG_S390 around kvm_vcpu_kick
Revert "KVM: Support vCPU-based gfn->hva cache"
tools/kvm: fix top level makefile
KVM: x86: don't hold kvm->lock in KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING
KVM: Documentation: remove VM mmap documentation
kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks
KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions
KVM: mark requests that need synchronization
KVM: return if kvm_vcpu_wake_up() did wake up the VCPU
KVM: add explicit barrier to kvm_vcpu_kick
KVM: perform a wake_up in kvm_make_all_cpus_request
KVM: mark requests that do not need a wakeup
KVM: remove #ifndef CONFIG_S390 around kvm_vcpu_wake_up
KVM: x86: always use kvm_make_request instead of set_bit
KVM: add kvm_{test,clear}_request to replace {test,clear}_bit
s390: kvm: Cpu model support for msa6, msa7 and msa8
KVM: x86: remove irq disablement around KVM_SET_CLOCK/KVM_GET_CLOCK
kvm: better MWAIT emulation for guests
KVM: x86: virtualize cpuid faulting
...
According to the SDM, if the "activate secondary controls" primary
processor-based VM-execution control is 0, no checks are performed on
the secondary processor-based VM-execution controls.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main x86 MM changes in this cycle were:
- continued native kernel PCID support preparation patches to the TLB
flushing code (Andy Lutomirski)
- various fixes related to 32-bit compat syscall returning address
over 4Gb in applications, launched from 64-bit binaries - motivated
by C/R frameworks such as Virtuozzo. (Dmitry Safonov)
- continued Intel 5-level paging enablement: in particular the
conversion of x86 GUP to the generic GUP code. (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- x86/mpx ABI corner case fixes/enhancements (Joerg Roedel)
- ... plus misc updates, fixes and cleanups"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (62 commits)
mm, zone_device: Replace {get, put}_zone_device_page() with a single reference to fix pmem crash
x86/mm: Fix flush_tlb_page() on Xen
x86/mm: Make flush_tlb_mm_range() more predictable
x86/mm: Remove flush_tlb() and flush_tlb_current_task()
x86/vm86/32: Switch to flush_tlb_mm_range() in mark_screen_rdonly()
x86/mm/64: Fix crash in remove_pagetable()
Revert "x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation"
x86/boot/e820: Remove a redundant self assignment
x86/mm: Fix dump pagetables for 4 levels of page tables
x86/mpx, selftests: Only check bounds-vs-shadow when we keep shadow
x86/mpx: Correctly report do_mpx_bt_fault() failures to user-space
Revert "x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()"
x86/espfix: Add support for 5-level paging
x86/kasan: Extend KASAN to support 5-level paging
x86/mm: Add basic defines/helpers for CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
x86/paravirt: Add 5-level support to the paravirt code
x86/mm: Define virtual memory map for 5-level paging
x86/asm: Remove __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT==47 assert
x86/boot: Detect 5-level paging support
x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()
...
According to the Intel SDM, "Certain exceptions have priority over VM
exits. These include invalid-opcode exceptions, faults based on
privilege level*, and general-protection exceptions that are based on
checking I/O permission bits in the task-state segment (TSS)."
There is no need to check for faulting conditions that the hardware
has already checked.
* These include faults generated by attempts to execute, in
virtual-8086 mode, privileged instructions that are not recognized
in that mode.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Users were expected to use kvm_check_request() for testing and clearing,
but request have expanded their use since then and some users want to
only test or do a faster clear.
Make sure that requests are not directly accessed with bit operations.
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Guests that are heavy on futexes end up IPI'ing each other a lot. That
can lead to significant slowdowns and latency increase for those guests
when running within KVM.
If only a single guest is needed on a host, we have a lot of spare host
CPU time we can throw at the problem. Modern CPUs implement a feature
called "MWAIT" which allows guests to wake up sleeping remote CPUs without
an IPI - thus without an exit - at the expense of never going out of guest
context.
The decision whether this is something sensible to use should be up to the
VM admin, so to user space. We can however allow MWAIT execution on systems
that support it properly hardware wise.
This patch adds a CAP to user space and a KVM cpuid leaf to indicate
availability of native MWAIT execution. With that enabled, the worst a
guest can do is waste as many cycles as a "jmp ." would do, so it's not
a privilege problem.
We consciously do *not* expose the feature in our CPUID bitmap, as most
people will want to benefit from sleeping vCPUs to allow for over commit.
Reported-by: "Gabriel L. Somlo" <gsomlo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
[agraf: fix amd, change commit message]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
vmm_exclusive=0 leads to KVM setting X86_CR4_VMXE always and calling
VMXON only when the vcpu is loaded. X86_CR4_VMXE is used as an
indication in cpu_emergency_vmxoff() (called on kdump) if VMXOFF has to be
called. This is obviously not the case if both are used independtly.
Calling VMXOFF without a previous VMXON will result in an exception.
In addition, X86_CR4_VMXE is used as a mean to test if VMX is already in
use by another VMM in hardware_enable(). So there can't really be
co-existance. If the other VMM is prepared for co-existance and does a
similar check, only one VMM can exist. If the other VMM is not prepared
and blindly sets/clears X86_CR4_VMXE, we will get inconsistencies with
X86_CR4_VMXE.
As we also had bug reports related to clearing of vmcs with vmm_exclusive=0
this seems to be pretty much untested. So let's better drop it.
While at it, directly move setting/clearing X86_CR4_VMXE into
kvm_cpu_vmxon/off.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
I have introduced this bug when applying and simplifying Paolo's patch
as we agreed on the list. The original was "x &= ~y; if (z) x |= y;".
Here is the story of a bad workflow:
A maintainer was already testing with the intended change, but it was
applied only to a testing repo on a different machine. When the time
to push tested patches to kvm/next came, he realized that this change
was missing and quickly added it to the maintenance repo, didn't test
again (because the change is trivial, right), and pushed the world to
fire.
Fixes: ae1e2d1082 ("kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Now use bit 6 of EPTP to optionally enable A/D bits for EPTP. Another
thing to change is that, when EPT accessed and dirty bits are not in use,
VMX treats accesses to guest paging structures as data reads. When they
are in use (bit 6 of EPTP is set), they are treated as writes and the
corresponding EPT dirty bit is set. The MMU didn't know this detail,
so this patch adds it.
We also have to fix up the exit qualification. It may be wrong because
KVM sets bit 6 but the guest might not.
L1 emulates EPT A/D bits using write permissions, so in principle it may
be possible for EPT A/D bits to be used by L1 even though not available
in hardware. The problem is that guest page-table walks will be treated
as reads rather than writes, so they would not cause an EPT violation.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[Fixed typo in walk_addr_generic() comment and changed bit clear +
conditional-set pattern in handle_ept_violation() to conditional-clear]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
handle_ept_violation is checking for "guest-linear-address invalid" +
"not a paging-structure walk". However, _all_ EPT violations without
a valid guest linear address are paging structure walks, because those
EPT violations happen when loading the guest PDPTEs.
Therefore, the check can never be true, and even if it were, KVM doesn't
care about the guest linear address; it only uses the guest *physical*
address VMCS field. So, remove the check altogether.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Large pages at the PDPE level can be emulated by the MMU, so the bit
can be set unconditionally in the EPT capabilities MSR. The same is
true of 2MB EPT pages, though all Intel processors with EPT in practice
support those.
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Virtual NMIs are only missing in Prescott and Yonah chips. Both are obsolete
for virtualization usage---Yonah is 32-bit only even---so drop vNMI emulation.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Let's combine it in a single function vmx_switch_vmcs().
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
According to the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 28.3.2: Creating and
Using Cached Translation Information, "No linear mappings are used
while EPT is in use." INVEPT will invalidate both the guest-physical
mappings and the combined mappings in the TLBs and paging-structure
caches, so an INVVPID is superfluous.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
L2 was running with uninitialized PML fields which led to incomplete
dirty bitmap logging. This manifested as all kinds of subtle erratic
behavior of the nested guest.
Fixes: 843e433057 ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The PML feature is not exposed to guests so we should not be forwarding
the vmexit either.
This commit fixes BSOD 0x20001 (HYPERVISOR_ERROR) when running Hyper-V
enabled Windows Server 2016 in L1 on hardware that supports PML.
Fixes: 843e433057 ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The nested_ept_enabled flag introduced in commit 7ca29de213 was not
computed correctly. We are interested only in L1's EPT state, not the
the combined L0+L1 value.
In particular, if L0 uses EPT but L1 does not, nested_ept_enabled must
be false to make sure that PDPSTRs are loaded based on CR3 as usual,
because the special case described in 26.3.2.4 Loading Page-Directory-
Pointer-Table Entries does not apply.
Fixes: 7ca29de213 ("KVM: nVMX: fix CR3 load if L2 uses PAE paging and EPT")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This can be reproduced by running L2 on L1, and disable VPID on L0
if w/o commit "KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control", the L2
crash as below:
KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0x7
EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000306c3
ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000
EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00
SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200
TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00
GDT= 00000000 0000ffff
IDT= 00000000 0000ffff
CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000
DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000
DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400
EFER=0000000000000000
Reference SDM 30.3 INVVPID:
Protected Mode Exceptions
- #UD
- If not in VMX operation.
- If the logical processor does not support VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=0).
- If the logical processor supports VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=1) but does
not support the INVVPID instruction (IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP[32]=0).
So we should check both VPID enable bit in vmx exec control and INVVPID support bit
in vmx capability MSRs to enable VPID. This patch adds the guarantee to not enable
VPID if either INVVPID or single-context/all-context invalidation is not exposed in
vmx capability MSRs.
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This can be reproduced by running kvm-unit-tests/vmx.flat on L0 w/ vpid disabled.
Test suite: VPID
Unhandled exception 6 #UD at ip 00000000004051a6
error_code=0000 rflags=00010047 cs=00000008
rax=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000001 rdx=0000000000000047 rbx=0000000000402f79
rbp=0000000000456240 rsi=0000000000000001 rdi=0000000000000000
r8=000000000000000a r9=00000000000003f8 r10=0000000080010011 r11=0000000000000000
r12=0000000000000003 r13=0000000000000708 r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
cr0=0000000080010031 cr2=0000000000000000 cr3=0000000007fff000 cr4=0000000000002020
cr8=0000000000000000
STACK: @4051a6 40523e 400f7f 402059 40028f
We should hide and forbid VPID in L1 if it is disabled on L0. However, nested VPID
enable bit is set unconditionally during setup nested vmx exec controls though VPID
is not exposed through nested VMX capablity. This patch fixes it by don't set nested
VPID enable bit if it is disabled on L0.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c614b3583 (KVM: nVMX: nested VPID emulation)
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Quoting from the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 28.3.3.4: Guidelines for
Use of the INVEPT Instruction:
If EPT was in use on a logical processor at one time with EPTP X, it
is recommended that software use the INVEPT instruction with the
"single-context" INVEPT type and with EPTP X in the INVEPT descriptor
before a VM entry on the same logical processor that enables EPT with
EPTP X and either (a) the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution
control was changed from 0 to 1; or (b) the value of the APIC-access
address was changed.
In the nested case, the burden falls on L1, unless L0 enables EPT in
vmcs02 when L1 doesn't enable EPT in vmcs12.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
There's a single caller that is only there because it's passing a
pointer into a function (vmcs_writel()) that takes an unsigned long.
Let's just cast it in place rather than having a bunch of trivial
helpers.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/46108fb35e1699252b1b6a85039303ff562c9836.1490218061.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
kvm mmu is reset once successfully loading CR3 as part of emulating vmentry
in nested_vmx_load_cr3(). We should not reset kvm mmu twice.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
This patch makes the GDT remapped pages read-only, to prevent accidental
(or intentional) corruption of this key data structure.
This change is done only on 64-bit, because 32-bit needs it to be writable
for TSS switches.
The native_load_tr_desc function was adapted to correctly handle a
read-only GDT. The LTR instruction always writes to the GDT TSS entry.
This generates a page fault if the GDT is read-only. This change checks
if the current GDT is a remap and swap GDTs as needed. This function was
tested by booting multiple machines and checking hibernation works
properly.
KVM SVM and VMX were adapted to use the writeable GDT. On VMX, the
per-cpu variable was removed for functions to fetch the original GDT.
Instead of reloading the previous GDT, VMX will reload the fixmap GDT as
expected. For testing, VMs were started and restored on multiple
configurations.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Luis R . Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314170508.100882-3-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Before trying to do nested_get_page() in nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(),
we have already checked that the MSR bitmap address is valid (4k aligned
and within physical limits). SDM doesn't specify what happens if the
there is no memory mapped at the valid address, but Intel CPUs treat the
situation as if the bitmap was configured to trap all MSRs.
KVM already does that by returning false and a correct handling doesn't
need the guest-trigerrable warning that was reported by syzkaller:
(The warning was originally there to catch some possible bugs in nVMX.)
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7832 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7832 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709
nested_get_vmcs12_pages+0xfb6/0x15c0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9640
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 7832 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #229
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51
panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179
__warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:540
warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:583
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709 [inline]
nested_get_vmcs12_pages+0xfb6/0x15c0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9640
enter_vmx_non_root_mode arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10471 [inline]
nested_vmx_run+0x6186/0xaab0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10561
handle_vmlaunch+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:7312
vmx_handle_exit+0xfc0/0x3f00 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:8526
vcpu_enter_guest arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6982 [inline]
vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7044 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1418/0x4840 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7205
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x673/0x1120 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2570
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
[Jim Mattson explained the bare metal behavior: "I believe this behavior
would be documented in the chipset data sheet rather than the SDM,
since the chipset returns all 1s for an unclaimed read."]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
VMCLEAR should silently ignore a failure to clear the launch state of
the VMCS referenced by the operand.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
[Changed "kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm" to "kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu".]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
L2 fails to boot on a non-APICv box dues to 'commit 0ad3bed6c5
("kvm: nVMX: move nested events check to kvm_vcpu_running")'
KVM internal error. Suberror: 3
extra data[0]: 800000ef
extra data[1]: 1
RAX=0000000000000000 RBX=ffffffff81f36140 RCX=0000000000000000 RDX=0000000000000000
RSI=0000000000000000 RDI=0000000000000000 RBP=ffff88007c92fe90 RSP=ffff88007c92fe90
R8 =ffff88007fccdca0 R9 =0000000000000000 R10=00000000fffedb3d R11=0000000000000000
R12=0000000000000003 R13=0000000000000000 R14=0000000000000000 R15=ffff88007c92c000
RIP=ffffffff810645e6 RFL=00000246 [---Z-P-] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000
CS =0010 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00a09b00 DPL=0 CS64 [-RA]
SS =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000
DS =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000
FS =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000
GS =0000 ffff88007fcc0000 ffffffff 00c00000
LDT=0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000
TR =0040 ffff88007fcd4200 00002087 00008b00 DPL=0 TSS64-busy
GDT= ffff88007fcc9000 0000007f
IDT= ffffffffff578000 00000fff
CR0=80050033 CR2=00000000ffffffff CR3=0000000001e0a000 CR4=003406e0
DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000
DR6=00000000fffe0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400
EFER=0000000000000d01
We should try to reinject previous events if any before trying to inject
new event if pending. If vmexit is triggered by L2 guest and L0 interested
in, we should reinject IDT-vectoring info to L2 through vmcs02 if any,
otherwise, we can consider new IRQs/NMIs which can be injected and call
nested events callback to switch from L2 to L1 if needed and inject the
proper vmexit events. However, 'commit 0ad3bed6c5 ("kvm: nVMX: move
nested events check to kvm_vcpu_running")' results in the handle events
order reversely on non-APICv box. This patch fixes it by bailing out for
pending events and not consider new events in this scenario.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Fixes: 0ad3bed6c5 ("kvm: nVMX: move nested events check to kvm_vcpu_running")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The pointer 'struct desc_struct *d' is unused since commit 8c2e41f7ae
("x86/kvm/vmx: Simplify segment_base()") so let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Lefaure <jeremy.lefaure@lse.epita.fr>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Guest segment selector is 16 bit field and guest segment base is natural
width field. Fix two incorrect invocations accordingly.
Without this patch, build fails when aggressive inlining is used with ICC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Intel's VMX is daft and resets the hidden TSS limit register to 0x67
on VMX reload, and the 0x67 is not configurable. KVM currently
reloads TR using the LTR instruction on every exit, but this is quite
slow because LTR is serializing.
The 0x67 limit is entirely harmless unless ioperm() is in use, so
defer the reload until a task using ioperm() is actually running.
Here's some poorly done benchmarking using kvm-unit-tests:
Before:
cpuid 1313
vmcall 1195
mov_from_cr8 11
mov_to_cr8 17
inl_from_pmtimer 6770
inl_from_qemu 6856
inl_from_kernel 2435
outl_to_kernel 1402
After:
cpuid 1291
vmcall 1181
mov_from_cr8 11
mov_to_cr8 16
inl_from_pmtimer 6457
inl_from_qemu 6209
inl_from_kernel 2339
outl_to_kernel 1391
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
[Force-reload TR in invalidate_tss_limit. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use actual pointer types for pointers (instead of unsigned long) and
replace hardcoded constants with the appropriate self-documenting
macros.
The function is still a bit messy, but this seems a lot better than
before to me.
This is mostly borrowed from a patch by Thomas Garnier.
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It was a bit buggy (it didn't list all segment types that needed
64-bit fixups), but the bug was irrelevant because it wasn't called
in any interesting context on 64-bit kernels and was only used for
data segents on 32-bit kernels.
To avoid confusion, make it explicitly 32-bit only.
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The current CPU's TSS base is a foregone conclusion, so there's no need
to parse it out of the segment tables. This should save a couple cycles
(as STR is surely microcoded and poorly optimized) but, more importantly,
it's a cleanup and it means that segment_base() will never be called on
64-bit kernels.
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
handle_vmon gets a reference on VMXON region page,
but does not release it. Release the reference.
Found by syzkaller; based on a patch by Dmitry.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The FPU is always active now when running KVM.
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Nested_vmx_run is split into two parts: the part that handles the
VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instruction, and the part that modifies the vcpu state
to transition from VMX root mode to VMX non-root mode. The latter will
be used when restoring the checkpointed state of a vCPU that was in VMX
operation when a snapshot was taken.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The checks performed on the contents of the vmcs12 are extracted from
nested_vmx_run so that they can be used to validate a vmcs12 that has
been restored from a checkpoint.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
[Change prepare_vmcs02 and nested_vmx_load_cr3's last argument to u32,
to match check_vmentry_postreqs. Update comments for singlestep
handling. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Perform the checks on vmcs12 state early, but defer the gpa->hpa lookups
until after prepare_vmcs02. Later, when we restore the checkpointed
state of a vCPU in guest mode, we will not be able to do the gpa->hpa
lookups when the restore is done.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Wanpeng Li